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Regulatory Conformance Checking: Logic and Logical Form
Abstract
We consider the problem of checking whether an organization conforms to a body of regulation.
Conformance is studied in a runtime verification setting. The regulation is translated to a logic, from which we
synthesize monitors. The monitors are evaluated as the state of an organization evolves over time, raising an
alarm if a violation is detected. An important challenge to this approach comes from the fact that regulations
are commonly expressed in natural language. The translation to logic is difficult. Our goal is to assist in this
translation by: (a) the design of logics that let us formalize regulation one sentence at a time, and (b) the use
of natural language processing as an aid in the sentential translation.
There are many features that are needed in a logic, to accommodate a sentential translation of regulation. We
study two features, motivated by a case study. First, statements in regulation refer to others for conditions or
exceptions. Second, sentences in regulation convey legal concepts, e.g., obligation and permission. Obligations
and permissions can be nested to convey concepts, such as, rights. We motivate and design a logic to
accomodate these two features of regulatory texts. The common theme is the importance of the notion of
{\em saying} in such constructs.
We begin by extending linear temporal logic to allow statements to refer to others. Inter-sentential references
are expressed via the use of a predicate, called "says", whose interpretation is determined by inferences from
laws. The "says" predicate offers a unified analysis of various kinds of inter-sentential references, e.g., priorities
of exceptions over rules, and references to definitions or list items.
We then augment the logic with obligation and permission, by considering problems in access control and
conformance. Saying and permission are combined using an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf
of another. The combination yields benefits to both applications. For access control, we overcome the
problematic interactions between hand-off and classical reasoning. For conformance, we obtain a
characterization of legal power by nesting saying with obligation and permission. A useful fragment of the
logic has a polynomial time decision procedure.
Finally, we turn to the use of natural language processing to translate a sentence to logic. We study one
component of the translation in a supervised learning setting. Linguistic theories have argued for a level of
logical form as a prelude to translating a sentence into logic. Logical form encodes a resolution of scope
ambiguties. We define a restricted kind of logical form, called abstract syntax trees (ASTs), based on the logic
developed. Guidelines for annotating ASTs are formulated, using a case study of the Food and Drug
Administration's Code of Federal Regulations.
We describe experiments on a modest-sized corpus, of about 200 sentences, annotated with ASTs. The main
step in computing ASTs is the ordering or ranking of operators. We adapt a learning model for ranking to
order operators. Features are designed by studying subproblems, such as, disambiguating between de re and
de dicto interpretations. We obtain an F-score of 90.6% on the set of pairwise ordering decisions.
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ABSTRACT
REGULATORY CONFORMANCE CHECKING: LOGIC AND LOGICAL FORM
Nikhil Dinesh
Aravind K. Joshi and Insup Lee
We consider the problem of checking whether an organization conforms to a body
of regulation. Conformance is studied in a runtime verification setting. The regula-
tion is translated to a logic, from which we synthesize monitors. The monitors are
evaluated as the state of an organization evolves over time, raising an alarm if a vio-
lation is detected. An important challenge to this approach comes from the fact that
regulations are commonly expressed in natural language. The translation to logic is
difficult. Our goal is to assist in this translation by: (a) the design of logics that let
us formalize regulation one sentence at a time, and (b) the use of natural language
processing as an aid in the sentential translation.
There are many features that are needed in a logic, to accommodate a sentential
translation of regulation. We study two features, motivated by a case study. First,
statements in regulation refer to others for conditions or exceptions. Second, sentences
in regulation convey legal concepts, e.g., obligation and permission. Obligations and
permissions can be nested to convey concepts, such as, rights. We motivate and
design a logic to accomodate these two features of regulatory texts. The common
theme is the importance of the notion of saying in such constructs.
We begin by extending linear temporal logic to allow statements to refer to oth-
ers. Inter-sentential references are expressed via the use of a predicate, called says,
whose interpretation is determined by inferences from laws. The says predicate of-
fers a unified analysis of various kinds of inter-sentential references, e.g., priorities of
exceptions over rules, and references to definitions or list items.
We then augment the logic with obligation and permission, by considering prob-
lems in access control and conformance. Saying and permission are combined using
an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf of another. The combination
v
yields benefits to both applications. For access control, we overcome the problematic
interactions between hand-off and classical reasoning. For conformance, we obtain a
characterization of legal power by nesting saying with obligation and permission. A
useful fragment of the logic has a polynomial time decision procedure.
Finally, we turn to the use of natural language processing to translate a sentence
to logic. We study one component of the translation in a supervised learning setting.
Linguistic theories have argued for a level of logical form as a prelude to translating a
sentence into logic. Logical form encodes a resolution of scope ambiguties. We define
a restricted kind of logical form, called abstract syntax trees (ASTs), based on the
logic developed. Guidelines for annotating ASTs are formulated, using a case study
of the Food and Drug Administration’s Code of Federal Regulations.
We describe experiments on a modest-sized corpus, of about 200 sentences, an-
notated with ASTs. The main step in computing ASTs is the ordering or ranking
of operators. We adapt a learning model for ranking to order operators. Features
are designed by studying subproblems, such as, disambiguating between de re and de
dicto interpretations. We obtain an F-score of 90.6% on the set of pairwise ordering
decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Regulations, laws, and policies that affect many aspects of our lives are represented
predominantly as documents in natural language. For example, the Food and Drug
Administration’s Code of Federal Regulations [144] (FDA CFR) governs the opera-
tions of American bloodbanks. Bloodbanks are organizations that collect, store, test,
and ultimately, ship donations of blood to their intended recepients. The CFR is
framed by experts in the field of medicine, and regulates the tests that need to be
performed on donations of blood before they are used. Bloodbanks, in turn, maintain
records of the donations, donors, and the tests performed, to demostrate conformance
to the CFR. In such safety-critical scenarios, it is desirable to assess formally whether
an organization (bloodbank) conforms to the regulation (CFR).
There is a growing interest in using formal methods to assist organizations in
complying with regulation in a variety of contexts. Examples include privacy policy [6,
10, 12, 25, 74, 101] and the broader problem of access control [1–3, 33, 50, 51, 93],
and business contracts [4, 54, 56, 60, 62, 88]. Assisting an organization in compliance
involves a number of tasks related to the notion of a violation. For example, it is of
interest to detect or prevent violations, assign blame, and if possible, recover from
violations. In this thesis, we focus on conformance checking which involves detecting
the presence of violations and assigning blame in the case of a violation.
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We begin, in Section 1.1, by describing the kinds of regulations that we examine in
this work. Section 1.2 gives an informal definition of conformance in legal terms. We
then cast conformance as a runtime verification question (Section 1.3). In Section 1.4,
we narrow our focus to the problem of translating regulation to logic. We conclude,
in Section 1.5, with a discussion of the contributions and organization of this thesis.
1.1 Kinds of Regulations Studied Here
Regulations are used in a wide variety of contexts. Different contexts give rise to
differing salient notions, which need to be accommodated by a conformance checking
solution. For example, in privacy regulation, we need to reason about delegations of
trust, where an individual permits another to access her private information. Business
contracts have complex interactions with time, e.g., the delivery of goods within a
time frame under different contracts.
While we attempt to identify general problems and solutions, our methods are
undoubtedly influenced by the specific regulations that we have examined. We briefly
describe the regulations studied here. Broader applicability is an empirical question
for further research.
The main regulatory corpus studied here is the Food and Drug Administration’s
Code of Federal Regulations [144] (FDA CFR). The CFR is divided into sections
that apply to different organizations. Our focus has been on section 610 of the CFR,
which applies to bloodbanks.
While the CFR provides many challenges, each section of the CFR usually applies
to a single organization. New problems arise when mutiple parties are involved. To
study these problems, we consider examples from privacy regulation and the broader
problem of access control. An example of privacy regulation is the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act [143] (HIPAA), which regulates the collection and
disclosure of patient health information by health-care providers. HIPAA has a rich
vocabulary of rights, which pose many interesting challenges in assessing conformance.
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Jural Privilege Claim Power Immunity
Opposites Duty No-Claim Disability Liability
Jural Claim Privilege Power Immunity
Correlatives Duty No-Claim Liability Disability
Table 1.1: Hohfeld’s Fundamental Legal Conceptions
1.2 Conformance - A Definition
Conformance is a legal notion, and hence, it needs to be defined in legal terms. Ho-
hfeld [69], in his seminal work in 1913, identified a set of fundamental legal concep-
tions, which remain well-accepted to this day. Hohfeld starts by relating the notions
in a scheme of “opposites” and “correlatives”, as shown in Table 1.1.1 We will now
define each of the terms informally, starting with duty:
Definition 1.1 (Duty [69, Page 32]). A duty or legal obligation is that which one
ought or ought not to do.
Duties are easily understood, e.g., “the duty of a bloodbank to test a donation of
blood”. Henceforth, we use the term obligation instead of duty, because the former
is used in logics for regulation.
Claims are defined in terms of obligations, i.e., when a claim is invaded, an obli-
gation is violated. As an example, a patient has a claim that a hospital notify her of
disclosures of her health information. And, the claim is equivalent to an obligation
of the hospital to notify her. Next, we define the notion of privilege:
1Hohfeld uses the word “right” instead of “claim”, but suggests the latter may be a better term
[69, Page 32]. In particular, he observes that the term “right” is used indiscriminately to cover what
in a given case may be a privilege, a power or an immunity [69, Page 30]. We believe that this
ambiguity persists, as evidenced by the continuing debate in jurisprudence. We will discuss example
regulations where “right” is used in different senses.
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Definition 1.2 (Privilege [69, Page 32]). A privilege is the negation of an obligation,
i.e., the negation of an obligation having content or tenor precisely opposite to that
of the the privilege in question.
For example, a hospital has the privilege to disclose patient health information in
emergency situations. Henceforth, we use the term permission instead of privilege,
again due to its adoption by logics for regulation. It has been observed that this
definition of permission is incomplete from a logical perspective (cf. [23]), and we will
have reason to revisit it. The concept of “no-claim” is the correlative of permission,
e.g., a patient has no claim against disclosures in an emergency. We now define power:
Definition 1.3 (Power [69, Page 44]). A person (or persons) may be said to have the
power to effect a particular change in legal relations, if the change in legal relations
results from some superadded facts which are under his volitional control.
For example, a company may have the power to create contractual obligations.
Liability is the correlative, i.e., a duty that is caused by the exercise of power. Dis-
ability and immunity are easily understood using the negation of power and liability,
resply.
Which of these terms should factor into a definition of conformance? In this work,
we explore the idea that obligation is the only fundamental legal conception. All other
conceptions are derived. Conformance is defined as follows:
Definition 1.4 (Conformance). An individual or organization conforms to a body of
regulation, if and only if, she satisfies all the obligations that are imposed on her.
This definition of conformance is relatively uncontroversial, if powers, liabilities,
and their negations are excluded. Following Ross [130], we will analyse permissions
as exceptions to obligations. Claim and no-claim are easily defined using obligation
and permission. We analyse powers and disabilities using nested obligations and
permissions, e.g., “permitted to require”, “permitted to permit”. While this analysis
has some precedent in logic (see Lindahl [95, Part II], and Jones and Sergot [74]),
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there are several open problems in theory and practice. We defer a discussion of the
advantages and limitations of our approach to Chapter 4. A formalization of liability
and immunity is left to future work, because these concepts are not prevalent in the
kinds of regulations that we examine.
1.3 Conformance at Runtime
Given our definition of conformance, it is natural to cast it as a problem of verifica-
tion, i.e., to show that a system (organization) satisfies its specification (obligations).
There are a variety of techniques for verification, e.g., theorem proving [20], model
checking [34], testing [115], and runtime verification [92].
Our choice of runtime verification is motivated by the kinds of organizations that
we examine. Many aspects of a bloodbank’s or hospital’s operations do not involve
computers. A complete description of operations (as needed for theorem proving or
model checking) has to include a model of human users, which is a research problem
in its own right that is well beyond the scope of this work. Given the need to
demonstrate conformance, such organizations maintain a record of the operations
that they perform. The evolution of records are easily described as a run. We note
that if a finite-state model of an organization can be created, the propositional version
of the logics developed here can be adapted to work with available model-checkers.
Figure 1.3 gives an overview of the checking process. From the regulation, we
obtain a set of atomic symbols, which are used to translate the regulation to logic.
Monitors are synthesized from the logic. An organization, such as a bloodbank,
generates events, which are changes in the valuations of the atomic symbols. The
monitors are evaluated using the events, and output violations, if any. The shaded
circles are those which require manual intervention. When a violation is detected,
the problem could be in one of three places – (a) the organization’s operations, (b)
the logical representation of regulation, or (c) the regulation itself.
There are several challenging aspects with the process in Figure 1.3. A complete
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Figure 1.1: Conformance checking as runtime verification
solution is well-beyond the scope of this thesis. In the following section, we narrow
our focus to the problem of translating regulation to logic.
1.4 Translating Regulation to Logic
An important challenge with the process in Figure 1.3 is the translation of regulation
to logic, and it is the central focus of this work. We take the approach of translating
regulation to logic one sentence at a time. A practical motivation for a sentential
translation is to aid in error-diagnosis. When a violation is detected, it is helpful to
associate it with a sentence in regulation, and its translation to logic. In Chapter 2,
we argue, using examples and lexical statistics, that a sentential translation eases the
difficulty in translating regulation to logic.
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There are two difficulties in sententially translating regulation to logic. First, the
logic needs to be expressive enough to accomodate a sentential translation. One of the
goals of this thesis is to design logics to handle frequently occuring constructs in reg-
ulation. The second difficulty is independent of the sentential aspect of our approach.
Regulatory bodies are large and complex. Manually translating each sentence to logic
is a difficult task. A long term goal of this work is to use natural language processing
(NLP) techniques to assist in the translation. In the short term, we set ourselves
the more modest goal of identifying subproblems on which NLP techniques can be
brought to bear. We now describe the common architecture (in linguistics and NLP)
for translating sentences to logic, and narrow our focus to a particular component in
the translation.
1.4.1 Translating a Sentence to Logic Using NLP
The translation of sentences in natural language to logic (with a correspondence at
the phrase or word-level) has been of interest for several years in linguistics (cf. [67]),
and more recently in NLP [24, 149, 150]. While there are different (proposed and
implemented) architectures for such systems, they typically consist of the components
shown in Figure 1.4.1.
The various steps in Figure 1.4.1 are best understood using an example. Let
us consider the procedure for translating the sentence (1) to the first-order logic
statement in (2):
(1) Everyone ate an apple.
(2) ∀x : person(x) ⇒ (∃y : apple(y) ∧ ate(x, y))
We start with a grammar or ontology which associates words or phrases (in a lexicon)
with syntactic information and its translation to logic. Examples of such grammars
include the Tree Adjoining Grammar [76], and the Combinatory Categorial Gram-
mar [141]. Given a sentence and the grammar, the first step consists of producing a
parse tree which captures notions of consituency. For (1), the parse tree is shown on
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Figure 1.2: Procedure for translating a sentence to logic. The computation of parse
trees has been explored. We focus on the definition and computation of logical form.
The conversion of logical form to logic is left to future work.
the left in Figure 1.3. The computation of parse trees has received much attention in
NLP (see, for example, [28, 36, 108]).
Using the grammar, the parse tree is rearranged to form another tree-like struc-
ture, which more closesly resembles the structure of the logic than natural language.
Following May [103], we call this tree the logical form of a sentence, and for (1), the
logical form is shown on the right in Figure 1.3. Finally, given the logical form and
the translation of each word (in the grammar) are used to compute the translation in
logic. The details of this step are not considered in this work, and we refer the reader
to [67] for examples.
In this work, we focus on the logical form component of translation. While logical
form has been studied extensively in linguistics (cf. [67]), it has not received attention
in the corpus-driven NLP approach. Our goal is to study the challenges in defining
logical form, in the context of regulatory texts, and the CFR in particular. We discuss
our contributions in the following section.
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Figure 1.3: Parse tree (on the left) and Logical Form (on the right)
1.5 Contributions and Outline
There are two main directions for research that we explore in this thesis:
• Logic – Our goal is to design logics that accomodate a sentential translation of
regulation, while preserving the decidability (and practicability) of conformance
checking. As with all applied logic design, the engineering problem is to find
the appropriate blend of expressive power and tractability.
• Logical Form – A challenge in NLP is to identify tasks beyond parsing, on
which we can make reasonable progress at the state-of-the-art. Various efforts
have been undertaken to annotate and compute aspects of predicate-argument
structure [110, 119]. Logical form offers a new direction in which progress can
be made, i.e., in the annotation and computation of scope.
In Section 1.5.1, we describe our work on the logical aspects. And, in Section 1.5.2,
we describe the logical form aspects.
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1.5.1 Logic
We design logics to accomodate two aspects of regulatory texts – (1) references be-
tween laws, and (2) the concepts of obligation and permission. The two aspects are
related. Conformance (Definition 1.4) is dependent on the satisfaction of obligations.
However, obligations refer to permissions for exceptions, indirectly affecting confor-
mance.
At a conceptual level, an underlying theme is the importance of the notion of say-
ing in the formalization of regulatory texts. Laws are introduced via communicative
acts, either spoken or written by a regulator. There are several lines of work which
suggest that an explicit representation of communication (saying) is useful in logics
for regulation:
• Abadi et al. [3] introduced the notion of saying in logics of access control, in
order to distinguish between policies introduced by different principals, and
express notions of delegation. Subsequent works, for example [2, 16, 50, 51],
have expanded on these ideas.
• Jones and Sergot [75], in their formalization of legal powers, use a modality to
characterize the facts that are operative according to an insitution. Gelati et al.
[53] augmented this approach with proclamations, to reason about individuals
representing others on statements.
• Kimbrough and colleagues [81–84] initiated the use of logics to reason about
speech acts, in the context of business contracts and transactions. For example,
it is of interest to tie events to speech acts, such as, the delivery of goods to the
promise of delivery.
In this work, we explore a particular sense of saying – speaking via laws. Informally,
a regulator introduces a set of (conditional) laws or statements. The regulator says
ϕ via a set of laws if we can prove ϕ from the laws. We use this sense of saying to
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describe references to laws, and in combination with obligation and permission, to
analyse legal powers.
Referring to Laws: Sentences in a body of regulation refer to others in a variety of
ways. Inter-sentential references are used to accommodate, for example, exceptions
to laws, requirements in other regulatory bodies, terms defined in different sections,
and even to refer to items in lists and tables. In Chapter 2 (see also Dinesh et al.
[44]), we motivate and develop a logic to accommodate inter-sentential references, by
focussing on the problem of exceptions to laws.
We relativize the exceptive reasoning to a predicate, called says, whose interpreta-
tion is determined by inferences from laws. Conditions and exceptions are expressed
by laws that reason about what other laws say and do not say. We build on ideas
from Reiter’s default logic [127] and Kripke’s theory of truth [85]. The says predicate
offers a unified analysis of various kinds of inter-sentential references, e.g., priorities of
exceptions over rules, and references to definitions or list items. In prior formalisms,
exceptions are not related to other kinds of inter-sentential references. The predica-
tive analysis is shown to have a modal flavour, i.e., it satisfies the properties of a
normal modal operator (c.f. [63]). We identify basic axioms for saying which we will
use in Chapter 4 to formalize concepts of legal power.
Checking Algorithms: Chapter 3 (see also Dinesh et al. [42]) presents algorithms
for checking conformace at runtime. Runtime verification has been extensively stud-
ied in the context of temporal logic (cf. [92]). We extend the rule-based formalism
Eagle [11] to handle inter-sentential references.
Allowing references between sentences aids in the ease of translation of regulation,
and in error-diagnosis. However, the evaluation involves (large) satisfiability tests,
which can be expensive at runtime. We identify a condition, motivated by a case
study of the CFR, under which satisfiability can be pre-computed, and replaced by
tests of lower complexity at runtime. We evaluate the algorithms and the convenience
of the logic using a prototype checking tool, applied to the CFR Section 610.40.
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Permission to Speak: In Chapter 4 (see also Dinesh et al. [45]), we augment the
logic with obligation and permission, by considering problems in access control and
conformance. Saying and permission are combined using an axiom that permits a
principal to speak on behalf of another. The combination yields benefits to both
access control and conformance. For access control, we overcome the problematic
interactions between hand-off and classical reasoning. For conformance, we obtain a
characterization of legal power by nesting saying with obligation and permission.
The axioms result in a decidable logic, and we characterize its complexity. We
integrate the axioms with the logic for reasoning about exceptions, giving says a
modal aspect and a non-montonic aspect. Conformance checking, in the presence
of nested obligations and permissions, is shown to be decidable. We prove a non-
interference property of the logic, to demonstrate that the axioms do not introduce
unwarranted dependencies between statements. We also show that a useful fragment
of the logic has a polynomial time decision procedure.
1.5.2 Logical Form
In Chapter 5, we turn to the annotation and computation of logical form. We de-
fine a restricted kind of logical form, called abstract syntax trees (ASTs), based on
the logic developed. ASTs divide a sentence into preconditions, which correspond
to facts, and postconditions, which correspond to obligations and permissions. We
present guidelines for annotating ASTs, based on a case study of the Food and Drug
Administration’s Code of Federal Regulations (FDA CFR).
We describe experiments on a modest-sized corpus, of about 200 sentences, an-
notated with ASTs. The main step in the computation of ASTs is the ordering or
ranking of operators. We adapt a learning model for ranking to order operators.
Features are designed by studying subproblems, such as, disambiguating between de
re and de dicto interpretations. We obtain an F-score of 90.6% on the set of pairwise
ordering decisions.
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Chapter 2
References to Laws
2.1 Introduction
Sentences in a body of regulation refer to others in a variety of ways. Inter-sentential
references are used to accommodate, for example, exceptions to laws, requirements in
other regulatory bodies, terms defined in different sections, and even to refer to items
in lists and tables. We motivate and develop a logic to accommodate inter-sentential
references, by focussing on the problem of exceptions to laws.
The design of logics for exceptions has been of interest for several years [5, 106,
134], and is related to the broader area of non-monotonic reasoning [97, 113, 117, 126].
Formalisms that have been applied to regulation are commonly based on default
logic [26, 134], logic programming [105, 136], and defeasible logic [56, 60]. Such logics
use two mechanisms to analyse exceptions – (a) consistency checks on rules, and (b)
priorities to break ties in the case of conflicting rules. The priorities are commonly
described by specifying a partial order over the rules in the meta-logic. The use of a
meta-language makes it difficult to describe the interaction between reasoning about
exceptions, and the other operators in the logic. In addition, due to the separation
between consistency checks and priorities, exceptions are not related to other kinds
of inter-sentential references.
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We generalize the mechanisms for exceptions via the use of a location sensitive
provability predicate, which we call says. Informally, the idea is that a regulator
communicates via laws, and to apply the laws in a given situation, we need to reason
about what the regulator says via her laws. References between laws are expressed
by laws that reason about what the regulator says via other laws. The motivation
for this analysis is as follows:
1. The says predicate offers a unified analysis of various kinds of inter-sentential
references, e.g., priorities of exceptions over rules, and references to definitions
or list items. In prior formalisms, due to the separation between consistency
checks and priorities, exceptions are not related to other kinds of references.
2. At a conceptual level, we believe that the notion of speaking via laws has broad
applicability. In this chapter, to formalize references between laws, we use
tests of the form “Does the regulator say ϕ via a particular set of laws”. In
Chapter 4, we combine this notion of saying with obligation and permission, in
order to formalize concepts of power that arise in privacy regulation.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we argue that a logic to
represent regulation should provide a mechanism for statements to refer to others.
We discuss how sentences from the FDA CFR can be represented in a logic without
references, and conclude that this would make the translation to logic difficult. We
then compare and contrast the distribution of some lexical categories in the CFR
with the newspaper text, which lets us conclude that intersentential references are
the predominant way of relating sentences in the CFR.
We then turn to the design of the logic. In Section 2.3.1, we begin by defin-
ing a trace or run-based representation for the operations of an organization, and
a predicate-based linear temporal logic (PredLTL) to make assertions about runs.
PredLTL is extended to express two kinds of normative statements (obligations and
permissions), but does not accommodate references between laws. Conformance is de-
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fined as the satisfaction of obligations, and at this stage, permissions are not relevant
to conformance.
In Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, we extend PredLTL to allow references between laws
thereby making permissions relevant to conformance. Specifically, we introduce a
predicate, called says, whose interpretation is determined by inferences from laws.
The justifications in default logic [127] can be cast as an instance of this predicate.
Statements are evaluated using the fixed points of an appropriate function, based on
a technique used in Kripke’s theory of truth [85]. The complexity of conformance
checking is established. Section 2.4 presents an axiomatization of the says predicate.
The predicative analysis is shown to have a modal flavour, i.e., it satisfies the proper-
ties of a normal modal operator (c.f. [63]). We identify basic axioms for saying which
we will use in Chapter 4 to formalize concepts of legal power.
Section 2.6 concludes with a discussion of constructs that we have not yet formal-
ized.
2.2 Motivation
In this section, we argue that a logic to represent regulation should provide a mech-
anism for sentences to refer to others. The discussion is divided into two parts. In
Section 2.2.1, we discuss examples of the phenomena that we are interested in and
how they may be represented in a logic with no mechanism for sentences to refer to
others. We then contrast the distribution of some lexical categories in the CFR with
newspaper text, which suggest that references to sentences are an important way of
expressing relationships between sentences in regulation (Section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Examples
The examples in this section are shortened versions of sentences from the CFR Section
610.40, which we will use through the course of this chapter. Consider the following
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sentences:
(3) Except as specified in (4), every donation of blood or blood component must
be tested for evidence of infection due to Hepatitis B.
(4) You are not required to test donations of source plasma for evidence of infec-
tion due to Hepatitis B.
Statement (3) conveys an obligation to test donations of blood or blood component
for Hepatitis B, and (4) conveys a permission not to test a donation of source plasma
(a blood component) for Hepatitis B. To assess an organization’s conformance to (3)
and (4), it suffices to check whether “All non-source plasma donations are tested for
Hepatitis B”. In other words, (3) and (4) imply the following obligation:
(5) Every non-source plasma donation must be tested for evidence of infection
due to Hepatitis B.
There are a variety of logics in which one can capture the interpretation of (5), as
needed for conformance. Now suppose we have a sentence that refers to (3):
(6) To test for Hepatitis B, you must use a screening test kit.
The reference is more indirect here, but the interpretation is: “If (3) requires a
test, then the test must be performed using a screening test kit”. A bloodbank is not
prevented from using a different kind of test for source plasma donations. (6) can
be represented by first producing (5), and then inferring that (5) and (6) imply the
following:
(7) Every non-source plasma donation must be tested for evidence of infection
due to Hepatitis B using a screening test kit.
It is easy to represent the interpretation of (7) directly in a logic. However, (7)
has a complex relationship to the sentences from which it was derived, i.e., (3), (4)
and (6). The derivation takes the form of a tree:
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(7)
(5)
(3) (4)
(6)
To summarize, if one wishes to use a logic with no support for referring to other
sentences, derived obligations must be created manually. We argue that the manual
creation of derived obligations is impractical in terms of the effort involved. The full
version of statement (3) in the CFR contains six exceptions, and these exceptions in
turn have statements that qualify them further. It is difficult to inspect a derived
obligation, and determine if it captures the intended interpretation of the sentences
from which it came. We discuss a realistic example in the context of a case study in
Chapter 3 (see Figure 3.5).
In the following section, we provide a more quantitative motivation for handling
intersentential references.
2.2.2 Distribution of Lexical Categories
In the previous section, we saw several examples of how sentences in regulation refer
to others. Natural language offers a variety of devices to relate sentences to others.
A large class of such devices fall under the rubric of anaphora, which is a means of
linking a sentence to the prior discourse. Common examples of such anaphoric items
are pronouns and adverbial connectives, e.g., however, instead, furthermore, etc.1
Table 2.1 contrasts the distribution of potentially anaphoric items in the Wall
Street Journal (WSJ) corpus, with the CFR. The first three rows show counts of
pronouns, and the CFR has a markedly lower number of pronouns than the WSJ.
The next two rows show counts of adverbial connectives. ADV1 comprises of the
connectives also, however, in addition, otherwise, for example, therefore, previously,
later, earlier, until and still. These connectives have specialized uses in the CFR and
1Not all uses of pronouns are anaphoric. Some pronouns are bound by quantifiers, e.g., every one
loves their mother. We report counts based on occurence of strings and do not distinguinsh between
different uses.
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Lexical Item WSJ CFR
he, she, him, her 8564 297
it, its 15168 2502
they, their 4500 862
ADV1 3162 2402
ADV2 2453 349
such 662 3028
References to other laws 18509
Table 2.1: Differences in the distribution of some anaphoric lexical items in the
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) corpus and the CFR. Both the WSJ and the CFR have
approximately 1M words.
tend to be quite frequent, with otherwise being the most frequent in the CFR (517
cases). ADV2 is a set of 48 adverbial connectives annotated by the Penn Discourse
Treebank [110] excluding those in ADV1, e.g., instead, as a result, nevertheless. The
connectives in ADV2 are significantly more frequent in the WSJ than in the CFR.
The last two rows in Table 2.1 show two common ways of establishing relationships
between sentences in the CFR. The adjective such is a common way of refering to a
set discussed in an immediately preceding law, e.g., such tests. The last row counts
explicit references to other law, by searching for phrases like this section, or references
to section and paragraph identifiers. Of the categories we considered this is by far the
most frequent in the CFR. The frequency of intersentential references has also been
observed in other bodies of regulation [18, 25].
We conclude that there are compelling qualitative and quantitative reasons to
handle intersentential references in a logic for regulation. In the following sections,
we develop a logic with a syntax and semantics for references.
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2.3 A Logic for Referring to Laws
In this section, we extend linear temporal logic (LTL) to distinguish between obli-
gations and permissions, and allow references between statements. We begin, in
Section 2.3.1, by representing a bloodbank as a run or trace. LTL is extended to dis-
tinguish between obligations and permissions, leading to definitions of conformance.
We then extend the logic to allow sentences to refer to others. Section 2.3.2 presents
a simplified version of the semantics which can accomodate some but not all kinds
of regulations. We identify the difficult cases and generalize the definitions in Sec-
tion 2.3.3. We also discuss the complexity of conformance checking with references.
Section 2.3.1 is intended as background, in which we discuss several underlying
assumptions. Our goal is to focus on the problem of references, and to treat the
representation of obligations and permissions as an important but orthogonal issue
(which we will return to in Chapter 4).
2.3.1 Predicate-based Linear Temporal Logic (PredLTL)
Representing regulated operations: Given the need to demonstrate conformance
to the regulation in case of an audit, regulated organizations such as bloodbanks keep
track of their operations in a database, for example, donor information and the tests
they perform. Such a system can be thought of abstractly as a relational structure
evolving over time. At each point in time (state), there are a set of objects (such
as donations and donors) and relations between the objects (such as an association
between a donor and her donations). The state changes by the creation, removal or
modification of objects. We represent this as a run.
Definition 2.1 (A Run of a System). Given countable sets Φ1, ...,Φn (where Φj is a
set of predicate names of arity j) and object names O, a run of a system R( Φ1, ...,
Φn, O), abbreviated as R, is a tuple (r, π1, ..., πn) where:
• r : N → S is a sequence of states. N is the set of natural numbers, and S is a
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set of states.
• πj : Φj × S → 2
Oj is a truth assignment to predicates of arity j. Given p ∈ Φj,
we will say that p(o1, ..., oj) is true at state s iff (o1, ..., oj) ∈ πj(p, s).
Given a run R and a time i ∈ N , the pair (R, i) is called a point (statements in
linear temporal logic are evaluated at points). Given the predicate names (Φ1, ...,Φn)
and object names O, the corresponding space of runs is denoted by R(Φ1, ...,Φn, O),
abbreviated as R.
Representing the regulation: The logic that we define in this section is a restricted
fragment of first-order modal logic. The restriction is that we allow formulas with free
variables, but no quantification over objects. Formulas will be interpreted using the
universal generalization rule, i.e., over all assignments to free variables. Quantifiers
are ommitted because we will need to use provability tests in a fragment of the
language here, in order to formalize references. Unrestricted quantification would
make these tests undecidable. At the same time, the lack of quantification here can
be too restrictive, if we wish to perform a sentential translation of the regulation.
We will show, in Section 2.3.3, that when references are added, the logic becomes
more expressive than first order logic, and quantifiers can be added in certain places
without affecting decidability.
We begin by defining the syntax:
Definition 2.2 (Syntax). Given countable sets Φ1, ...,Φn (of predicate names), object
names O, and a set of variables X, the language L(Φ1, ...,Φn, O,X), abbreviated as
L, is the smallest set such that:
• p(y1, ..., yj) ∈ L where p ∈ Φj and (y1, ..., yj) ∈ (X ∪O)
j.
• If ϕ ∈ L, then ¬ϕ ∈ L and 2ϕ ∈ L. If ϕ, ψ ∈ L, then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L.
Disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and implication ϕ ⇒ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ are derived
connectives. The temporal operator is understood in the usual way: 2ϕ (ϕ holds and
will always hold (globally)). 3ϕ (ϕ will eventually hold) is defined as ¬2¬ϕ.
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The syntax is extended to to express three kinds of statements in a body of
regulation:
Definition 2.3 (Syntax of Regulation). Given a finite set of identifiers ID, a body of
regulation Reg is a set of statements such that for each id ∈ ID, there exist ϕ, ψ ∈ L
such that either: (id) ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg, (id).o : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg, or (id).p : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg
A body of regulation is a finite set of rules, which are understood as follows.
(id) ϕ 7→ ψ is read as “If ϕ, then the regulatory authority says ψ via the law labeled
(id)”. Such rules are used to represent, for example, institutional facts [73], e.g., If a
priest performs a particular ceremony for a couple, then the regulatory authority says
that the couple is married (where married is an instiutional fact). The normative
statement (id).o : ϕ 7→ ψ ((id).p : ϕ 7→ ψ) is read as: “If ϕ, then the regulatory
authority says ψ is obligated (permitted) via the law labeled id”. ϕ is called the
precondition of the law, and ψ is called the postcondition. We use the notation (id).x :
ϕ 7→ ψ to stand for a generic rule corresponding to institutional facts, obligations, or
permissions.
We note that the formal notation doesn’t quite capture the informal reading of
normative statements. In particular, the informal interpretation suggests that obli-
gation and permission need to be operators within the postcondition. We make some
simplifying assumptions in this chapter (discussed below), in order build up intuition
for the analysis of obligation and permission in Chapter 4. The semantics is defined
as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Semantics). Given a run R = (r, π1, ..., πn), ϕ ∈ L, and a variable
assignment v : X → O, the relation (R, i, v) |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
• (R, i, v) |= p(y1, ..., yj) iff (o1, ..., oj) ∈ πj(p, r(i)) where ok = v(yk) if yk ∈ O,
and ok = yk otherwise.
• The semantics of conjunction and negation is defined in the usual way.
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• (R, i, v) |= 2ϕ iff for all k ≥ i : (R, k, v) |= ϕ
We extend the semantic relation to regulatory statements. We take |= to stand for
“conforms to”:
• (R, i, v) |= (id).o : ϕ 7→ ψ iff (R, i, v) |= ϕ⇒ ψ (⇒ is implication)
• (R, i, v) |= (id).p : ϕ 7→ ψ. Runs vacuously conform to permissions. Permis-
sions will become relevant when references from obligations are present (Section
2.3.2).
• (R, i, v) |= (id) ϕ 7→ ψ. Institutional facts are also not directly relevant to
conformance, and will be used via references from other laws.
Consider again our example from Section 4.2. We use three predicates defined as
follows. d(x) is true iff x is a donation. sp(x) is true iff x consists of source plama.
test(x) is true iff x is tested for Hepatitis B. Statement (5) is represented as:
(5).o : d(x) ∧ ¬sp(x) 7→ 3test(x)
Statement (4) is be represented as:
(4).p : d(y) ∧ sp(y) 7→ ¬3test(y)
However, statement (3) cannot be represented directly.
We will now define conformance, and then discuss the various definitions in the
context of related work. Conformance of a run R is defined using the notion of validity.
A formula ϕ is valid at the point (R, i), (R, i) |= ϕ, iff for all variable assignments v:
(R, i, v) |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid on R if it is valid in all points, that is, R |= ϕ iff
for all i : (R, i) |= ϕ.
Definition 2.5 (Run Conformance). Given a body of regulation Reg and a run R rep-
resenting the operations of an organization, we say that R conforms to the regulation
iff for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg, we have R |= (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ.
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Discussion: The deontic concepts of obligation and permission are treated as prop-
erties of sentences. Only obligations matter for conformance. If a non-source plasma
donation is not tested, there is a problem. On the other hand, a bloodbank may
choose to test a donation of source plasma or not. In assessing conformance, the
function of a permission is to serve as an exception to an obligation, and in this
indirect manner it becomes relevant. We will give a semantics to this function of
permissions in Section 2.3.2. Such a treatment of permissions has its basis in the
legal theory of Ross [130].
Ross’ approach to permission is by no means the only one. Theories have distin-
guished between various kinds of permission (cf. [23]), the most common distinction
being that of positive and negative permission. We discuss the analysis by Makinson
and van der Torre [99]. ϕ is said to positively permitted iff it is explictly permitted
by the laws, and ϕ is negatively permitted iff it is not forbidden. The key issue is
whether positive permissions can give rise to violations. In regulations phrased ex-
clusively in terms of permissions, it is desirable to say that if ϕ denotes a “relevant”
condition which is not explicitly permitted, then it should not hold in conforming im-
plementations. While this has been analysed as a property of permission, following
Ross, we take such violations as arising from an implicit obligation, i.e., the italicized
clause. This implicit obligation can be represented using the techniques we discuss in
Section 2.3.2, provided that the relevance of the condition is known.
In this chapter, we treat obligation and permission as top-level operators. Nested
deontic constructs [100] cannot be expressed, i.e., sentences of the form “required to
allow x” or “allowed to require x.”. Conformance is defined at the level of a run, and
as a result, blame cannot be assigned to different individuals. The motivation for
these simplifications is to focus on the problem of exceptions, which is taken to be
orthogonal to the analysis of obligations and permissions. We will formalize obligation
and permission in Chapter 4.
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2.3.2 References to Other Laws – A Sketch
In this section, we develop some intuition for reference logic (Refl), which is used
to handle references. We describe the syntax and present a simplified version of the
semantics, which can accommodate some but not all kinds of regulations. We will
then identify the difficult cases and generalize the definitions in Section 2.3.3.
The syntax of PredLTL is extended with an inference predicate saysId ϕ, where Id
is a set of identifiers. saysId ϕ is read as “the regulatory authority says ϕ via the laws
labeled Id”. There are two restrictions: (a) ϕ is a statement in PredLTL (Definition
2.2) and (b) the predicate saysId ϕ can appear only in preconditions of laws. These
restrictions are similar to those that apply to justifications in default logic [127]. In
Chapter 4, when we consider nested obligations and permissions, these restrictions
will be lifted:
Definition 2.6 (Syntax of Preconditions). Given countable sets Φ1, ...,Φn (of predi-
cate names), object names O, and a set of variablesX, the language L′(Φ1, ...,Φn, O,X),
abbreviated as L′, is the smallest set such that:
• p(y1, ..., yj) ∈ L
′ where p ∈ Φj and (y1, ..., yj) ∈ (X ∪ O)
j.
• If ϕ ∈ L′, then ¬ϕ ∈ L′ and 2ϕ ∈ L′. If ϕ, ψ ∈ L′, then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L′
• If Id ⊆ ID and ϕ ∈ L(Φ1, ...,Φn, O,X) (Definition 2.2), then saysId ϕ ∈ L
′
The syntax of regulatory statements (Definition 2.3) is modified so that the pre-
conditions of laws are statements from L′. We use (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ to stand for a
generic law (either institutional fact, obligation, or permission), where ϕ ∈ L′ and
ψ ∈ L.
Let us consider how we might evaluate formulas of the form saysId φ. Informally,
we wish to capture the idea that saysId φ is true if the regulator says φ via the laws
Id. Thus, we need some representation of what the regulator says via her laws.
Recall that our informal interpretation of a rule (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ is “If ϕ, then the
24
regulator says ψ via the law labeled (id)”. The postconditions of laws provide a
suitable representation of what the regulator says. We now make this idea precise.
We begin by defining the propositionalization of formulas, which is used in sub-
sequent definitions:
Definition 2.7 (Propositionalization). Given φ ∈ L and an assignment v ∈ V , the
propositionalization of ϕ w.r.t. v, denoted v(φ), is defined inductively as follows:
• v(p(y1, ..., yn)) = p(o1, ..., on), where oi = v(yi) if yi ∈ X and oi = yi otherwise
(yi ∈ O).
• v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∧ v(ψ), and v(¬ϕ) = ¬v(ϕ)
• v(2ϕ) = 2(v(ϕ))
Given φ ∈ L and v ∈ V , we say that v(φ) is true at a point (R, i), denoted
(R, i) |= v(φ), iff (R, i, v) |= φ. The notation lets us disregard the variable assignment
in evaluating propositionalized formulas.
We now define utterances, which represent what the regulator can say, i.e., possible
statements from the regulator:
Definition 2.8 (Utterance). Given a body of regulation Reg and a variable assign-
ment v ∈ V (X,O), an utterance is a statement (id, v(ψ)) such that id ∈ ID and
(id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg. The set of utterances is denoted by U(Reg, V ), abbreviated U .
Given a set of utterances U ⊆ U and Id ⊆ ID, UId is the set such that ψ ∈ UId
iff (id, ψ) ∈ U and id ∈ Id.
An utterance (id, v(ψ)) is read as “the regulator says ψ via the law id”. Given
a set of utterances U , the set UId is understood as what the regulator says via her
the labeled Id. As we mentioned, a set of utterances represent possible statements
from a regulator. How do we determine what the regulator actually says? Intuitively,
we need to obtain utterances from laws with true preconditions. However, we need
an appropriate set of utterances to evaluate saysId φ in the preconditions of laws. As
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a result, there is a circular dependency between the appropriate set of utterances
and the evaluation of preconditions. To address this cirularity, let us assume the
existence of a relation |=1, such that (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 ϕ, read as “ϕ is true at the point
(R, i) w.r.t. the regulation Reg and assignment v”. We can now define properties of
utterances to determine what a regulator actually says:
Definition 2.9 (Sound and Complete Utterances). Given a body of regulation Reg,
a set of utterances U ⊆ U is sound w.r.t. a point (R, i) if:
US If (id, φ) ∈ U , then there exists (id) ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that φ = v(ψ)
and (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 ϕ
Similarly, a set of utterances U is said to be complete w.r.t. a point (R, i) if:
UC If there exists (id) ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 ϕ, then
(id, v(ψ)) ∈ U
Informally, a set of utterances is sound if all the utterances in it come from laws
with true preconditions. A set of utterances is complete if the converse holds, i.e., all
the laws with true preconditions have a corresponding utterance. Given a sound set
of utterances U and an assigmnent v, we will say that saysId φ is true w.r.t. U and v
iff UId entails v(φ). We now define this notion of entailment:
Definition 2.10 (Entailment). Given a set of propositional LTL formulas ∆, and a
propositional formula ψ, we say that ∆ entails ψ, denoted ∆ |= ψ, iff for all runs
R ∈ R and times i ∈ N , if (R, i) |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ∆, then (R, i) |= ψ.
Note that ∆ |= ψ involves a validity test in propositional LTL, which can be
decided in space polynomial in the size of ∆ and ψ [139]. We remind the reader that
formulas of the form saysId φ appear only in preconditions of laws, and are restricted
so that φ is a statement in PredLTL. Crucially, these restrictions allow us to use
validity tests in LTL. If we allowed either nested occurences of says or says to appear
in postconditions of laws, we would need an underlying notion of validity for saying.
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In this chapter, we use the syntactic restriction to identify basic properties of says,
and we will use these properties to design a logic of saying in Chapter 4.
We are now left with the task of defining the relation |=1. We discuss a candidate
definition, which can accommodate some but not all kinds of regulations. We will
then identify the difficult cases and generalize the definitions. Let us assume as given
a run R, a time i ∈ N , a body of regulation Reg and an assignment v ∈ V . We wish
to determine whether the precondition of a law (ϕ ∈ L′) is “true” w.r.t. (R, i), Reg
and v. The relation (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 ϕ defined inductively as follows:
P1 (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 p(y1, ..., yj) iff (o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj (p), where oi = v(yi) if yi ∈ X
and oi = yi otherwise.
P2 Conjunction, negation, and the temporal operator are handled as usual
P3 (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 saysId φ iff there exists set of utterances U ⊆ U such that U is
sound and UId |= v(φ)
P4 |=1 is extended to statements in Reg (again with the interpretation that |=1
stands for conforms to):
(R, i,Reg, v) |=1 (id).o : ϕ 7→ ψ iff (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 ϕ⇒ ψ
(R, i,Reg, v) |=1 (id).p : ϕ 7→ ψ and (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 (id) ϕ 7→ ψ – Runs
vacuously conform to permissions and institutional facts.
We now discuss two examples to illustrate the various definitions. The first example
describes a case where the definitions suffice. We then consider an example where the
definitions fail, and we will use it to generalize the definitions in Section 2.3.3.
Example 1: Consider again our example from the CFR:
(3) Except as specified in (4), every donation of blood or blood component must
be tested for evidence of infection due to Hepatitis B.
(4) You are not required to test donations of source plasma for evidence of infec-
tion due to Hepatitis B.
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(3) and (4) are represented in Refl as follows:
• (3).o : d(x) ∧ ¬ says{4}(¬3test(x)) 7→ 3test(x), and
• (4).p : d(y) ∧ sp(y) 7→ ¬3test(y)
In the obligation above, the subformula says{4}(¬3test(x)) is read as “The FDA says,
via law (4), that x is not tested eventually”. The obligation is read as: “If x is a
donation (d(x)) and the FDA does not say, via law (4), that x is not tested eventually,
then the FDA says, via law (3), that x is tested eventually”.
Time Objects Predicates Utterances
1 o1 d(o1), sp(o1), ¬test(o1) (4,¬3test(o1))
2 o1 d(o1), sp(o1), ¬test(o1) (4,¬3test(o1))
o2 d(o2), ¬sp(o2), ¬test(o2) (3,3test(o2))
3 o1 d(o1), sp(o1), test(o1) (4,¬3test(o1))
o2 d(o2), ¬sp(o2), ¬test(o2) (3,3test(o2))
Table 2.2: A run and the associated utterances.
Table 2.2 shows a run of a bloodbank, where each point is associated with a set of
utterances. First, an object o1 is enters the system. o1 is a donation of source plasma
(d(o1) and sp(o1) are true). When a donation is added, its test predicate is initially
false. Then, an object o2 is added, which is a donation but not of source plasma. In
the third step, the object o1 is tested. At this point, unless the run is extended to
test o2 as well, it does not conform with the regulation.
The set of utterances associated with each point in Table 2.2 is the unique set
of sound and complete utterances for the point. We will prove this below. At the
times 2 and 3, there is an utterance from law (3) which requires a test for the non-
source plasma donation o2 ((3,3test(o2))). And, at the times 1 to 3, there is an
utterance from law (4) which permits the source plasma donations o1 not to be tested
((4,¬3test(o1))). The bloodbank conforms if the utterances obtained from (3) are
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true, and in this case, the bloodbank does not conform, since the donation o1 is not
tested. We now establish a property of the example sentences, to illustrate why the
definition of |=1 works for this example:
Proposition 2.1. Given a body of regulation Reg that consists of the following two
statements:
(3).o : d(x) ∧ ¬ says{4}(¬3test(x)) 7→ 3test(x)
(4).p : d(y) ∧ sp(y) 7→ ¬3test(y)
For all runs R ∈ R and times i ∈ N , there is a unique set of utterances U (R,i) such
that U (R,i) is sound and complete w.r.t. (R, i).
Proof sketch. Given a point (R, i), let U (R,i) be the set such that for all v ∈ V :
• (3, v(3test(x))) ∈ U (R,i) iff (R, i, v) |=1 d(x) ∧ ¬sp(x).
• (4, v(¬3test(y))) ∈ U (R,i) iff (R, i, v) |=1 d(y) ∧ sp(y).
Informally, U (R,i) contains utterances from law (3) requiring a test for non-source
plasma donations, and from law (4) permitting source plasma donations not to be
tested. The utterances associated with each point in Table 2.2 corresponds to U (R,i).
It is easy to show, using P1-P4, that U (R,i) is the unique set of sound and complete
utterances. We leave the proof as an exercise to the reader.
A question arises with our formalization of (3). We only require that a test be
performed eventually, i.e., the postcondition is 3test(x). However, common sense
tells us that donations must be tested before they are shipped to or used by their
ultimate recepients. This intuition can be formalized by a separate law:
(8) Donations that are required to be tested must not be released or shipped prior
to the completion of testing
• (8).o : d(x) ∧ says{3}(3test(x)) ∧ ¬test(x) 7→ ¬ship(x)
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The formalized version of (8) is read as follows. If x is a donations (d(x)) that is
required to be tested (says{3}(3test(x))), and it has not been tested (¬test(x)), then
the regulator says that it must not be shipped (¬ship(x)).
Although there is no explicit law equivalent to (8) in CFR Section 610.40, there
are laws about the shipping of donations:
(9) Human blood or blood components that are required to be tested...may be
released or shipped prior to completion of testing in the following circum-
stances...
Sentence (9) conveys permissions to ship donations prior to testing, in some excep-
tional circumstances. And, the formal version of (8) needs to be modified to take
these into account.
In general, there may be implicit obligations that can be inferred based on com-
mon sense or domain knowledge. Such obligations need to be explicitly formalized.
We believe that Refl provides a convenient way to separately specify such implicit
obligations, by referring to the explicit ones. For example, the formal representation
of the implicit obligation (8) refers to the explicit obligation (3).
Example 2: As we mentioned, the definition of |=1 is not appropriate for all kinds
of regulations. The key feature of the example above is that the references between
the laws in acyclic, i.e., law (3) refers to (4) via the use of says{4} ¬3test(x) in its
precondition. When there are circular references, we can potentially obtain multiple
sets of sound and complete utterances and a choice needs to be made. However, a
more serious problem arises when negation is involved with circular references:
Proposition 2.2. There is no relation |=1 that satisfies the properties P1-P4
Proof. Consider a regulation Reg that consists of the statement:
(id).o : ¬ says{id} p(x) 7→ p(x)
In other words, “If the regulator does not say p(x) via law (id), then the regulator says
p(x) via law (id)”. The self-referential nature of this sentence coupled with negation
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leads to the problem. Kripke [85] discusses several similar examples.
Suppose (R, i,Reg, v) |=1 says{id} p(x). By P3, there exists a set U which is
sound w.r.t. (R, i) and U{id} |= v(p(x)). However, since U is sound, (R, i,Reg, v) |=1
¬ says{id} p(x), giving us a contradiction.
Suppose (R, i,Reg, v) 6|=1 says{id} p(x). Then, (R, i,Reg, v) |= ¬ says{id} p(x).
The set U = {(id, v(p(x)))} is sound w.r.t. (R, i) and Uid |= v(p(x)). So, by P3,
(R, i,Reg, v) |=1 says{id} p(x), giving us a contradiction.
2.3.3 Reference Logic (Refl)
The semantic evaluation outlined in Section 2.3.2 works only when the references are
acyclic, as we saw in the proof of Proposition 2.2. To handle circular statements,
we use a technique from Kripke’s theory of truth [85], which also forms the basis for
the Kripke-Kleene-Fitting semantics of logic programs [49]. There are two pieces of
machinery needed. First, we move to a three-valued logic, where the third (middle)
value stands for ungrounded. The values are denoted by B3 = {⊤, ?,⊥}. Second,
we will evaluate sentences w.r.t. a pair of sets of utterances associated with each
point. Let (U,U ′) be a pair associated with the point (R, i). Informally, U will be
the set of utterances obtained from laws with true preconditions, while U ′ will be set
of utterances from laws with true or ungrounded preconditions (U ⊆ U ′). The truth
of saysId ϕ will determined using U as before (UId |= v(ϕ)), but falsity is determined
using U ′ (U ′Id 6|= v(ϕ)). We begin by defining utterance sequences:
Definition 2.11 (Utterance Sequence). Given a body of regulation Reg and a set of
variable assignments V , an utterance sequence is a function u : N → 2U(Reg,V ), i.e.,
u(i) ⊆ U(Reg, V ) is a set of utterances. We use u(i)Id to denote the set of formulas
ψ such that (id, ψ) ∈ u(i) and id ∈ Id.
The space of utterance sequences is denoted by Υ(Reg, V ), abbreviated Υ.
We begin by defining an assignment of truth values to formulas w.r.t. a point
(R, i), a variable assigment v and an pair of utterance sequences (u, u′):
31
Definition 2.12 (Truth Value Assignment). Given a body of regulation Reg, a set
of assignments V , and a pair of utterance sequences (u, u′) ∈ Υ × Υ, the function
η(u,u′) : L
+ ×R×N × V → B3 is defined as follows:
• η(u,u′)(p(x1, ..., xj), R, i, v) = ⊤ if (v(x1), ..., v(xj)) ∈ πj(p, r(i))
η(u,u′)(p(x1, ..., xj), R, i, v) = ⊥ otherwise.
• Conjuction and negation are handled using the Kleene semantics.
• η(u,u′)(2ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤ if for all j ≥ i, η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤
η(u,u′)(2ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥ if there exists j ≥ i, η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥
η(u,u′)(2ϕ,R, i, v) = ? otherwise.
• η(u,u′)(saysId ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤ if u(i)Id |= v(ϕ)
η(u,u′)(saysId ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥ if u
′(i)Id 6|= v(ϕ)
η(u,u′)(saysId ϕ,R, i, v) = ? otherwise.
• η(u,u′)((id).o : ϕ 7→ ψ,R, i, v) = η(u,u′)(ϕ⇒ ψ, s, i, v).
η(u,u′)((id).p : ϕ 7→ ψ,R, i, v) = ⊤
η(u,u′)((id) ϕ 7→ ψ,R, i, v) = ⊤
Definition 2.12 places no restrictions on the utterance sequences (u, u′). However,
as we sketched in Section 2.3.2, u and u′ need to satisfy certain conditions, in order
to give an appropriate interpretation to formulas. We now define what it means for
a pair of utterance sequences to be sound and complete:
Definition 2.13 (Sound and Complete Utterances). Given a body of regulation Reg
and a set of assignments V :
A pair (u, u′) ∈ Υ × Υ is sound w.r.t. a point (R, i) if u(i) ⊆ u′(i) and:
US1 If (id, φ) ∈ u(i), then there exists (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that
φ = v(ψ) and η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤
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US2 If (id, φ) 6∈ u′(i), then for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that
φ = v(ψ) and η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥
(u, u′) is sound w.r.t. R if it is sound w.r.t. all points (R, i).
Similarly, (u, u′) is said to be complete w.r.t. a point (R, i) if u(i) ⊆ u′(i) and:
UC1 If there exists (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤,
then (id, φ) ∈ u(i).
UC2 If for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that φ = v(ψ), we have
η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥, then (id, φ) 6∈ u
′(i).
(u, u′) is complete w.r.t. R if it is complete w.r.t. all points (R, i).
A partial order is defined over the space of sound utterance pairs:
Definition 2.14 (Partial Order). Given a body of regulation Reg, a set of assignments
V , and the pairs {(u1, u
′
1), (u2, u
′
2)} ⊆ Υ × Υ, we say that (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2) iff for
all i ∈ N , u1(i) ⊆ u2(i) and u
′
1(i) ⊇ u
′
2(i).
Let SRΥ be the set such that (u, u
′) ∈ SRΥ iff (u, u
′) ∈ Υ × Υ and (u, u′) is sound
w.r.t. R. The pair (SRΥ ,≤) is a partially ordered set (poset).
Finally, we define the function whose fixed points we are interested in.
Definition 2.15 (Inflationary function). Given a poset (SRΥ ,≤), the function I
R
Υ :
SRΥ → S
R
Υ is defined as follows. I
R
Υ(u1, u
′
1) is the pair (u2, u
′
2) ∈ S
R
Υ such that for all
(id, φ) ∈ U :
• (id, φ) ∈ u2(i) iff there exists (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that
v(ψ) = φ and η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤.
• (id, φ) 6∈ u′2(i) iff for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(ψ) = φ
and η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥.
We can show the following:
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Theorem 2.1. Given the poset of sound utterance pairs (SRΥ ,≤) and a function I
R
Υ :
SRΥ → S
R
Υ which is inflationary and monotonic, I
R
Υ has a least fixed point and a
maximal fixed point.
We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for the proof.
Complexity: We mention the upper and lower bounds for the complexity of con-
formance checking w.r.t. the least fixed point. Given a run R and regulation Reg, we
say that R conforms to Reg, denoted R |= Reg, iff all obligations are valid in R at the
least fixed point. R is assumed to be finite in two ways: (a) The set of objects O is
finite, and (b) There exists n, such that for all j ≥ n, r(n) = r(j), i.e., R eventually
reaches a stable state. The following bounds can be established.
Lemma 2.1 (Upper Bound). Given a finite run R and regulation Reg, R |= Reg can
decided in EXPSPACE (space exponential in the size of Reg)
Lemma 2.2 (Lower Bound). Given a finite run R and regulation Reg, R |= Reg is
hard for EXPTIME (time exponential in the size of Reg)
The proofs are sketched in Appendix A.2.
Discussion: We now discuss some options in defining conformance, depending on
the needs of the application. The sections of the FDA CFR that we have examined
can be formalized so that there is a unique fixed point, and conformance is simply
the satisfaction of obligations at this fixed point.
However, examples discussed in the literature suggest that it may not be desirable
to always have a unique fixed point. A well-known example is that of contrary-to-duty
(CTD) obligations [30]. CTD obligations are those that arise when other obligations
have been violated. Prakken and Sergot [123] point out an inflexibility in casting
CTD structures as an instance of non-monotonic reasoning. We outline how this
inflexibility can be avoided, using alternate definitions of conformance. Consider the
following example from [98]:
(10) Cottages must not have a fence or a dog.
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(11) If a cottage has a dog, it must have both a fence and a warning sign
The question is what are the obligations when the cottage has a dog. We discuss two
possible solutions.
The first solution is to treat the CTD norm (11) as an exception to (10):
(10).o : c(x) ∧ ¬ says{2}(f(x) ∨ d(x)) 7→ ¬(f(x) ∨ d(x))
(11).o : c(y) ∧ d(y) 7→ f(y) ∧ w(y)
The predicate c(x) is read as “x is a cottage”, and f(x), d(x) and w(x) correpond to
the cottage x having a fence, dog and warning sign resply. Let o be a cottage with a
dog, i.e., c(o) and d(o) are true. The precondition of (11) is true for the assignment of
y to o, and we obtain the utterance (11, f(o)∧w(o)). Since f(o)∧w(o) |= f(o)∨d(o),
for the assignment of x to o, says{2}(f(x) ∨ d(x)) is true, and the precondition of
(10) is false. So if f(o) ∧ w(o) holds (the cottage has a fence and a warning sign),
there is no violation. However, as [123] points out, it may be useful to detect that
the situation is worse than the one in which there is no dog.
In the second solution, we treat the laws as exceptions to each other:
(10).o : c(x) ∧ ¬ says{2}(f(x) ∨ d(x)) 7→ ¬(f(x) ∨ d(x))
(11).o : c(y) ∧ d(y) ∧ ¬ says{1} ¬(f(y) ∧ w(y)) 7→ f(y) ∧ w(y)
At the least fixed point, both obligations are ungrounded, and we get two maximal
fixed points – one with the utterance (10,¬(f(o)∨d(o))), and one with the utterance
(11, f(o) ∧ w(o)). Since d(o) holds, there is a violation w.r.t. the former fixed point.
In a scenario where there is no dog, a unique fixed point is obtained.
Our analysis of CTD structures achieves the same effect as the analyses in [98, 123].
However, the solution is deficient in two respects. First, from an intuitive perspective,
it is not clear why the laws should be exceptions to each other. (11) is an obligation
to mitigate a violation of (10). The analysis as exceptions sheds no light on this issue.
Second, from a practical perspective, it is infeasible to enumerate all the fixed points
35
as there may be exponentially many in the face of multiple violations. In [98, 123],
the CTD norm is characterized as presupposing the violation of the other, and then
revising the situation. In future work, we plan to investigate predicates that capture
this presuppositional analysis more directly.
2.4 Axiomatization
In Chapter 4, we will extend the predicative analysis of says to accomodate nested
obligations and permissions, by treating says as a modal operator. We provide an
axiomatization for a fragment of RefL in Section 2.4.1, and then, discuss how it can
be extended for a modal treatment of says (Section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 The Acyclic Fragment
As we discussed in the proof of Lemma 2.2, RefL contains first order logic enriched
with a least fixed point predicate. It can be shown that the validity problem is
Π11-hard, and as a result, it cannot be recursively axiomatized. In this section, we
briefly discuss an axiomatization of the propositional fragment of L′ (the language of
preconditions).
We assume as given a fixed finite domain of quantification, and replace variables
by identifiers for domain elements. Given a set of identifiers ID, a propositionalized
body of regulation has one or more statements of the form (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ for each
id ∈ ID. For example, the presence of (id).x : ϕ1 7→ ψ1 and (id).x : ϕ2 7→ ψ2
corresponds to different assignments to the variables.
To simplify presentation, we will assume that the references in the regulation are
acyclic. This lets us obtain a unique fixed point and restrict attention to a two-valued
logic. We refer the reader to [43] for a discussion of the general case.
We begin with axioms and rules for propositional LTL:
A1 All substitution instances of propositional tautologies
36
A2 2(ϕ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (2ϕ⇒ 2ψ)
A3 2ϕ⇒ ϕ ∧ 22ϕ
R1 From ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ and ⊢ ϕ, infer ⊢ ψ
R2 From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ 2ϕ
We say that ϕ ∈ L is is provable (denoted ⊢L ϕ) if it is an instance of the axioms
A1-A3, or follows from the axioms using the rules R1 and R2. Given a finite set of
formulas ∆ ⊆ L, we say that ϕ is provable from ∆, denoted ∆ ⊢L ϕ, if ⊢ (
∧
∆) ⇒ ϕ.
The says predicate is characterized by the laws it refers to. To axiomatize saysId ϕ,
we need to reason about provability in the language L (propositional LTL). Crucially,
we will use the negation of provability in the premise of a rule. Similar mechanisms
have been used to axiomatize autoepistemic logics, e.g., Lakemeyer and Levesque [89]
use satisfiability in the premise of a rule, and Halpern [63] augments a modal language
with an operator for satisfiability.
We begin by developing some notation. Given a set of regulatory statements
F = {(id1).x : ϕ1 7→ ψ1, ..., (idn).x : ϕn 7→ ψn}, let Fpre = {ϕ1, ..., ϕn} be the set of
preconditions, Fpost = {ψ1, ..., ψn} be the set of postconditions, and Fid = {id1, ..., idn}
be the set of identifiers. Given a finite set of formulas Γ, we denote the conjunction
by
∧
Γ. The conjunction of the empty set is identified with ⊤ (a tautology). We use
two rules for the inference predicate:
R3 For all F ⊆ Reg with Fid ⊆ Id, from Fpost ⊢L φ, infer ⊢
∧
Fpre ⇒ saysId φ
R4 For all ψ ∈ L′, if for all F ⊆ Reg with Fid ⊆ Id, either Fpost 6⊢L φ, or ⊢ ψ ⇒
¬
∧
Fpre, then infer ⊢ ψ ⇒ ¬ saysId φ.
Informally, R3 says that saysId φ is true, if there exists a set of laws whose post-
conditions imply φ, and whose preconditions are true. R4 says that saysId φ is false,
if one of the preconditions is false for all sets of laws whose postconditions imply φ.
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In particular, if Fpost 6⊢L φ for all appropriate subsets, then ⊢ ⊤ ⇒ ¬ saysId φ, and
using R1, ⊢ ¬ saysId φ.
Completeness can be shown by adapting the standard pre-model construction for
LTL [94]. We now discuss the general case, i.e., when there are circular references and
multiple fixed points. In the presence of multiple fixed points, we can define validity
w.r.t. all fixed points, the least fixed point, or maximal fixed points. The axioms
and rules discussed here can be adapted to characterize valdity w.r.t. all fixed points.
We refer the reader to [43] for the proof. Using the fact that ϕ is true (or false) at
the least fixed point iff it is true (resply., false) at all fixed points, we can use the
axiomatization to reason about the least fixed point. We leave a characterization of
validity w.r.t. maximal fixed points to future work.
2.4.2 Towards a Modal Analysis of Says
In this chapter, we have analysed says as a predicate, which applies to sentences in
LTL. This restriction of the argument of says to LTL sentences is ad-hoc, and we
cannot express nested statements, e.g., “The bloodbank says that the FDA says ϕ”.
In Chapter 4, we will show that nested statements are useful to formalize, for example,
notions of rights. A natural way to accomodate nested statements is to treat says as
a modal operator. We explore how the predicative definition of says can be extended
to a modal definition.
We evaluate the question “Does the FDA say ϕ via its laws”, by checking if ϕ is
provable from the utterances obtained from the laws. More formally, saysId ϕ is true
w.r.t. the pair of utterance sequences (u, u′) at time i, if u(i)Id |= ϕ. The set u(i)Id is
associated with utterances (id, ψ) with id ∈ Id. The intuitive interpretation of (id, ψ)
is “The FDA says ψ in the law labeled id”. This suggests that an utterance (id, ψ) is
better represented as says{id} ψ, and that we conduct our deduction over the entire set
of utterances. We make this idea precise. Let Γi be the set such that says{id} ψ ∈ Γi
iff (id, ψ) ∈ u(i). We will consider relations ⊢′ which extend the predicative definition
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as follows:
Γi ⊢
′ saysId ϕ iff u(i)Id |= ϕ (∀ϕ ∈ L)
In other words, the relation ⊢′ agrees with the predicative definition for propositional
formulas, but additional items may be provable when there are nested constructions.
Halpern [63] adopts a similar criterion for extending an autoepistemic logic to ac-
comodate nesting. Note that there are (infinitely) many relations ⊢′ satisfying the
condition above. We will motivate the additional inferences that are needed for nested
constructions in Chapter 4.
A relation ⊢′ that extends the predicative definition (in the sense discussed above)
has to support inferences of the form {saysId1 ϕ1, ..., saysIdn ϕn} ⊢ saysId ϕ. We now
identify two axioms and a rule, which are necessary to characterize these inferences,
and show that they are sufficient in Chapter 4 (see Theorem 4.4):
Proposition 2.3. The following are provable:
1. ⊢ saysId(ϕ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (saysId ϕ⇒ saysId ψ)
2. If ⊢L ϕ, then ⊢ saysId ϕ.
3. ⊢ saysId ϕ⇒ saysId′ ϕ for all Id ⊆ Id
′
Proof. We begin with some notation to faciliate the proofs. Given φ ∈ L, let F(Id,φ)
be the set of subsets (F ⊆ Reg with Fid ⊆ Id) such that F ∈ F iff Fpost ⊢L φ. Let
∆(Id,φ) be the set such that
∧
Fpre ∈ ∆(Id,φ) iff F ∈ F(Id,φ). It can be show that:
(∗) ⊢ saysId φ⇔
∨
∆(Id,φ)
Each direction follows easily from R3 and R4.
For the first iterm, using (∗):
⊢ saysId(ϕ⇒ ψ) ⇒
∨
∆(Id,ϕ⇒ψ)
⊢ saysId ϕ⇒
∨
∆(Id,ϕ)
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⊢
∨
∆(Id,ψ) ⇒ saysId ψ
Consider the set ∆ = {φ∧φ′|φ ∈ ∆(Id,ϕ⇒ψ), φ
′ ∈ ∆(Id,ϕ)}. By propositional reasoning,
⊢ saysId(ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (saysId ϕ ⇒
∨
∆) Furthermore, ∆ ⊆ ∆(Id,ψ), and so, ⊢
∨
∆ ⇒
∨
∆(Id,ψ). The desired result follows using propositional reasoning.
The second item is immediate from R3. For the third item, using (∗):
⊢ saysId ϕ⇒
∨
∆(Id,ϕ)
Using propositional reasoning, ⊢
∨
∆(Id,ϕ) ⇒
∨
∆(Id′,ϕ) for all Id ⊆ Id
′, since
∆(Id,ϕ) ⊆ ∆(Id′,ϕ). And, using propositional reasoning, ⊢ saysId ϕ⇒ saysId′ ϕ.
The first two items are analogs of the distribution axiom (A2) and the gener-
alization rule (R2), which hold for the global temporal modality (2). An operator
satisfying these two properties is known as a normal modal operator (c.f. [63]). The
third item gives us monotonicity of says, i.e., if we can deduce ϕ from a set of ut-
terances, then we can deduce it from a larger set of utterances. Note that inferences
from regulations are not necessarily monotonic, i.e., if we deduce saysId ϕ from Reg,
it is not necessary that we deduce saysId ϕ from all Reg
′ ⊇ Reg. The monotonicity
is w.r.t. utterances.
2.5 Related Work
In this section, we compare Refl to other non-monotonic formalisms that have been
applied to regulation. Examples include those based ondefault logic [26, 134], logic
programming [105, 136], and defeasible logic [56, 60]. We will use default logic to illus-
trate various issues, but the remarks apply to other systems as well. In Section 2.5.1,
we describe how rules in default logic can be translated to Refl, and consider the
interaction of the consistency checks with connectives. Section 2.5.2 describes how
references to list items can be expressed in Refl via the same mechanism that is used
to handle exceptions (the says predicate). Default logic needs separate mechanisms
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to handle such references. We then compare the use of priorities in default logic to
the says predicate (Section 2.5.3), and identify some directions for future work.
2.5.1 Default Rules in Refl
The following is an example of a rule in default logic:
ϕ : φ1, ..., φn
(id).o
ψ
The rule is read as “If ϕ, and φi is consistent for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ψ. Default rules
can be directly translated to Refl:
(id).o : ϕ ∧
∧n
i=1 ¬ saysID ¬φi 7→ ψ
φi is consistent is translated as ¬ saysID ¬φi, i.e., the rules do not say ¬φi. In Reiter’s
default logic [126], the consistency check is w.r.t. all the rules, and hence, in Refl,
we use the set of all identifiers ID. A limitation of default logic is that it does not
allow the mixing of consistency checks with the other connectives in the logic. For
example, it is not possible to state the equivalent of ϕ∨¬ saysID ¬φ. This limitation
is further magnified when we consider the addition of temporal operators. While
we can describe exceptions involving an eventuality (¬ saysID ¬3φ) in default logic,
exceptions that hold eventually (¬3 saysID ¬φ) cannot be described directly.
2.5.2 Lists
Lists are frequent in the CFR, and are used in a variety of ways. We discuss a simple
example here to illustrate how the says predicate can be used to preserve the structure
of lists. The following is an expanded version of the obligation from the CFR:
(12) Except as specified in (4) every donation of blood or blood component must
be tested for evidence of infection due to the following disease agents:
a. HIV Type 1
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b. HIV Type 2
c. Hepatitis B
d. ...
(12) conveys an obligation to perform tests for the detection of a list of disease, and
the exceptions can apply to tests for any of the diseases. Such lists can be easily
represented in Refl:
(12).o : d(x) ∧ says{12a,12b,12c}(list(y)) ∧ ¬ says{4}(¬3test(x, y)) 7→ 3test(x, y)
(12a) HIV Type1(z) 7→ list(z)
(12b) HIV Type2(z) 7→ list(z)
(12c) HepB(z) 7→ list(z)
...
The predicate list(z) is read as “z is listed”. HIV Type1(z) is read as “z is the
disease agent HIV Type1”. We assume that there is a unique object that satisfies
HIV Type1(z), i.e., it denotes a constant symbol. The formula says{12a,12b,12c}(list(y))
accesses the items that are listed by (12a)-(12c) and can be understood as the trans-
lation of the phrase the following disease agents. The predicate test(x, y) is read as
“x is tested for the disease agent y”. We note that a richer representation is needed
to accomodate reasoning about events, such as, tests and tests for a particular pur-
pose. In Chapter 3, we describe a case study using a prototype implementation that
extends Refl with an object-oriented representation of events.
While the list in (12a)-(12c) is simple, it illustrates the applicability of says for
constructions other than exceptions. In this example, the identifiers let us draw
inferences from particular list items, thereby allowing us to preserve the structure of
the list in logic. To our knowlege, this use of identifiers is novel to Refl. Previous
non-monotonic formalisms based on default logic [26, 134] and defeasible logic [56, 60]
make use of identifers to specify priorities over rules, and we will discuss this in the
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following example. However, the priorites are commonly specified in the meta-logic,
which limits its applicability to cases where rules are in conflict. To refer to list
items or definitions in particular sections, we need to parametrize predicates, such as,
list, with the identifier. This results in the need to maintain identifiers in the object
language for lists, and in the meta-language for priorities. The says predicate offers
a unified mechanism for these kinds of inter-sentential references.
2.5.3 Priorities
Let us consider an example of nested exceptions to illustrate the need for priorities
in default logic:
(13) Except as specified in (14), every donation of blood or blood component must
be tested for evidence of infection due to Hepatitis B.
(14) Except as specified in (15), you are not required to test donations of source
plasma for evidence of infection due to Hepatitis B.
(15) If a source plasma donation is used for treatment, it must be tested for Hep-
atitis B.
Such nested exceptions arise, for example, when a regulatory document is modified
over time. For example, the regulatory base may initially consist of only (13) and (14).
At some point, the regulator may realize that source plasma donations have unforseen
uses, and exceptions, such as (15), may be added. The sentences are represented in
Refl as follows:
(13).o : d(x) ∧ ¬ says{14} ¬3test(x) 7→ 3test(x)
(14).p : d(x) ∧ sp(x) ∧ ¬ says{15} 3test(x) 7→ ¬3test(x)
(15).o : d(z) ∧ sp(z) ∧ uft(z) 7→ 3test(x)
The predicate uft(z) is read as “z is used for treatment”. And, the other predicates
are read as before. Suppose we are given a donation o, which is a source plasma
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donation sp(o) and used for treatment uft(o). At the least fixed point, we obtain
utterances from (13) and (15) – (13,3test(o)) and (15,3test(o)). If a donation is not
used for treatment, we obtain utterances from either (13) or (14), as we discussed in
Section 2.3.2.
These statements are represented in default logic without priorities as follows:
d(x) : 3test(x)
(13).o
3test(x)
d(x) ∧ sp(x) : ¬3test(x)
(14).p
¬3test(x)
d(z) ∧ sp(z) ∧ uft(z)
(15).o
3test(x)
Since the consistency checks are w.r.t. all rules, in the case of a non-source plasma
donation, the preconditions of both (13) and (14) will be ungrounded at the least fixed
point. To avoid this, an order is specified over the rules [26], e.g., (15) > (14) > (13).
With the order over rules, the statements are interpreted in an analogous manner to
the corresponding statements in Refl above. The use of identifiers, as a parameter
to the says predicate, lets us avoid the need for a separate specification of priorities.
We conclude this section by discussing some limitations of Refl. While the
says predicate generalizes default logic with priorities, rules have to refer to their
exceptions. However, there are examples in the CFR where the exceptions refer to
the rule. Consider the following paraphrase of (14) and (15):
(16) You are not required to test donations of source plasma for evidence of infec-
tion due to Hepatitis B.
(17) If a source plasma donation is used for treatment, exemption (16) no longer
applies.
(16) and (17) would be expressed in Refl in a similar manner to (14) and (15), i.e.,
there would be a reference from (16) to (17) using says. However, the phrasing of
the sentences suggest that (17) refers to (16). Such references commonly arise in the
context of abrogation and annulment of laws [58]. In the example above, (17) annuls
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the permission provided by (16). Governatori and Rotolo [58, 59] analyse abrogation
and annulment by using a temporal version of defeasible logic. The analysis involves
the use of meta-rules which abrogate or annul other rules. However, the presence of
variables in Refl make matters more complicated. Only a subset of the utterances
produced are annulled. For example, (17) annuls the utterances produced by (16) for
source plasma donations that are used for treatment. We speculate that a solution
in Refl will involve the formalization of the word applies in (17) and its connection
to says. We leave an investigation to future work.
2.6 Conclusions
We have motivated and described a logic (Refl) that accomodates references between
laws. Inter-sentential references are expressed using formulas of the form saysId ϕ,
read as “the regulator says ϕ via the laws Id”. In Section 2.3, we formalized the
evaluation of says via a combination of techniques from Reiter’s default logic [127]
and Kripke’s theory of truth [85]. The says predicate offers a unified analysis of
various kinds of inter-sentential references, e.g., priorities of exceptions over rules
(Section 2.3.2), and references to definitions or list items (Section 2.5.2).
In Section 2.4, we discussed an axiomatization of the says predicate, and showed
that the predicative analysis satisfies the axioms of a normal modal operator. In
Chapter 4, we will use these axioms in a modal logic that combines saying with obli-
gation and permission, to formalize concepts of power that arise in privacy regulation.
While Refl provides an expressive mechanism for references, assessing confor-
mance is EXPTIME-hard (Section 2.3.3). It would be infeasible to use Refl to
check conformance w.r.t. traces with a large number of objects. The main obstacle is
the provability tests that are used in evaluating the says predicate. In the following
chapter, we develop algorithms for checking conformance at run time. We describe
an assumption which lets us compile out the predicate (by replacing it with tests of
lower complexity), leading to efficient checking in practice.
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Chapter 3
Conformance Checking at Runtime
In Chapter 2, we motivated and developed the logic Refl to accomodate interstential
references. The mechanism for references is a predicate (says) which is evaluated using
provability tests. In this chapter, we develop runtime checking algorithms for Refl,
and describe a case study conducted using a prototype implementation.
We begin, in Section 3.1, with some background on runtime checking for LTL,
based on the rule-based formalism Eagle [11]. Section 3.2 adapts the Eagle calculus
for Refl. While Refl allows for a direct representation of references, the provability
tests at runtime are expensive. In Section 3.3, we describe an assumption (based on
a case study of the CFR) which lets us compile out the provability tests, replacing it
with tests of lower complexity. The case study is described in Section 3.4.
3.1 Runtime Checking for LTL
In this section, we give some background on runtime checking for LTL. Section 3.1.1
introduces the concept of a monitor. Following Bauer et al. [14], in Section 3.1.2,
we interpret a monitor’s state using three values. In Section 3.1.3, we introduce the
rule-based formalism Eagle [11], which we will extend in the following section.
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3.1.1 Monitor
In runtime checking, we observe a run of a system, one state at a time. The evaluation
of a property at a point in time is based on the states seen so far, i.e., the prefix of
the run upto that point. We begin by developing some notaion for prefixes of runs,
and then, turn to the definition of a monitor.
Prefixes of Runs: Let S be the set of system states, where each state contains the
interpretation of atomic predicates, and F ⊆ S is a set of final states. A prefix of a
run is a finite sequence of states (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S
n. The set of all prefixes is denoted
by S∗ =
⋃
n∈N S
i ∪ {ǫ}. Given σ ∈ S∗, |σ| denotes the length of the prefix and σi
denotes the ith element for 1 ≤ i ≤ |σ|. A prefix is said to have terminated iff |σ| ≥ 1
and σ|σ| ∈ F .
A run R = (r, π1, ..., πn) is said to have the prefix σ ∈ S
∗ if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |σ|,
we have r(i) = σi and (o1, ..., oj) ∈ πj(p, σi) iff p(o1, ..., oj) ∈ σi. In addition, if σ
has terminated, then for all j > |σ|, we require that r(j) = σ|σ|. Note that if σ has
terminated, there is a unique run R which has the prefix σ, and we call R the run
generated by σ.
Monitors: A monitor for an LTL formula ϕ receives as input a prefix of a run,
one state at a time. On receiving a state, a monitor raises an alarm (denoted a) if
a violation is detected. Otherwise, no alarm is raised (denoted ā). We now define a
monitor formally:
Definition 3.1 (Monitor). A monitor for ϕ, denoted mϕ : S
∗ → {a, â}, is a function
such that for all terminated prefixes σ ∈ S∗, if the run R generated by σ is such that
(R, 1) 6|= ϕ, mϕ(σ) = a.
A monitor mϕ is optimal if for all σ ∈ S
∗, mϕ(σ) = ā iff there is a run R which
has the prefix σ and (R, 1) |= ϕ.
In other words, a monitor is guaranteed to raise an alarm if the run generated by
a terminated prefix does not satisfy ϕ. And, a monitor is optimal if it raises an alarm
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as early as possible, i.e., if no alarm is raised, then the prefix can be extended into a
run satisfying ϕ.
3.1.2 Three-Valued Monitors
There is an important difference between safety and liveness properties from the
perspective of runtime checking. For a global or safety property, e.g., 2p, a monitor
can raise an alarm as soon as it receives a state where p is not true, but it needs to
check every state for the truth of p. On the other hand, for an eventual or liveness
property, e.g., 3p, a monitor has to wait until the end of the run and raises an alarm
if p is false at all states, but it can stop checking as soon as it receives a state where p
is true. This difference suggests a three-valued interpretation of a monitor’s state [14]:
(a) ⊤ - True. No alarm will be raised, and no more states need to be checked.
(b) ? - Undetermined. Depends on future states.
(c) ⊥ - False. An alarm is raised.
Let B3 = {⊤, ?,⊥}. We can now define a three-valued monitor:
Definition 3.2 (Three-valued Monitor). Given a monitor mϕ, m
3
ϕ : S
∗ → B3 is a
three-valued interpretation of mϕ if for all σ ∈ S
∗, m3ϕ(σ) = ⊥ iff mϕ(σ) = a. In
addition, for all terminated prefixes σ ∈ S∗, if the run R generated by σ is such that
(R, 1) |= ϕ, m3ϕ(σ) = ⊤.
m3ϕ is optimal if mϕ is optimal and for all σ ∈ S
∗, m3ϕ(σ) = ⊤ iff for all runs R
which have the prefix σ, (R, 1) |= ϕ.
In other words, a three-valued interpretation m3ϕ agrees with the underlying mon-
itor mϕ on when an alarm is raised, and if m
3(σ) = ⊤, no more states need to be
checked. m3ϕ is optimal if it raises an alarm or stops checking as early as possible.
We can show the following:
Proposition 3.1. Given an LTL formula ϕ:
(1) There is a unique optimal monitor m̂ϕ and it has a unique optimal three-valued
interpretation m̂3ϕ
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(2) Given a prefix σ ∈ S∗, deciding whether m̂3ϕ(σ) = ⊥ is PSPACE-complete.
The first item follows easily from Definitions 3.1 and 3.2. For the second item,
the decision problem m̂3ϕ(σ) = ⊥ encodes the result of satisfiability testing, e.g.,
m̂3ϕ(ǫ) = ⊥ iff ϕ is not satisfiable. And, satisfiability testing for LTL is PSPACE-
complete.
It is often of interest to use extensions of LTL in monitors, for which the satis-
fiability question is undecidable. For example, Barringer et al. [11] allow arbitrary
Java expressions as atomic propositions, Basin et al. [13] use a variant of first-order
LTL, and Refl is more powerful than first-order LTL. In these cases, synthesizing
the optimal monitor is undecidable in general. However, there is a fragment of Refl,
which suffices for the CFR, and for which optimal monitors can be synthesized. We
will discuss this in Section 3.2.
3.1.3 The Eagle Formalism
We now describe the Eagle formalism [11] for monitor synthesis. The monitors
obtained are not optimal, but the mechanism generalizes naturally to extensions of
LTL. The core of the Eagle formalism is a calculus for transforming formulas based
on a state. The calculus (see [11]) provides a general treatment of past modalities
and data dependencies. For simplicity, we will work directly with formulas in the
logic. We begin by giving a brief sketch of the calculus, followed by a discussion of
two examples. Then, we present the formal definitions.
Sketch: Let us assume as given a propositionalized PredLTL formula ϕ, i.e., with
variables replaced by object names. When we receive a state s1, we transform the
formula ϕ into another formula ϕ1 = τ(ϕ, s1). On receiving the next state s2, we
transform ϕ1 into another formula ϕ2 = τ(ϕ1, s2) = τ(τ(ϕ, s1), s2). And, so on. After
receiving n states, we will have a formula ϕn. We use a function η to map formulas
to truth values. For example, if η(ϕn, sn) is true, then we will conclude that the run
satisfies ϕ. If η(ϕn, sn) is false, then we conclude that the run cannot be extended to
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satisfy ϕ. Otherwise, η(ϕn, sn) is undetermined, and we continue to wait for states.
However, if sn is a final state, we will ensure that η returns either true or false.
Example 1: Suppose we are given ϕ = 2p(o). On receiving the state s1 such that
p(o) ∈ s1, we transform ϕ into ϕ1 = τ(ϕ, s1) = τ(p(o), s1) ∧ 2p(o) = ⊤ ∧ 2p(o).
The truth value assigned to ϕ1 using the function η is (the conjuction of ⊤ and)
the truth value assigned to 2p(o). The truth value assigned to 2p(o) depends on
whether or not s1 is a final state. If s1 is not a final state, then η(2p(o), s1) is
undetermined. And, η(2p(o), s1) is true, if s1 is a final state. Thus, if s1 is non-final,
η(ϕ1, s1) is undetermined, and we will wait for the next state. If s1 is final, η(ϕ1, s1)
is true, and we will conclude that the run satisfies the fomula. However, if p(o) 6∈ s1,
τ(p(o), s1) = ⊥. As a result, η(ϕ1, s1) would be false (regardless of the truth value
assigned to 2p(o)), and we raise an alarm.
Example 2: An eventual formula ϕ = 3p(o) is handled via the duality with global
formulas, i.e., 3p(o) = ¬2¬p(o). Here, we can conclude that the formula is true
as soon as we see a state where p(o) is true. However, we need to wait till a final
state before we conclude that an eventuality has not been satisfied. To see that this
procedure is not optimal, consider the formula 3⊥. On receiving a state, we will
transform it into ⊥ ∨ 3⊥. But, we cannot detect that this formula is unsatisfiable
until a final state is received.
Formal definitions: We now turn to the formal defintions, starting with the
transformation function:
Definition 3.3 (Transformation function). The transformation function τ : L×S →
L is defined as follows:
• τ(p(o1, ..., oj), s) = ⊤ if p(o1, ..., oj) ∈ s and ⊥ otherwise
• τ(ϕ ∧ ψ, s) = τ(ϕ, s) ∧ τ(ψ, s), and τ(¬ϕ, s) = ¬τ(ϕ, s)
• τ(2ϕ, s) = τ(ϕ, s) ∧ 2ϕ
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The transformation function is extended to prefixes. Given σ = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S
∗, let
σ′ = (s2, ..., sn). Then, τ(ϕ, σ) = τ(τ(ϕ, s1), σ
′).
Next, we define a function to map formulas to truth values:
Definition 3.4 (Truth Value Mapping). The function η : L× S → B3 is defined as
follows:
• Predicates, conjunction, and negation are handled in the usual way.
• η(2ϕ, s) = ⊤ if s is a final state.
η(2ϕ, s) = ? otherwise.
Given a propositionalized PredLTL formula ϕ ∈ L, the Eagle monitor for ϕ,
denoted by mEϕ , is given by:
mEϕ (σ) = η(τ(ϕ, σ), σ|σ|)
In other words, we transform the formula at each state in the prefix and then assign a
truth value at the last state. It is easy to establish that mEϕ is a three valued monitor
(Defintion 3.2). We now extend this process of transforming and evaluating formulas
to accomodate references between laws.
3.2 Adapting the Eagle Calculus for Refl
The key idea is to treat the predicate saysId ϕ as kind of eventuality. As we discussed
in Section 2.3.2, to evaluate saysId ϕ at time i, we need to check the utterances
obtained from the laws in Id at time i. If the preconditions of the laws in Id are
temporal, we need to wait until they are evaluated before the utterances are obtained.
So, we need to keep utterances for a time i until all subformulas saysId ϕ for time i
have been evaluated. Given saysId ϕ and a time i, we attempt to evaluate it using
the current set of utterances. If we cannot determine the truth value, saysId ϕ is
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transformed into saysId(ϕ, i) (read as “saysId ϕ is true at time i”), and evaluated
at subsequent times. We extend the syntax of preconditions to accomodate such
formulas:
Definition 3.5 (Syntax of Preconditions). Given countable sets Φ1, ...,Φn (of pred-
icate names), object names O, and a set of variables X, the language L′(Φ1, ...,Φn,
O,X), abbreviated as L′, is the smallest set such that:
– p(y1, ..., yj) ∈ L
′, where p ∈ Φj and (y1, ..., yj) ∈ X
j.
– If ϕ ∈ L′, then ¬ϕ ∈ L′ and 2ϕ ∈ L′. If ϕ, ψ ∈ L′, then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L′
– If Id ⊆ ID and ϕ ∈ L(Φ1, ...,Φn, X) (Definition 2.2), then saysId ϕ ∈ L
′. In
addition, for all natural numbers i ∈ N , saysId(ϕ, i) ∈ L
′.
The syntax of regulatory statements (Definition 2.3) is modified so that the pre-
conditions of laws are statements from L′. The set L′ together with a set of regulatory
statements Reg is denoted by L+ = L′ ∪ Reg. Given a set of objects O, V (X,O)
denotes the set of all variable assigments, i.e., functions v : X → O.
We now extend the transformation function (Definition 3.3). As in Chapter 2,
we use two utterance sequences u and u′ such that for all i, u(i) ⊆ u′(i). u(i) is
the set of utterances obtained from laws with true preconditions, while u′(i) is set of
utterances from laws with true or undetermined preconditions. The truth of saysId ϕ
is determined using u, and falsity is determined using u′.
Definition 3.6 (Transformation function). Given a pair of utterance sequences u
and u′ such that u(i) ⊆ u′(i) for all i ∈ N , the transformation function τ(u,u′) :
L+ × S ×N → L+ is defined as follows:
• τ(u,u′)(saysId ϕ, s, i) = τ(u,u′)(saysId(ϕ, i), s, i)
τ(u,u′)(saysId(ϕ, j), s, i) =









⊤ if j ≤ i and u(j)Id |= ϕ
⊥ if j ≤ i and u′(j)Id 6|= ϕ
saysId(ϕ, j) otherwise
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• τ(u,u′)((id).o : ϕ 7→ ψ, s, i) = (id).o : τ(u,u′)(ϕ, s, i) 7→ τ(u,u′)(ψ, s, i)
τ(u,u′)((id).p : ϕ 7→ ψ, s, i) = (id).p : τ(u,u′)(ϕ, s, i) 7→ ψ
τ(u,u′)((id) ϕ 7→ ψ, s, i) = (id).p : τ(u,u′)(ϕ, s, i) 7→ ψ
• For all other formulas, Definition 3.3 is used.
Note that the postcondition of permissions are not transformed, as their truth
value is irrelevant. The only use of postconditions of permissions is to provide utter-
ances. We now define the function to map formulas to truth values:
Definition 3.7 (Truth Value Mapping). Given a pair of utterance sequences u and
u′ such that u(i) ⊆ u′(i) for all i ∈ N , the function η(u,u′) : L
+ × S × N → B3 is
defined as follows:
• η(u,u′)(saysId ϕ, s, i) = η(u,u′)(saysId(ϕ, i), s, i)
η(u,u′)(saysId(ϕ, j), s, i) = ?
• η(u,u′)((id).o : ϕ 7→ ψ, s, i) = η(u,u′)(ϕ⇒ ψ, s, i).
η(u,u′)((id).p : ϕ 7→ ψ, s, i) = ⊤
η(u,u′)((id) ϕ 7→ ψ, s, i) = ⊤
• For all other formulas, Definition 3.4 is used.
At the end of the trace, subformulas 2ϕ are replaced by ⊤, but subformulas
saysId(ϕ, j) may still be undetermined. This is due to the fact that with circular
references, we can create paradoxical statements – (id).o : ¬ says{id} ϕ 7→ ϕ. This
statement requires ϕ to hold when it doesn’t require ϕ, and is always undetermined.
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for computing the least fixed point in a
runtime setting. In addition to u and u′, we maintain a set of tuples Φ, where each
element is a transformed regulatory statement, the associated utterance, and time.
Given ((id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ, a, j) ∈ Φ, if ϕ is determined to be true, the utterance a is
added to u(j). On the other hand, if ϕ is determined to be false a is removed from
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Update(Reg,Φ, u, u′, s, i):
Input: The regulation Reg, the set of formulas to be updated Φ, the utterance
sequences u and u′, the state s and time i
Let u(i) = u′(i) = ∅;
Let Φ′ = ∅;
for all ((id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ, a, j) ∈ Φ do
Φ′ = Φ′ ∪ {τ(u,u′)((id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ, s, i)};
end
Φ = Φ′;
for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and assignments v do
Let φ = τ(u,u′)(v((id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ), s, i);
Φ = Φ ∪ {(φ, (id, v(ψ)), i)}, and u′(i) = u′(i) ∪ {(id, v(ψ))}
end
repeat
for all e = ((id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ, a, j) ∈ Φ do
Let φ = (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ;
If η(u,u′)(ϕ, s, i, v) = ⊤, then u(j) = u(j) ∪ {a};
If η(u,u′)(ϕ, s, i, v) = ⊥, then u
′(j) = u′(j) − {a};
If η(u,u′)(φ, s, i, v) 6= ? and η(u,u′)(ϕ, s, i, v) 6= ?, Φ = Φ − {e};
If η(u,u′)(φ, s, i, v) = ⊥, then raise alarm.
end
until u and u′ do not change ;
Algorithm 1: An algorithm for evaluating statements with references
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u′(j). For all j ∈ N , u(j) increases monotonically, and u′(j) decreases monotonically
with each execution of the repeat loop, until a fixed point is reached.
As we mentioned in Section 3.1, Algorithm 1 does not determine a formula to be
true or false as early as possible. To decide if a formula is true as early as possible,
we need to check whether all possible suffixes to the trace satisfy the formula [14]. In
other words, we need to decide if the transformed formula is valid. In Chapter 2, we
showed that with references one can encode formulas in first-order logic as regulations,
and as a result, the validity problem is undecidable. The satisfiability tests used to
evaluate the says predicate are in propositional LTL, and are decidable.
In the case where preconditions of laws are atemporal, optimal monitors can be
synthesized. This is because the fixed point can be computed as soon as a state is
received. The satisfaction of postconditions of obligations can then be handled using
automata-based algorithms [14]. The sentences that we have examined in Section 610
of the CFR can be formalized with atemporal preconditions.
3.3 Precomputing Satisfiability
The main practical difficulty with Algorithm 1 is the size of the satisfiability tests that
are used to evaluate the says predicate. In this section, we describe an empirically
motivated assumption that lets us compile out the says predicate, i.e., by replacing it
with tests of lower complexity during checking. Section 3.3.1 describes the assump-
tion, called the single copy property, by contrasting two examples. In Section 3.3.2,
we show how the assumption can be used to compile out the says predicate.
3.3.1 The Single Copy Property
The complexity of Algorithm 1 in each state of a run depends on two factors – the
number of steps necessary to reach a fixed point, and the size of the satisfiability
instances that need to be handled in the evaluation of the predicate saysId ϕ. We
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discuss examples that illustrate these two aspects, by encoding the graph reachability
problem in different ways. In the first example, the number of steps taken to reach
the fixed point grows with the number of objects. In the second example, the size of
the satisfiability instances grows with the number of objects.
Both examples operate on the same model, where a state in the run contains a
description of a graph. Objects o1 and o2 represent nodes, and the predicate δ(o1, o2)
is true iff there is an edge between o1 and o2. In addition, δ
+(o1, o2) is true iff there
is a path from o1 to o2. Suppose we wish to check whether δ
+ has been computed
correctly.
Example 1. Consider a self-referential sentence:
(id).o : δ(x, z) ∨ (δ(x, y) ∧ says{id} δ
+(y, z)) 7→ δ+(x, z)
The precondition of this sentence corresponds to the definition of a path. In other
words, there is a path between x and z (δ+(x, z)), if there is an edge between x
and y (δ(x, y)), and a path between y and z (says{id} δ
+(y, z)). Let u0, ..., uf be the
utterance sequences obtained in the least fixed point computation. It is easy to see
that (id, δ+(o, o′)) ∈ uj(i) iff there is a path of length at most j from o to o
′. Given a
graph with |O| nodes, there is a path from o to o′ iff there is a path of length at most
|O| from o to o′. As a result, the fixed point will be reached in at most |O| steps. The
worst-case number of steps needed to reach the fixed point is O(m× |O|k), where m
is the size of the regulation, and k is the maximum number of variables appearing in
a sentence.
Example 2. Consider now the following statements:
(A).o : says{B,C} δ
+(x, y) 7→ δ+(x, y)
(B).o : δ(x, y) 7→ δ+(x, y)
(C).o : ⊤ 7→ (δ+(x, y) ∧ δ+(y, z)) ⇒ δ+(x, z)
Note that A refers to C. The presence of implication in the postcondition of C is
an important feature of this example. Let, for simplicity, the graph in the state
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be a chain. Since the precondition of C is always true, the first step of the fixed
point computation yields an utterance that contains (C, (δ+(o, o′) ∧ δ+(o′, o′′)) ⇒
δ+(o, o′′)) ∈ u1(i) for all o, o
′, o′′ in the graph. The next step of the evaluation will
yield the fixed point, but the size of the validity test performed in this step is O(|O|3),
as Algorithm 1 uses all the available utterances. The worst-case size of the validity
instances is in O(m×|O|k), and the time complexity of a step in computing the fixed
point is O(2m×|O|
k
).
Discussion. In both examples above, Algorithm 1 checks validity instances of size
polynomial in |O|. However, there is a crucial difference in the maximum size of tests
that are needed. In Example 1, says{id} δ
+(o, o′) is true iff (id, δ+(o, o′)) ∈ u(i). In
other words, at most one utterance is need to evaluate says{id} δ
+(o, o′). In Example 2,
we do need validity tests of size |O| to evaluate says{B,C} δ
+(o, o′). A case study of the
CFR revealed that the references behaved like Example 1 in that a single utterance
or copy of the referenced statement suffices to evaluate formulas saysId ϕ. We call
this the single copy property.
Definition 3.8 (Single Copy Property). Given a body of regulation Reg, saysId(ϕ, j)
has the single copy property iff for all points (R, i), and utterance sequences (u, u′):
η(u,u′)(saysId(ϕ, j), R, i, v) =









⊤ if ψ |= v(ϕ) for some ψ ∈ u(j)Id
⊥ if ψ 6|= v(ϕ) for all ψ ∈ u′(j)Id
? otherwise
Verifying whether the single copy property holds is undecidable. We have not
been able to identify useful sufficient conditions for which the property holds. For ex-
ample, if the postconditions of laws are atomic predicates, then saysId(p(x), j) has the
single copy property. However, restricting postconditions to atomic predicates makes
the translation of regulation to logic more difficult. Furthermore, in the presence of
negation, the postconditions of laws can lead to the truth of saysId(⊥, j), unless the
preconditions ensure that this does not happen. As a result, a useful characterization
would have to involve restrictions on the preconditions as well. We leave an investi-
57
gation of these issues to future work. In the rest of this chapter, we will assume that
the single copy property holds, and study what advantages it offers in the checking
process.
The single copy property allows us to reduce the size of the satisfiability tests.
However, we need to perform O(m × |O|k) tests for each inference predicate. The
question arises as to whether satisfiability tests can be avoided during checking. We
answer this question positively in the following section.
3.3.2 The Pre-computation Procedure
In this section, we show that the single copy property gives us a way to assess satisfi-
ability symbolically, and use tests of lower complexity during checking. The strategy
we use is as follows. Given a body of regulation, we perform a compilation step
which involves: a) testing satisfiability, and b) replacing the predicates saysId ϕ by
equivalent formulas in another logic. We begin by discussing two examples, and then
formalize the compilation step.
Example 1: Consider our regulatory sentences:
• (3).o : d(x) ∧ ¬ says{4} ¬3test(x) 7→ 3test(x), and
• (4).p : d(y) ∧ sp(y) 7→ ¬3test(y)
Consider a state at which o1, o2, ..., on are source plasma donations. This would
result in ¬3test(o1), ¬3test(o2), ..., ¬3test(on) being available as utterances. To
evaluate saysId¬3test(oi), Algorithm 1 uses all the utterances in the satifiability test.
However, in this case, it suffices to check if ¬3test(oi) is present as an utterance. The
other utterances are irrelevant. To check if ¬3test(oi) is present as an utterance, it
suffices to evaluate the precondition of the referenced law, i.e., whether d(oi)∧ sp(oi)
is true (whether oi is a donation of source plasma). Instead of evaluating saysId φ
using satisfiability tests, we will check if the precondition of a referenced law is true.
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Informally, the compilation step involves anwering the question when does state-
ment 2 provide an exception for statement 1. Equivalently, when does ¬3test(y)
imply ¬3test(x). The answer is only when y = x. We can then evaluate the pre-
condition of 2 with y replaced by x, i.e., d(x) ∧ sp(x). This lets us replace state-
ment 1 with (3).o : d(x) ∧ ¬(d(x) ∧ sp(x)) 7→ 3test(x), which is equivalent to
(3).o : d(x)∧¬sp(x) 7→ 3test(x). Observe that this is the derived obligation implied
by statements 1 and 2, i.e., every non-source plasma donation must be tested.
Example 2: The example above is simple in two ways: a) the number of variables
in both statements are the same, and b) the references are acyclic. We discuss the
general case in the context of the reachability example we saw in the previous section:
(id).o : δ(x, z) ∨ (δ(x, y) ∧ says{id} δ
+(y, z)) 7→ δ+(x, z)
We observe that the precondition is structurally similar to a procedure that checks
if a path exists between two nodes x and z. That is, if δ(x, z) then δ+(x, z) is true.
Otherwise, if there exists y such that δ(x, y) and there is a path from y to z, then
δ+(x, z) is true, otherwise false.
We will produce a formula which mimics the procedure. There are two pieces of
machinery used by the procedure that are not directly available in the logic: a) an
existential quantifier over objects (there exists y), and b) a mechanism for recursion.
To address this, let us consider a logic which extends PredLTL with existential quan-
tifiers, and a function symbol Pid for id ∈ ID (P stands for precondition). Pid takes as
argument a substitution θ : X → X, which is a function from variables to variables.
A substitution is represented a set of replacements x/y (read as “x is replaced by y”),
such that each variable has at most one replacement. We replace the formula above
with:
(id).o : δ(x, z) ∨ (δ(x, y) ∧ ∃y1 : Pid({x/y, y/y1, z/z})) 7→ δ
+(x, z)
It remains to give this formula a semantics. Given a variable assignment v and
a subtitution θ, θ(v) denotes the variable assignment v′ such that v′(x) = v(θ(y)).
Given a point (R, i) and regulation Reg, the idea is to say that (R, i, v) |= Pid(θ) iff
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(R, i, θ(v)) |= ϕ where (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg. We now formalize the compilation
procedure.
Compiling References into Precondition Tests: We begin by defining the syntax
of compiled preconditions:
Definition 3.9 (Syntax of Compiled Preconditions). Given sets Φ1, ...,Φn (of pred-
icate names), a set of variables X, and a finite set of identifiers ID, the language
L′C(Φ1, ...,Φn, X, ID), abbreviated as L
′
C, is the smallest set such that:
• If t ∈ B3, t ∈ L′C. And, p(y1, ..., yj) ∈ L
′
C where p ∈ Φj and (y1, ..., yj) ∈ X
j.
• If ϕ ∈ L′C, then ¬ϕ ∈ L
′
C and 2ϕ ∈ L
′
C. If ϕ, ψ ∈ L
′
C, then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L
′
C
• If ϕ ∈ L′C, for all y ∈ X, we have ∃y : ϕ ∈ L
′
C.
• For all id ∈ Id and substitutions θ : X → X, we have Pid(θ) ∈ L
′
C. In addition,
for all natural numbers i ∈ N , Pid(θ, i) ∈ L
′
C
The syntax of regulatory statements (Definition 2.3) is modified so that the precon-
ditions of laws are statements from L′C . The set L
′
C together with a set of regulatory
statements RegC is denoted by L
+
C = L
′
C ∪RegC . We remind the reader that L
+ and
L′ are the languages with the predicate saysId ϕ.
The semantics of L+C is defined in a manner similar to L
+. Rather than using
utterances (u, u′), we now evaluate statements w.r.t. two sets of assignment functions
(γ, γ′). γ(i, id) (resply., γ′(i, id)) is a set of variable assignments for which the pre-
condition of the law with identifier id is true (resply., true or undetermined). As with
utterances, we require that for all i ∈ N and id ∈ ID, γ(i, id) ⊆ γ′(i, id). Given an
assignment v and a substitution θ, θ(v) denotes the assignment v′ such that for all
y ∈ X, we have v′(y) = v(θ(y)). We can now adapt the η function:
η(γ,γ′)(Pid(θ, j), R, i, v) =







⊤ if θ(v) ∈ γ(j, id)
⊥ if θ(v) 6∈ γ′(j, id)
? otherwise
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The definitions of fixed points are easily adapted, and we leave the details to the
reader.
We now describe the compilation procedure. Given ϕ ∈ L+, we use X(ϕ) to
denote the set of variables appearing in ϕ, and θ(ϕ) to denote the formula obtained
by performing the substitution θ on ϕ. Consider saysId(ϕ, j), which has the single
copy property, and variables disjoint from all regulatory statements:
• Let S(ϕ, id) = { θ| (id).x : φ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg, and |= θ(ψ ⇒ ϕ)}.
• For all θ ∈ S(ϕ, id), let φ′ = (id).x : φ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg. We define the formula:
ϕC(θ, j, id) = ∃z1, ..., zm : Pid(θ, j)
Where the existentially quantified variables are in one-to-one correspondence
with those in X(φ′) − X(ϕ). More formally, zj 6∈ X(φ
′) ∪ X(ϕ) and θ is a
one-to-one function from {zj |1 ≤ j ≤ m} to X(φ
′) −X(ϕ).
• ϕC(saysId(ϕ, j), id) =
∨
{ϕC(θ, j, id)|θ ∈ S(ϕ, id)}, and
• ϕC(saysId(ϕ, j)) =
∨
{ϕC(saysId(ϕ, j), id)|id ∈ Id}
We note that the first step makes crucial use of the single copy property (SCP).
In computing S(ϕ, id), it suffices to find substitutions such that |= θ(ψ ⇒ ϕ). If the
SCP does not hold, then we need to check if multiple copies of postconditions provide
the necessary implication (as in Example 2, Section 3.3.1). For example, we need to
check if θ(ψ1 ∧ ...∧ψn ⇒ ϕ), where ψ1, ..., ψn are copies of the postcondition of a law
with the variables renamed. It can be shown that detecting whether the SCP holds
is undecidable. In future work, we plan to investigate restrictions on postconditions
that make SCP-detection decidable.
To prove the correctness of the compilation procedure, we use a notion of cor-
respondence between utterances and assignments. Let us assume as given a body
of regulation Reg (in L+), a run R and consistent utterances (u, u′). Rather than
producing a regulation in L+C , we prove correctness by evaluating formulas in L
′
C
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against Reg. We construct (γu, γ
′
u′) such that for all i ∈ N and id ∈ ID, v ∈ γu(i, id)
iff (id, v(ψ)) ∈ u(i), and v ∈ γ′u′(i, id) iff (id, v(ψ)) ∈ u
′(i). We can now show the
following:
Lemma 3.1. Given a body of regulation Reg, a run R, utterance sequences (u, u′),
and saysId ϕ, j which has the single copy property, for all i ∈ N and assignments v:
η(u,u′)(saysId(ϕ, j), R, i, v) = η(γu,γ′u′ )(ϕC(saysId θ, j), R, i, v)
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from the construction of ϕC(saysId θ, j)
and the single copy property. We sketch one of the cases.
Suppose η(u,u′)(saysId(ϕ, j), R, i, v) = ⊤. There exists (id, v
′(ψ)) ∈ u(i) such
that v′(ψ) ∧ v(¬ϕ) is not satisfiable, or equivalently v′(ψ) ⇒ v(ϕ) is valid. It fol-
lows that there exists a substitution θ such that θ(ψ ⇒ ϕ) is valid. By definition
v′ ∈ γu(i), and hence, η(γu,γ′u′)(Pid(θ, j), R, i, v
′) = ⊤. We can then argue using
the construction that η(γu,γ′u′)(∃z1, ..., zm : Pid(θ, j), R, i, v) = ⊤, and as a result,
η(γu,γ′u′)(ϕC(saysId(θ, j)), R, i, v) = ⊤. The other cases are handled similarly.
Given Reg in which all subformulas saysId ϕ have the single copy property, we can
now produce the regulation RegC in L
+
C with all occurences of saysId ϕ replaced by
ϕC(saysId ϕ). It follows from Lemma 3.1 that if (u, u
′) is a fixed point w.r.t. Reg,
then (γu, γ
′
u′) is a fixed point w.r.t. RegC . In addition, the truth values assigned to
regulatory statements are identical.
The complexity of evaluation depends on the number of disjuncts in ϕC(saysId ϕ),
which in turn depends on the size of the set: S(ϕ, id). |S(ϕ, id)| ≤ (2k)2k, where k
is the maximum number of variables in a regulatory statement. (2k)2k is a bound
on the number of equivalence classes, i.e., we have 2k variables (k in ϕ and k in ψ)
and at most one equivalence class for each variable. Hence, the size of ϕC(saysId ϕ)
is O(m× (2k)2k), where m is the number of regulatory statements. Each quantified
precondition test can be evaluated in O(|O|k) time, where O is the set of objects. As
a result, the time complexity for evaluating ϕC(saysId ϕ) is O(m× (2k)
2k × |O|k). In
the sections of the CFR that we have formalized, |S(ϕ, id)| ≤ 1, and the observed
62
time complexity is O(m × |O|k). As a result, it is much more efficient to check the
compiled formulas, as opposed to testing satisfiability during checking.
3.4 Case Study
We now discuss a case study conducted using a prototype implementation of the
checker. In Section 3.4.1, we describe the interface between the regulation and traces
(schemas), and how the logic operates over instances of schemas. We then turn to the
formalization of Section 610.40 of the FDA CFR in Refl (Section 3.4.2). Section 3.4.3
shows that the approach is practicable by considering the performance of the checker
on (synthetic) states with a large number of objects.
3.4.1 Schemas, Predicates, and the SAT Solver
Schemas form the interface between the regulation and trace. A schema is a set of
class and type definitions. Classes can inherit from others, and have attributes which
have atomic types, tuples or unions of types, pointers to other objects or sets of
values. Figure 3.1 shows the schema definition for donations. The attributes include
the material of the donation (blood or source plasma), the donor (which is a pointer
to an object carrying information about the donor), the recepient of the donation,
and the tests that have been performed.
Predicates are defined using the schema. Figure 3.2 gives two predicate defintions.
pDedicatedDonation(x) is true iff the donation x has an identified recepient. The
CFR 610.40 gives permissions not to test certain dedicated donations. The predicate
pTestFor(x, y) is true iff the donation x has been tested for the disease y. Predicates
are type-checked against the schema, to ensure that checks on attributes have a well-
defined meaning.
The syntax for predicates is based in part on the OCaml language. Once the pred-
icate has been type-checked, it is compiled into a modal (description) logic (c.f. [9]).
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class cDonation =
(* The material can be either blood or source plasma *)
fMaterial : tDonationMaterial
fDonor : cDonor
(* The hospital or laboratory receiving the donation *)
fOrgRecepient : cDonationHandler
(* The final recepient *)
fEndRecepient :
Some of cPerson
| Unknown
(* The use, e.g., transfusion, research *)
fIntendedUse : tDonationUse
(* The tests that have been performed *)
fTests : set of cTest
Figure 3.1: Schema definition for donations
The compilation target, which we call Graded Hybrid Logic (GHL), is a combination
of graded modal logic [48] (which is modal logic with counting quantifiers) with the
nominal expressions of hybrid logic [7]. The syntax allows for predicates which cannot
be compiled into GHL, and in such cases, the user is warned that the predicate is
treated as atomic for the purposes of inference.
The predicate definitons (in GHL) are then combined using connectives and tem-
poral operators. We have implemented a SAT solver for GHL, which uses a standard
tableaux algorithm with BDD-based backtracking. The solver is schema-aware, e.g.,
given a donation x, if x is not a donation of blood, we will infer that x is a donation of
source plasma. For the temporal operators, we use the tool LTL2BA [52], which pro-
duces a Buchi automaton representing all possible runs that an LTL formula accepts.
We modified LTL2BA to interact with our solver for GHL, since LTL2BA assumes
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(** Is x a dedicated donation, i.e., intended for
an identified recepient *)
predicate pDedicatedDonation (x : cDonation) =
match x.fEndRecepient with
Some(y) -> true
| _ -> false
(* Donation x is tested for the disease y *)
predicate pTestFor (x : cDonation) (y : cDiseaseConst) =
exists z in x.fTests:
z.fTestPurpose = y
Figure 3.2: Two predicate defintions. pDedicatedDonation(x) is true iff the donation
x has an identified recepient. pTestFor(x, y) is true iff the donation x has been tested
for the disease y
that propositions are atomic, while our propositions have notions of quantification.
3.4.2 Formalizing the Regulation
We have manually translated Sections 610.11 and 610.40 of the CFR into Refl. We
given an overview of the formalization. Then, we evaluate Refl qualitatively via
a discussion of four examples. Finally, we use the annotation of logical form (see
Chapter 5) to provide some quantitative insights into the coverage of the logic.
Overview: Table 3.1 gives a breakdown of the various types of rules and formulas
that were used in translating CFR 610.11 and 610.40 into Refl. The columns corre-
spond to the number of obligations, permissions, other rules (which typically consist
of list items), and intersentential references formalized using the says predicate. For
example, in CFR 610.40, we formalized 12 obligations, 5 permissions, 6 list items
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Document Obligations Permissions Other says
CFR 610.11 10 6 3 13
CFR 610.40 12 5 6 8
Table 3.1: Types of rules and formulas used in translating CFR 610.11 and 610.40
into RefL
corresponding to disease names, and a total of 8 instances of the says predicate were
used. There are a total of 42 rules (in both documents), and 21 instances of the says
predicate. In other words, the says predicate is used once in every two rules. We now
turn to a discussion of examples.
Example 1: Figure 3.3 shows the translation of CFR 610.40 Paragraph (a) into
Refl. The predicate says is used twice in the precondition. says./∗ list(z) is the
translation of the phrase “the following communicable disease agents”, and is under-
stood as follows. ./∗ is an expression to select the sub-paragraphs. The predicate
list(z) is a convenient way to represent lists of noun phrases. For example, the list
item “(3) Hepatitis B virus” is represented as:
(3) z.fName = Hepatitis(B) 7→ list(z)
This rule lists the object representing the disease name “Hepatitis B”, and the
utterance obtained can be used to access the object. The other says predicate in
Figure 3.3 is ¬ says[c,d] ¬pTestFor(x, z), which is the translation of the clause “Except
as specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section”.
Example 2: Figure 3.4 shows the translation of CFR 610.40 Paragraph (d) into
Refl. Paragraph (d) provides exceptions to the tests required in Paragraph (a), for
“autologous donations”. Autologous donations are those that are made by a donor for
herself, e.g., prior to surgery. Paragraph (d)(1) cancels this exemption under certain
conditions, with the phrase “must be tested under this section”. A direct translation
of Paragraph (d)(1) would give us an obligation of the form:
((d)(1)).o : ϕ(x) ∧ says610/40/∗ test(x) 7→ test(x)
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[a (** Except as specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section,
you ... must test each donation ... for evidence of infection
due to the following communicable disease agents:
(1) Human immunodeficiency virus, type 1;
(2) Human immunodeficiency virus, type 2;
(3) Hepatitis B virus; ...**)
obligation (x : cDonation) (z : cDiseaseConst) =
(** x is a donation of human blood or blood component, used in
a product or device **)
pHumanDonation x && (pUsedInProduct x || pUsedInDevice x) &&
(** z is a disease agent listed below
and no exception is granted by other laws **)
(says ( ./* ) (listDisease z)) && !(says ( [c, d] ) !(pTestFor x z))
-->
(* If I, II and III hold, x must be tested for z *)
pTestFor x z
[1 rule (z : cDiseaseConst) = z.fName = HIV(Type1) --> list z]
[2 rule (z : cDiseaseConst) = z.fName = HIV(Type2) --> list z]
[3 rule (z : cDiseaseConst) = z.fName = Hepatitis(B) --> list z]
Figure 3.3: CFR 610.40 Paragraph (a) and its translation in logic
Where ϕ(x) checks some conditions on the donation. The obligation is understood
as “If ϕ(x) holds and test(x) is required in this section, then x must be tested”. This
translation of (d)(1) gives rise to a circular reference to Paragraph (a), leaving (a),
(d), and (d)(1) ungrounded at the least fixed point. However, there exists a maximal
fixed point where the donation is required to be tested. There are three options when
faced with such a circular reference:
1. Assess conformance w.r.t. maximal fixed points
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[d (** Autologous donations. You,..., are not required to test donations
of blood...from autologous donors for evidence of infection due to
the disease agents listed in paragraph (a) of this section...,
except: (1) If you allow any autologous donation to be used for
allogeneic transfusion, you must assure that all autologous
donations are tested under this section;... *)
permission (x : cDonation) (z : cDiseaseConst) =
(** x is an autologous donation, i.e., intended for the donor herself.
And, z is a disease listed in paragraph (a) *)
pAutologousDonation x && (says ( [a]/* ) (list z)) &&
(** There is no exception *)
!(says (./[1-3]) (cancel x))
-->
!(there exists z in x.fTests : true)
[1
rule (x : cDonation) =
pAutologousDonation x &&
x.fCollector.fAllowsAutologousForAllogeneicTransfusion
-->
(cancel x) ]]
Figure 3.4: CFR 610.40 Paragraph (d) and its translation in logic. A direct translation
of the phrase “tested under this section” in (d)(1) results in a circular reference to
paragraph (a), leaving (a), (d), and (d)(1) ungrounded. The cancel predicate is used
to break this cycle.
2. Issue a warning if the precondition of an obligation is ungrounded, and the
postcondition is false
3. Break the cycle by introducing a new predicate
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[(a) obligation (x : cDonation) (z : cDiseaseConst) =
(pHumanDonation x) && (pUsedInProduct x || pUsedInDevice x) &&
(z.fName = HIV Type1) || (z.fName = HIV Type2) ||
(z.fName = Hepatitis B) || (z.fName = Hepatitis C) ||
(z.fName = HTLymph Type1) || (z.fName = HTLymph Type2) &&
!((Exists (x15 : cThirtyDayPeriodConst):
(pDedicatedDonation x && !(pFirstDonationInPeriod x x15) &&
pUsedForTransfusion x)) || (pSourcePlasma x) &&
((z.fName = HTLymph Type1) || (z.fName = HTLymph Type2)) ||
(match x.fIntendedUse with
Device d -> !d.fContainsViableLeucocytes | _ -> false) &&
((z.fName = HTLymph Type1) || (z.fName = HTLymph Type2)) ||
(match x.fIntendedUse with
ClinicalTesting | Research -> true | _ -> false) ||
(CFR61040.pAutologousDonation x) &&
!((x.fCollector.fAllowsAutologousForAllogeneicTransfusion) ||
(x.fOrgRecepient.fAllowsAutologousForAllogeneicTransfusion) ||
(Exists (x25 : cThirtyDayPeriodConst):
(pAutologousDonation x && pFirstDonationInPeriod x x25 &&
!x.fOrgRecepient.fAllowsAutologousForAllogeneic))))
-->
(CFR61040.pTestFor x z)]
Figure 3.5: CFR 610.40 Paragraph (a), after the says predicate is compiled out.
The first option of computing maximal fixed points is infeasible, as there can be
exponentially many. The second option is supported by our implementation. And,
for the last option, we detect cycles and present them to the user, who can then
introduce a new predicate. In Figure 3.4, the predicate cancel(x) is used to break
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the cycle. We note that the cycle detection is carried out after we compile out the
satisfiability tests (as in Section 3.3.2). This ensures that only cycles leading to
ungrounded precondition are presented to the user.
Example 3: We now discuss some issues in sententially translating CFR 610.11 into
Refl. Consider the following sentences:
(18) A general safety test for the detection of extraneous toxic contaminants shall be
performed on biological products intended for administration to humans.
(19) The general safety test is required in addition to other specific tests prescribed in
the additional standards for individual products in this subchapter, except that, the
test need not be performed on those products listed in paragraph (g) of this section.
It is not possible to translate (18) and (19) separately into Refl. (18) conveys a
requirement to perform “a general safety test”, and (19) reiterates this requirement,
while providing exceptions. The problem arises because: (A) there is an incomplete-
ness in (18), i.e., the exception is not provided, and (B) there is a redundancy in
(19), i.e., the requirement is reiterated. To translate these sentences into Refl, we
combine them into the following obligation:
(20) Except as specified in paragraph (g) of this section, a general safety test ... shall be
performed on biological products ...
It is easy to translate (20) into Refl. We note that the permission given by (19)
is restated in paragraph (g) of CFR 610.11.
Example 4: Consider the following sentences:
(21) The general safety test shall be performed as specified in this section...
a. The general safety test shall be conducted upon a representative sample of the
product in the final container from every final filling of each lot of the product.
b. The duration of the general safety test shall be 7 days for both species, except
that a longer period may be established for specific products in accordance with
Sec. 610.9.
It is unclear how to translate (21) into Refl, due to the phrase “as specified in
this section”. At one level, it is just an informational requirement, i.e., as long as
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one conforms to the rest of the requirements (such as (21a) and (21b)), one conforms
to (21). However, we will need to interpret (21a) and (21b) as quantifying over all
general safety tests. For example, we can interpret (21a) as:
(22) If a general safety test is required to be performed on a product, then it shall be
conducted upon a representative sample of the product...
It is easy to translate (22) into Refl. However, the question is whether there is a
way to translate (21) into Refl, so that we can avoid such paraphrases. We believe
that the central problem is the analysis of the phrase “the general safety test” – what
is the test that is being referred to? There are several possibilities for formalization
within Refl, and we leave an investigation to future work.
Coverage: The discussion of examples gives us a qualitative way to evaluate Refl.
A question arises as to whether there is a more quantitative way to do it. The best
test is, of course, to translate large bodies of regulation into Refl, and evaluate how
it corresponds to the text. However, doing this would be quite time consuming. In
Chapter 5, we describe an annotation of logical form on about 200 sentences of Section
610 of the CFR. While logical form is not quite the same as logic, our hope is that it
can serve as an approximation to the logic, in order to evaluate it quantitatively. We
take a preliminary step toward this end, here, by studying the distribution of clause
a verb phrase modifiers.
Number of Temporal and Purpose Other References Other
Instances Conditional to Laws
333 29.1% 28% 30.2% 12.7%
Table 3.2: Subtypes of clause and verb phrase modifiers.
Table 3.2 gives a breakdown of clause and verb phrase modifiers found in Section
610 of the CFR. Temporal and conditonal modifiers (29.1%) include, for example,
“before”, “after”, “if”, and “except as”. The purpose modifiers (28%) are signalled
by “for”. Other references to to laws (30.2%) are introduced by “as”, “under”, and
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“according to”. Note that the temporal and conditional (and exceptional) modifiers
introduce references to laws as well. The other modifiers include cases which we have
not categorized yet, e.g., “regardless”, “notwithstanding”.
The temporal and conditional/exceptional modifiers are adequately handled by
Refl. However, the modifers conveying references to laws need further investigation.
Refl provides no special capabilities for purpose modifiers, but the notions of purpose
in the CFR 610.40 are simple, and constant symbols suffice. We conclude that the
Refl accomodates approximately 57.1% of modifiers (the first two columns), needs
to be extended to accomodate another 30.2%, and the remaining 12.7% needs to
be categorized. We note that 57.1% is an upper bound, because the temporal and
conditional modifiers may include contain some other constructs that we do not know
how to formalize.
3.4.3 Precomputing Satisfiability and Checking Traces
We compiled out the says predicate in the formal versions of CFR 610.11 and 610.40,
using the techniques in Section 3.3.2. The compilation step took 14s with 160 sat-
isfiability tests. Figure 3.5 shows the result of compiling out says from Paragraph
(a). The original Refl translation is given in Figure 3.3. If we used a logic without
inter-sentential references, the representation in Figure 3.5 would have to be created
directly. This would involve translating phrases from different portions of the doc-
ument, as the precondition in Figure 3.5 contains items from Paragraphs (a), (c),
and (d). It would be difficult to preserve any correspondence to the document, and
correct errors in the logical translation. By using the compilation procedure, we are
able to track every subformula to the sentence from which it came.
Our current implementation of the trace-checker is static in the sense that the
entire trace is stored on disk (in an NDBM database). The objects at each state
belong to classes in a given schema. The regulation, which is type-checked against
the same schema, is compiled using the techniques discussed in Section 3.3.2, and
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evaluated at each state. We do not have any special optimizations for speed. The
objects are stored as strings, and reparsed every time they are loaded into memory.
The checker evaluates each obligation w.r.t. all variable assignments, loading into
memory a single variable assignment at a time.
We now describe a preliminary evaluation of the checker. Our goal was to check
if we could scale to traces with a large number of objects, rather than very long
traces. To do this, we checked a number of synthetically generated (final) states for
conformance. Given the schema for FDA CFR 610.40, we generated a set of donors
by choosing random values for atomic attributes. For each donor we generate a set
of donations again choosing attribute values at random. Each donation is randomly
tested as follows: with p = 0.3 it is tested for all diseases with negative results, with
p = 0.3 it is test for diseases with a random result, and otherwise it is not tested.
We evaluated performance of the checker against a number of states. The number
of disease names was 8, and the number of donations varied. The time taken varied
linearly with a number of donations. For states with 100, 1000, 5000, and 10000 dona-
tions the conformance check took 12s, 130s, 500s, and 1042s resply. The performance
suggests that the approach is practical for checking short traces. However, for longer
traces, re-evaluating the regulation w.r.t. all variable assignments at each state can
be expensive. We need to have notions of incrementality, to activate evaluation only
when a new object enters the system.
3.5 Conclusions
We have described the checking process for Refl, which allows statements to refer to
others for conditions or exceptions. While RefL give us a way to represent regulation
directly, the evaluation of references during checking has high complexity. Algorithm 1
uses satisfiability tests of size polynomial in the number of objects. In Section 3.3, we
described an emprically motivated assumption (the single copy property), which lets
us replace satifiablity tests with tests of lower complexity. The case study using our
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prototype implementation (Section 3.4) suggests that Refl offers a convenient way
to formalize regulations, and that the approach is suitable for conformance audits
of medium-sized traces. A discussion of examples and a study of the distribution of
modifiers, in Section 3.4.2, led us identify avenues for further inquiry.
There are several optimizations that can be applied to our implementation to make
it more efficient. For example, when a new object is added to a system or an attribute
of an object changes, we would like to find the smallest set of variable assignments
under which the regulation needs to be evaluated. Since there are pointers between
objects, potentially any object that is pointed to or reachable from a modified object
may need re-evaluation. We are currently exploring ways to use the schema and the
structure of regulatory statements to determine what to re-evaluate.
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Chapter 4
Permission to Speak
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we turn to the analysis of obligation and permission, and their inter-
action with saying. We motivate and develop a formalism by considering problems in
– (a) access control, (b) legal powers, and (c) conformance checking. We begin with
a discussion of prior work, and the problems that we are addressing.
Access Control: Access control is an important problem in trust management sys-
tems. Informally, a trust management system involves a set of actors or principals,
and a set of controlled or regulated actions, e.g., accessing medical information, or
downloading a song. The goal of such a system is to administrate requests to perform
actions. Trust management systems are commonly decomposed into two (interact-
ing) components [1]: (a) authentication - determining the source of a request, and
(b) access control - determining whether a request is permitted according to a policy.
Abadi et al. [3] cast access control as a problem for logic. We assume as given an
action (p), which is controlled by a principal (A), and a request to perform p from a
principal (B). Access is granted if we can prove, using A’s policy, that A says that
B is permitted to perform p. In access control logics, such as [1–3, 50, 51], says is
treated as a (modal) operator. However, the use of an operator for permission has
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not been explored.
The concept of representation is prevalent in access control policies, and it forms
the central focus of this work. Representation arises in situations where a principal
is held to declarations made on her behalf (cf. [53]). For example, consider a scenario
where a software company authorises project managers to permit their team members
to access the production server. If a project manager says that a team member is
permitted to access the server (on behalf of the company), we conclude that the
company says that the team member is permitted to access the server. In such a
scenario, project managers represent the company on permitting access to the server.
All access control logics provide principals with the capability to let other principals
represent them on statements. In the example above, the company would say, in its
policy, that “Project managers represent the company on permitting team members
to access the production server”. The manner in which such a policy is formally
expressed depends on the logic, and we will discuss a few choices in later sections.
In this chapter, we argue for an explicit account of permission in a logic for access
control. We motivate and develop a logic that combines saying and permission, using
an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf of another. The combination
leads us to a novel account of representation. In the logics of saying, where there is no
notion of permission, representation is accommodated using variants of the hand-off
axiom [1]. Abadi [1] pointed out some problematic interactions between the hand-off
axiom and classical reasoning, which we will discuss in detail in Section 4.2.2. The
use of permission provides a way to avoid these problems. An explicit account of
permission leads naturally to an explicit account of obligation, which in turn leads us
to examine legal powers and conformance checking. We now introduce these topics.
Legal Power: Representation is a special case of the broader concept of legal power.
Hohfeld, in his seminal work, defined the concept of power as follows [69, Page 44]:
A person (or persons) may be said to have the power to effect a change
in legal relations, if the change in legal relations results from some super-
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added facts that are under his volitional control.
We decompose this definition into three components, to give the main intuitions for
our approach:
1. The description of the power - A principal (A) grants the power of representation
to another principal (B) on certain statements, if A says that B is permitted to
issue those statements (on her behalf).
2. The “superadded facts” by which a power is exercised - B exercises the power
of representation by issuing statements on behalf of A.
3. The change in legal relations - If A grants the power of representation to B,
and B exercises this power, then we will infer that the statement issued by B
is issued by A as well.
The logical analysis of power has been of interest for several years [53, 74, 75, 79, 95].
Our approach is related to two lines of research. With regard to the description of
power (Item 1 above), Lindahl [95, Part II] (see also [74]) suggested that various
notions of power can be distinguished by nesting obligations and permissions with
an action modality. Saying is our analog of the action modality. With regard to the
change in legal relations (Item 3 above), Jones and Sergot [75] and Gelati et al. [53]
describe general frameworks to reason about situations where an act by a principal
counts as a means to create a state of affairs within an institution. We consider a
restricted scenario where a statement by one principal counts as an identical statement
made by another principal. However, in [53, 75], the concept of counts as is taken to
be the description of power itself, and it is independent of the concept of permission.
The dependence of power on permission, in our approach, leads us to a novel analysis
of recursive notions of power, e.g., “empowerment to empower”. We discuss the
differences in Section 4.4.2.
Conformance Checking: The problems of access control, representation, and power
arose for us while extending our approach to privacy regulation. We briefyl reintro-
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duce the problem of conformance here, and discuss how the ideas in Chapter 2 relate
to this chapter in Section 4.2.4. In conformance, one is interested in checking whether
the operations of organizations obey a policy. We are given a policy and a description
of an organization’s operations (as a state or trace). An organization (A) is confor-
mant if we can prove that for all p, if the policy says that A is required or obligated
to do p, then A does p. The design of logics for conformance, notably deontic logic,
has been of interest for several years, and we refer the reader to [73, 111] for a broad
perspective. In recent years, the focus has been more on tailoring logics for the reg-
ulations at hand, and examples include business contracts [4, 54, 56, 60, 62, 88] and
health-care regulations [25, 44]. Our focus in this work is on how power interacts with
the question of conformance.
Contributions and Outline: In this chapter, we motivate and design a formal-
ism that combines saying and permission, with applications to access control and
conformance. The combination yields benefits to both applications:
1. For access control, we propose a new decidable axiomatization which accommo-
dates delegation [3, 93] and “speaking for” [2, 3, 50]. Our approach overcomes
the problematic interactions with classical reasoning, pointed out by Abadi [1].
“Speaking for” and delegation are obtained as consequences of an axiom that
permits a principal to speak on behalf of another.
2. For conformance, the proposed axiomatization is used to reason about declara-
tive powers [53], by nesting saying with obligation and permission. We obtain a
novel analysis of recursive notions of power, e.g., “empowerment to empower”.
Conformance, as the satisfaction of obligations, is shown to be decidable.
In Section 4.2, we give a detailed motivation and background for our approach
in three parts. First, we consider representation in access control, under which we
include delegation [3, 93] and “speaking for” [1, 3, 50]. Second, we discuss examples
of powers conveyed by nested permissions, and compare our approach to the counts
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as frameworks for power [53, 75]. And, finally, we discuss how we integrate the work
here with the logic from Chapter 2.
Section 4.3 develops a logic in the form of two interacting components. The infer-
ence component determines what has been said, and involves the choice of appropriate
axioms [1, 3, 51]. We introduce two axioms to characterize the interaction between
saying and permission. The decidability and complexity of the resulting logic are
established. The saying component is used to create new utterances. For this compo-
nent, we extend Refl, which we developed in Chapter 2. The modularization allows
us to use restricted forms of quantification while preserving decidability of access
control and conformance. We also prove a non-interference property which is crucial
for the distributed policies that arise in access control. While the logic is expressive,
the expressive power comes at the price of high complexity. The decision problem
is NEXPTIME-complete, i.e., complete for non-deterministic exponential time. We
identify an expressive fragment of the logic, which generalizes the logic programming
approaches, and has a polynomial time decision procedure.
In Section 4.4, we discuss our formalism in the context of related work. We con-
sider access control examples, and conformance in the presence of nested obligations
and permissions. We also connect our work to speech act theories. Section 4.5 con-
cludes.
4.2 Permission to Speak
In this section, we motivate the explicit use of saying and permission in a formal
language for policy. We begin, in Section 4.2.1, by introducing the syntax and basic
axioms of a logic with saying and obligation, in order to facilitate a precise comparison
with prior work. Section 4.2.2 considers the problem of representation in access
control, under which we include delegation [3, 93] and “speaking for” [1, 3, 50]. In
Section 4.2.3, we discuss examples of powers conveyed by nested permissions. We
compare and contrast our approach with the counts as approaches to power. Finally,
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we discuss how we integrate the work here with the logic developed in Chapter 2, to
clarify some methodological decisions (Section 4.2.4).
4.2.1 Preliminaries
We begin by defining the syntax of a logic with saying and obligation, which we will
revise in Section 4.3.2:
Definition 4.1 (Syntax). Given sets Φ (of propositions), object names O, a finite
set of identifiers ID, and a function l : O → 2Id, the language L(Φ, X,O, l, ID),
abbreviated as L, is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= Φ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | saysIdy ϕ | Oyϕ
where, y ∈ O, and Idy is a non-empty subset of l(y). In addition, we assume that for
all distinct y, y′ ∈ O, l(y) ∩ l(y′) = ∅ and l(y) 6= ∅, i.e., the assigned identifiers are
disjoint, and non-empty.
Disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and implication ϕ ⇒ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ are derived
connectives. ⊥ (false) is an abbreviation for p ∧ ¬p for some p ∈ Φ, and ⊤ (true) is
¬⊥.
Oyϕ is read as “ϕ is obligatory for y”. Permission is defined as the dual of
obligation, i.e., Pyϕ = ¬Oy¬ϕ. For example, “B is permitted to delete the file (del)”
is expressed as PBdel.
saysIdy ϕ is read as “y says ϕ via the laws labeled with identifers in Idy”. We
will also parphrase this as “y says ϕ”. We build on ideas in Chapter 2. Principals
speak by introducing laws. Given a principal A ∈ O, a law of A is a statement ϕ ∈ L
associated with an identifier id ∈ l(A). Let us consider an example. Suppose a system
administrator A has the following statement in her policy:
(1A) B is permitted to delete the file
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1A ∈ l(A) is an identifier associated with the statement. Formally, we represent
the law as:
says{1A}(PBdel)
In other words, “A says B is permitted to delete the file (via the law labeled {1A})”.
We will need the machinery developed in Chapter 2 to accomodate conditional laws,
and in particular, the cases where says appears in the antecedent of the condition.
We revisit these issues in Section 4.3.3.
How do we evaluate statements in the logic? Most logics that are used in computer
science have a compelling semantics. For example, in linear temporal logic, state-
ments are evaluated against a trace of states that arise during computation. In some
scenarios, obligations have a good semantics, e.g., ϕ is obligated by a program if ¬ϕ
causes the program to raise an exception. However, it is hard to give a semantics for
saying (cf. [1]).
What does it mean for a principal to say ϕ? In the access control setting, it means
that a principal has issued a digital certificate (or a law) declaring ϕ. However, a
certificate or law is a syntactic notion, and as a result, we are interested in what we can
prove from the laws of a principal. For this reason, access control logics are commonly
designed axiomatically. Following Garg and Abadi [50], we use semantics as a tool, to
show that a statement is not provable. But, it is the theorem proving questions that
are of central interest. We give the basic axioms and rules for saying below (those
which are common to all access control logics), and defer the introduction of further
axioms to later sections:
A1 All substitution instances of (classical) propositional tautologies
A2 saysl(A)(ϕ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (saysl(A) ϕ⇒ saysl(A) ψ) for all A ∈ O
R1 From ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ and ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ ψ
R2 From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ saysl(A) ϕ for all A ∈ O
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We say that ϕ is provable, denoted ⊢ ϕ, if ϕ is an instance of A1 or A2, or follows
from the axioms using the rules R1 and R2. ψ is provable from a set of formulas
{ϕ1, ..., ϕn}, denoted ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⊢ ψ, if ⊢ (ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn) ⇒ ψ.
A1 and R1 give us classical propositional reasoning. The distribution axiom
(A2) states that says distributes over implications (⇒), and R2 is the generalization
rule common to all normal modal logics. The appropriateness of R2 for says is not
obvious, as principals do not explicitly say all the theorems in the language. However,
it can be understood as the willingness of a principal to admit all theorems as her
statements, so that we can infer the consequences of her statements using A2 (since
all theorems are of the form ϕ⇒ ψ).1
We now return to the example where the administrator A has permitted B to
delete the file, via the law 1A. Suppose a principal C requests that the file be deleted.
The access control problem is to decide whether we can prove prove saysl(A)(PCdel)
from A’s laws , i.e., whether “A says that C is permitted to delete the file”. Suppose
A’s policy consisted of the single statement (1A) above, i.e., l(A) = {1A}, it can be
shown that:
saysl(A)(PBdel) 6⊢ saysl(A)(PCdel)
And, hence, C is not permitted to delete the file. We now turn to a discussion of the
literature to motivate our choice of additional axioms.
4.2.2 Representation in Access Control
All access control logics give a principal the ability to let another principal make
statements on her behalf. As an example (based on [50]), consider a file access
scenario, where an administrator (A) has control the operation of deleting files shared
1We note that an (appropriate) non-normal modal logic (cf. [29]) may be a better basis for says,
if we wish to capture the notion of explicitly says. We have chosen the minimal normal modal logic
K because it is adopted by most access control logics in the literature (perhaps by default). The
counts as approaches to power [53, 75] use non-normal operators. From an application perspective,
we do not have motivation for one choice over the other, and leave an investigation to future work.
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by groups of principals. When there are many shared files in the system, A cannot
personally handle all requests. Suppose that the administrator authorises the leader
of a group (B) to decide when a particular file is to be deleted (del). In this scenario,
we say that B represents A on del, and we wish to conclude that if saysl(B)(del), then
saysl(A)(del).
How do we accommodate this inference? A naive approach is to introduce:
ψ ≡ saysl(B)(del) ⇒ saysl(A)(del)
into A’s policy. However, such statements create an access control risk, because ψ
could be introduced by B, thereby giving B the ability to decide whether any file is
to be deleted.
To address this security risk, a principal A is only allowed to introduce statements
of the form saysl(A) ψ. Additional machinery (usually an axiom) is needed to accom-
modate representation. Abadi [1] discusses several alternatives, involving variants of
the hand-off axiom:
AH saysl(A)(φ⇒ saysl(A) ψ) ⇒ (φ⇒ saysl(A) ψ)
B represents A on del is expressed as:
ϕ = saysl(A)(saysl(B)(del) ⇒ saysl(A)(del))
Using the hand-off axiom, we conclude that ϕ ⊢ saysl(B)(del) ⇒ saysl(A)(del), using
R1. However, the hand-off axiom has displeasing consequences in classical logics:
Proposition 4.1 (Abadi [1]). The following is provable:
⊢ ¬ saysl(B) ⊥ ⇒ (saysl(B) ϕ⇒ ϕ)
Proof. We proceed as follows:
1. ⊢ ϕ⇒ (¬ϕ⇒ saysl(B) ⊥) (using A1)
2. ⊢ saysl(B)(ϕ⇒ (¬ϕ⇒ saysl(B) ⊥)) (from (1) using R2)
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3. ⊢ saysl(B)(ϕ) ⇒ saysl(B)(¬ϕ⇒ saysl(B) ⊥) (from (2) using A2 and R1)
4. ⊢ saysl(B) ϕ⇒ (¬ϕ⇒ saysl(B) ⊥) (from (3) using AH, A1 and R1)
5. ⊢ ¬ saysl(B) ⊥ ⇒ (saysl(B) ϕ⇒ ϕ) (from (4) using A1 and R1)
By Proposition 4.1, if we impose the (reasonable) restriction that principals do not
utter contradictions, then we are forced to accept every statement as truth! Halpern
and van der Meyden [64] discuss the same problem in the context of a logic for local
names:
We certainly want to be able to use the logic to say that if a principal’s
statements are not blatantly inconsistent, then certain conclusions follow.
While Halpern and van der Meyden [64] address the issue of naming, they exclude
notions of representation from their framework. In the context of access control,
the solution to the problematic inferences has been to move to an intuitionistic
logic [2, 50, 51]. The last step in the deduction above, i.e., from (4) to (5) in the
proof of Proposition 4.1, is blocked, since implication is not defined in terms of dis-
junction in intuitionistic logic. We note that the inference in (4) holds in intuitionistic
systems [2, 50, 51], i.e., if a principal makes a false statement, then her statements
are inconsistent. Although this does not seem to cause problems in applications, we
believe that it is counterintuitive. Why should a mistaken statement or a lie make
a principal’s statements inconsistent? Neither (4) or (5) holds in the logic that we
develop.
We suggest that the problem is not with classical reasoning, but with the hand-off
axiom. The key idea is to reformulate the axiom using the interaction between saying
and permission. We now introduce the reformulated version of the axiom, followed
by a discussion of its benefits.
We say that B represents A on del, if A says that B is permitted to say del.
More formally, the statement saysl(A)(PB(saysl(B) del)) is added to A’s policy, where
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PB(saysl(B) del) is read as “B is permitted to say del”. The following are equivalent
versions of the axiom of representation:
AR If A says that B is permitted to say ϕ, then if B says ϕ, A says ϕ
AR saysl(A)(PB(saysl(B)ϕ)) ⇒ (saysl(B) ϕ⇒ saysl(A) ϕ)
The axiom of representation is intended for a particular sense of speaking/saying, i.e.,
speaking on someone’s behalf. This sense of saying is the usual one in access control.
To simplify matters, we do not explicitly represent the principal on behalf of whom
a statement is being made.
“Speaking for” [2, 3, 50] is a case of representation when one principal represents
another on all statements. If B speaks for A, we wish to conclude saysl(B) ϕ ⇒
saysl(A) ϕ for all ϕ. “Speaking for” has a compelling definition in our approach. We
say that B speaks for A if A permits B to say anything (⊥) on her behalf, i.e.,
saysl(A) PB(saysl(B) ⊥).
A novelty in our approach is that “speaking for” and hand-off are both obtained as
a consequence of the axiom of representation. In [2, 3, 50], “speaking for” and hand-
off are not related, i.e., the former involves an algebra over principals or second-order
quantification, and the latter is obtained using an axiom (which implies hand-off).
This suggests that the representation axiom is quite different from the hand-off axiom.
It is tempting to relate the representation axiom to a restricted version of hand-off:
• saysl(A)(saysl(B) ϕ⇒ saysl(A) ϕ) ⇒ (saysl(B) ϕ⇒ saysl(A) ϕ)
However, even for this restricted case, we do not know of a complete semantics
for hand-off, which makes it difficult to show that a statement is not provable (Abadi
et al. [3] observe similar difficulties).2 We believe that the representation axiom is a
2Garg and Abadi [50] provide a complete semantics for a version of the hand-off axiom which
implies but is not equivalent to AH. However, this version of the hand-off leads to the problematic
inferences discussed in Proposition 4.1.
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persuasive alternative to hand-off, because it yields a decidable logic with a complete
semantics, and more importantly, it has an intuitive interpretation.
A restricted version of the axiom of representation has been proposed by Becker
et al. [16], in the context of the authorization language Secpal. In Secpal, rep-
resentation is restricted to atomic predicates, and hence, “speaking for” cannot be
accomodated. Moreover, the relationship between permission and obligation is not
explored, and “permission to say” (called “can say” in Secpal [16]) is treated as a
primitive construct. Our formalism generalizes Secpal, to accomodate both “speak-
ing for” and obligation. In Section 4.3.6, we show that an extension to Secpal
fragment of the logic is decidable in polynomial time, thereby preserving Secpal’s
computational benefits. We now discuss further motivation for our approach.
4.2.3 Power and Nested Permissions
In this section, we consider examples of powers that arise via nested permissions. We
compare and contrast our approach to the counts as approaches to power [53, 75].
We begin by discussing our approach to nested permissions. Consider the following
statement: “A hospital (H) permits a patient (A) to permit her mother (B) to access
her information”. We will rephrase the permission as follows: H says that A is
permitted to say that B is permitted to access her information. Formally, this is
expressed as: saysl(H)(PA(saysl(A)(PBaccess))). If A does indeed permit access to her
mother (saysl(A)(PBaccess)), we will conclude saysl(H)(PBaccess) using the axiom of
representation, i.e., H permits access to B. As a result, nested permissions are related
to representation, i.e., “H permits A to permit B to do ϕ” iff “A represents H in
permitting B to do ϕ”.
We now turn to the analysis by Gelati et al. [53]. To simplify presentation, we
describe their approach using the notation that we have already introduced. In [53],
declarative power, which includes representation, is defined formally in terms of a
counts as operator/connective:
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(P1) DPHA (ϕ) = CountsAs(saysl(A) ϕ, saysl(H) ϕ)
DPHA (ϕ) is read as “H grants A the power to declare ϕ on its behalf”. And,
CountsAs(saysl(A) ϕ, saysl(H) ϕ) is read as “A saying ϕ counts as B saying ϕ”. The
logic of counts as [53, 75] has broad applicability, and a detailed exposition is well
beyond the scope of this thesis. For present purposes, it suffices to note that a version
of the following is provable:
(P2) ⊢ CountsAs(saysl(A) ϕ, saysl(H) ϕ) ⇒ (saysl(A) ϕ⇒ saysl(H) ϕ)
Returning to our example of nested permissions, using (P1) and (P2), we can show
that:
(P3) ⊢ DPHA (PBaccess) ⇒ (saysl(A)(PBaccess) ⇒ saysl(H)(PBaccess))
And, (P3) plays the role of the representation axiom. As a result, our approach is
quite similar to that of Gelati et al. [53], when there is one level of nesting. However,
differences arise when we consider one more level of nesting.
Suppose H says that A is empowered to empower B to permit C to access her
information. Note that empowerment can be paraphrased as permission to say in our
approach, and the analysis would proceed analogously to the previous case. Gelati
et al. [53] express this empowerment to empower as: DPHA (DP
H
B (PCaccess)). Let
ϕ = PCaccess. Using (P1) and (P2), we obtain:
(P4) ⊢ DPHA (DP
H
B (ϕ)) ⇒ (saysl(A)(DP
H
B (ϕ)) ⇒ saysl(H)(DP
H
B (ϕ)))
Given DPHA (DP
H
B (ϕ)), if A exercises this power by empowering B to declare ϕ, we
will conclude that saysl(H)(DP
H
B (ϕ)), i.e., H says that B is empowered to declare ϕ.
However, the following is not provable:
(P5) 6⊢ saysl(H)(DP
H
B (ϕ)) ⇒ (saysl(B) ϕ⇒ saysl(H) ϕ)
Thus, B cannot exercise the power in the same way as A. From a technical perspec-
tive, there are a variety of ways to augment [53, 75] to accommodate these inferences.
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From an intuitive standpoint, we believe that this assymetry, between primary and
recursive powers, arises because the counts as operator is taken to be the description
of power itself. In our approach, the description of power (using nested permissions)
is separate from the changes that arise (via the representation axiom), leading to a
symmetric treatment of primary and recursive powers.
4.2.4 Exceptions and Doesn’t Say
In Chapter 2, building on Reiter’s Default Logic [126] and Kripke’s theory of truth [85],
we expressed laws using labeled conditional statements of the form:
(id) ϕ 7→ ψ
Our informal interpretation of such statements was “If ϕ is true, then the regulator
says ψ via the law labeled (id)”, where “id” is an identifier for the law. This inter-
pretation of rules has the flavor of the counts as connective [53, 75], i.e., ϕ counts as
a statement of ψ from the regulator. Now, we can consider statements of the form:
(id1) The regulator does not say ψ via the law labeled (id) 7→ ψ′
In other words, “If the regulator does not say ψ via the law labeled (id), then the
regulator says ψ′ via the law labeled (id1)”. Does not say is useful in expressing
exceptions to laws, and the law labeled (id) would serve as an exception to the law
labeled (id1). We discuss an example in Section 4.3.3.
Exceptions make regulations non-monotonic, in the sense that adding a new ex-
ception would prevent certain conclusions that were drawn before. There are also
well-established reinterpretations of non-monotonic logics as modal logics, and here,
we refer the reader to some classic works on autoepistemic logic [63, 113]. Given
these connections, an important question that arises is whether the underlying logic
for saying should be non-monotonic. The approach we take in this work is to start
with a monotonic logic with saying, obligation, and permission (Section 4.3.2), and
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Laws:
1. If B says p, then p
2. p
A
B
Utterances:
Grant or Deny
Violations
Request
AxiomsState
A says p via Law 1
B says p via Law 2
Figure 4.1: Interaction between the components of the logic
then integrate it into a non-monotonic framework (Section 4.3.3). The idea is that
the non-monotonic component resolves exceptions, giving us a consistent set of state-
ments on which to base access control and conformance decisions. This aspect of our
approach was motivated purely by methodological convenience, and sufficed for the
regulations at hand. A proper non-monotonic treatment of nested modalities is a
challenging problem (see [63]), and we leave an investigation to future work.
4.3 A Logic for Access Control and Conformance
In this section, we develop a logic in the form of two interacting components – (a)
the inference component, which involves the choice of appropriate axioms, and (b)
the saying component, which is used to represent policies. Figure 4.1 shows the
interaction between the components of the access control system. There are two
kinds of actions of interest – (1) operational acts, e.g., downloading a song, and (2)
speech acts. The operational acts are described using a state, which contains the
interpretation of predicates, and the speech acts are described using laws.
A principal speaks by introducing laws. In Figure 4.1, the principals A and B
introduce the laws 1 and 2 respectively. The laws are evaluated using the axioms to
produce a set of utterances, i.e., what the principals say via their laws. A set of laws
can be thought of as a logic program, and utterances as the extensions that result from
the program (via a fixed point computation). Once we have the utterances, there are
89
several decision problems of interest. The access control problem is to decide whether
a request is permitted by the set of utterances. The conformance problem is to decide
whether operational and speech acts satisfy the obligations imposed by the utterances,
and if they do not, violations are reported.
In Section 4.3.1, we introduce an example from privacy regulation, which we will
use to illustrate the various definitions. Section 4.3.2 is an overview of the inference
component. We describe (axiomatically) a logic with two modalities – saying and
obligation. In Section 4.3.3, we adapt the formalism in [44] for the saying component.
We extend [44] in two ways. First, we prove a non-interference property which is
crucial for the distributed policies that arise in access control (Section 4.3.4). Second,
we show that conformance, in the presence of nested obligations and permissions, is
decidable (Section 4.3.5). In Section 4.3.6, we describe a fragment of the logic, moti-
vated by the access control literature, for which provability is decidable in polynomial
time.
4.3.1 Example
We will use an example from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) (cf. [25]), to illustrate the various definitions. HIPAA regulates the
uses and disclosures of patient health information, and provides a natural test bed
for investigating both access control and conformance. The following example is
intended to illustrate several subtleties involved in reasoning about rights:
(23) A patient has the right to view his records that are maintained in a designated
record set, except for:
a. Psychotherapy notes.
b. Records compiled for a legal proceeding.
c. ...
There are three (types of) principals associated with this right:
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• The regulatory authority behind HIPAA, which enforces the right.
• Patients, who can exercise the right, and
• Principals who maintains records of the patient, and have to conform to the
right.
Section 4.3.2 is concerned with how to formally express the phrase “has the right”. In
Section 4.3.3, we deal with the exceptions. Sections 4.3.4 and Section 4.3.5 consider
the access control and conformance aspects.
4.3.2 The Inference Component – Axioms
In this section, we develop a predicate logic with two modalities saying and obligation.
We allow formulas with free variables, but no quantifier over objects. The quantifi-
cation over objects is carried out in the process of saying (Section 4.3.3), which uses
provability in the propositional subset of the language defined here. We begin by
defining the syntax:
Definition 4.2 (Syntax). Given sets Φ1, ...,Φn (of predicate names), countable sets
of object names O, principal names OP ⊆ O, variables X, variables for principals
XP ⊆ X, identifiers ID, and a function l : OP → 2
ID, the language L(Φ1, ..., Φn, O,
OP , X, XP , l, ID), abbreviated as L, is defined as follows:
ϕy ::= α | ϕy ∧ ϕy | ¬ϕy | saysIdy ψ
ψy ::= ϕy | ψy ∧ ψy | ¬ψy | Oyϕy
ϕ ::= ϕy (for all y ∈ XP ∪ OP )
ψ ::= ψy (for all y ∈ XP ∪OP )
where, y ∈ XP ∪ OP , and α generates atomic predicates of the form p(z1, ..., zj)
with p ∈ Φj and (z1, ..., zj) ∈ (X ∪ O)
j. In addition, ∅ ⊂ Idy ⊆ l(y) if y ∈ OP
and Idy = l(y) otherwise (y ∈ XP ). We assume that for all distinct A,B ∈ OP ,
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l(A) ∩ l(B) = ∅ and l(A) 6= ∅, i.e., the assigned identifiers are disjoint, and non-
empty.
The set of formulas generated by each BNF rule are referred to as Lϕy , Lϕ, Lψy
and Lψ respectively, and L = Lϕ ∪ Lψ.
Disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and implication ϕ ⇒ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ are derived
connectives.
There is a set of object names O with a distinguished set OP ⊆ O called principals.
Principals include individual persons, such as patients and doctors, and institutions,
such as hospitals and regulatory authorities. We use upper case letters for principals,
e.g., A, B. Other named objects (O−OP ) include entities with no associated notion
of agency, e.g., medical records and songs. We use lower case letters for these objects,
except for the letters {x, y, z} which are reserved for variables. It is useful to divide
the objects in O−OP further into sorts, but we avoid it to simplify notation. Variables
are divided into two sorts as well, i.e., all variables X, and variables for principals
XP . In a slight abuse of notation, we will use the symbols for variables, i.e., x, y and
z, to stand for a generic element in X ∪O or XP ∪ OP .
Oyϕ is read as “ϕ is obligatory for the principal y”. Permission is defined as the
dual of obligation, i.e., Pyϕ = ¬Oy¬ϕ.
The saying operator is understood as follows. Principals speak by introducing
identified laws, as shown in Figure 4.1. The function l assigns non-empty and disjoint
sets of identifiers to each principal, and for example, l(A) denotes the set of identifiers
for laws introduced by the principal A ∈ OP . saysIdy ϕ is read as “y says ψ via the
laws Idy”. In the case where Idy = l(y), saysl(y) ψ is read as “y says ψ via her laws”,
or briefly “y says ψ”.
We give some examples to clarify the notation for identifiers. Given A ∈ OP , let
l(A) = {1, 2}. The formulas saysl(A) ϕ and says{1,2} ϕ are identical. In many examples,
we will have need only for the notation saysl(A) ϕ.
3 Specific identifiers (e.g., says{1} ϕ)
3The assumptions about assignment of identifiers are purely (and hopefully) for clarity. We do
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will be used to accommodate exceptions to laws (Section 4.3.3). Exceptions are often
conveyed by phrases such as “except as specified in Section 120 of HIPAA” [25, 44],
and a subset of identifers would correspond to the laws in “Section 120 of HIPAA”.
Given a variable over principals x ∈ XP , we will only use the notation saysl(x) ϕ.
This is useful, for example, to grant powers to a class of principals, e.g., patients of a
hospital.
We now mention a peculiarity of Definition 4.2. The BNF rules ensure the alter-
nation of obligation and saying modalities, e.g., Oy saysl(y) Ozϕ ∈ L, but OyOzϕ 6∈ L.
Following von Wright [147], we understand obligations as applying to actions and
their consequences. The language Lϕy (obtained from the first BNF rule) is used to
describe actions of a principal y – (a) atomic actions, (b) combinations of actions
(using connectives), or (c) saying, which is (a consequence of) a speech act. An obli-
gation is an opinion, which is created via a speech act, but is not an act by itself.
These restrictions are similar in spirit to the logics of power [53, 74, 75, 95].
The statements in L will be used in the inference component of access control, i.e.,
to determine what has been said. In other words, we will be given a set of utterances
U and a question ψ, and we need to determine whether ψ is provable from U . We
focus on provability for the propositional subset of L, i.e., without variables. The
propositional subset of L has the modalities saysIdA ϕ and OA(ϕ) (for all A ∈ O and
IdA ⊆ l(A)).
We adopt the axiomatization in Figure 4.2. A1 and R1 give us propositional
reasoning. A2 and R2 are common to both saying and obligation. A3 and A4
are specific to saying and obligation respectively. Finally, A5 and A6 describe the
interaction between the two modalities.
The notion of provability is of crucial interest. We say that ϕ is provable (denoted
⊢ ϕ), if ϕ is an instance of the axioms A1-A6 or follows from the axioms using the
not consider obligations, permissions, and statements associated with groups of individuals in this
work, and shared identifiers may be useful here. We believe that these can be straightforwardly
added to the present framework.
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A1 All substitution instances of propositional tautologies.
A2 Q(ϕ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (Q(ϕ) ⇒ Q(ψ)) (for all modalities Q)
A3 saysIdA ϕ⇒ saysId′A ϕ (for all A ∈ OP and IdA ⊆ Id
′
A ⊆ l(A))
A4 OAϕ⇒ PAϕ (for all A ∈ OP )
A5 saysIdA(PB saysIdB ϕ) ⇒ (saysIdB ϕ ⇒ saysIdA ϕ) (for all {A,B} ⊆ OP , IdA ⊆
l(A), and IdB ⊆ l(B))
A6 saysIdA(PA saysIdA ϕ) ⇒ saysIdA ϕ (for all A ∈ OP , and IdA ⊆ l(A))
R1 From ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ and ⊢ ϕ, infer ⊢ ψ
R2 From ⊢ ϕ, infer ⊢ Q(ϕ) (for all modalities Q)
Figure 4.2: Axiomatization of the propositional fragment of L. The set of modalities
Q consists of saysIdA ϕ and OA(ϕ) (for all A ∈ O and IdA ⊆ l(A)).
rules R1 and R2. Given a finite set of formulas ∆, we say that ϕ is provable from
∆, denoted ∆ ⊢ ϕ, if ⊢ (
∧
∆) ⇒ ϕ.
We mention some provable statements that we will use in the example from HIPAA
(Section 4.3.2):
Proposition 4.2. The following are provable:
1. ⊢ saysl(A)(OB saysl(B) ϕ) ⇒ (saysl(B) ϕ⇒ saysl(A) ϕ)
2. ⊢ saysl(A)(OA saysl(A) ϕ) ⇒ saysl(A) ϕ
3. ⊢ saysl(A)(PB saysl(B) ⊥) ⇒ (saysl(B) ϕ⇒ says(A) ϕ)
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The proofs are easy and we leave the details to the reader. Items 1 and 2 show
that versions of axioms A5 and A6 hold for obligation. Item 3 gives us speaking for,
i.e., B speaks for A, as we discussed in Section 4.2.2.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the various
axioms in the context of related work. We then analyse some aspects of the exam-
ple from HIPAA (introduced in Section 4.3.1, and the various subtleties involved in
reasoning about rights. We present a complete Kripke semantics for the axioms, and
use it to show that provability is decidable.
Discussion of Axioms
We now discuss the axioms. The axioms A1 and A2, together with the rules R1 and
R2, gives us the modal logic K. The K axiomatization was used by Abadi et al. [3]
as a basis for all (classical) access control logics. From A3, it follows that if A says
ϕ via the laws (IdA), then ϕ also holds w.r.t. a larger set of laws issued by A (Id
′
A).
As we discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), these axioms arise from the predicative
definition of says, which we are extending to a modal definition.
The K axiomatization, together with A4, gives us the the modal logic KD. This
axiomatization is common to many systems, giving it the name Standard Deontic
Logic (SDL) (c.f. [73]). We note that SDL is a very simplistic system of obligation,
and several objections can be raised. The most serious objection is that SDL does
not cope with contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations (see, e.g., [57, 98, 123]). A CTD
obligation is one that arises when another has been violated. This is useful, for
example, in business contracts to describe mitigating actions [56, 60, 62, 88], e.g.,
“paying a fine”, upon failure to deliver goods. We do not address CTD structures in
this work, as they are not as prevalent in privacy regulation as they are in contracts.
Governatori and Rotolo [57] propose that CTDs are not a problem with obligations
per se, but can be understood as a special kind of exception. We agree entirely with
their perspective. However, accommodating these kinds of exceptions involves the
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introduction of a preference operator, and we leave this to future work.
As we discussed in Section 4.2.2, A5 is needed to accommodate notions of repre-
sentation in access control. The self-respecting axiom, A6, is read as “If A permits
herself to say ϕ, then A says ϕ”. We discuss the use of A6 in the example from
HIPAA.
Example
We consider the example from HIPAA, introduced in Section 4.3.1. In this section,
our focus is on the utterances obtained from the laws of the various principals.
Let H stand for (the regulator who wrote) HIPAA. And, let Alice (A) be a patient
whose records (r) are maintained by an insurance company run by Bob (B). Let us
assume further that A has the right to access her records. The utterance obtained
from H ’s laws would be:
(u1) saysl(H) PA saysl(A) OB saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r)
The direct reading of (u1) in English is unwieldy, i.e., we get “H says that A is
permitted to say that B is required to say that A is permitted to access her records”.
A better reading is obtained by eliding all occurrences of say that appear immediately
above an obligation or permission, except for the outermost one. Applying this ellipsis
to (u1), we get: saysl(H) PA...OB...PAaccess(A, r), which is read as: “HIPAA says that
Alice is permitted to require Bob to permit her to view her records”. We will use
such readings henceforth.
The word right does not have a unique translation into logic. Hohfeld [69] pointed
out that the word right is used in different senses, and depending on the context, it
can entail a permission, claim, or power.4 The formulation in (u1) corresponds to
the power interpretation. As we mentioned in Section 4.1, our descriptions of powers
4Hohfeld [69] describes a claim as the correlative of obligation, i.e., when a claim is invaded an
obligation is violated. For example, a patient has a claim that hospitals notify her of disclosures of
her health information. And, the claim is equivalent to an obligation on the hospital to notify her.
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follows the suggestion of Lindahl [95, Part II] (see also [74]), in terms of nesting
obligations and permissions with an action modality.
How does Alice exercise this right? In our approach, rights are exercised by the
introduction of a law. The specific mechanism for introducing such laws is application
dependent. For example, if Alice sends an email to Bob requiring him to grant her
access, then this may count as Alice exercising her right (see [53, 75]). Alice’s attempt
to exercise her right would be result in the following utterance:
(u2) saysl(A) OB saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r)
In other words, Alice says that Bob is required to permit her to view her records.
How does Bob comply with this right? In our approach, this happens via Bob’s access
control policy. Suppose Bob wants to permit a patient to view their records only if
HIPAA requires it. Bob’s policy is represented as follows:
(u3) saysl(B) PH saysl(H) OB saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r)
In other words, Bob permits HIPAA to require him to permit Alice to view her
records. Note that Bob has no regard for Alice’s requirement to see her records, but
only what HIPAA says.
Let ∆ consist of the utterances (u1), (u2), and (u3) above. Since Alice wants to
view her records, the access control system tries to prove that ∆ ⊢ saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r).
The derivation proceeds as follows:
(d1) ∆ ⊢ saysl(H) OB saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r) (from (u1) and (u2) using A5).
(d2) ∆ ⊢ saysl(B) OB saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r) (from (u3) and (d1) using Proposition 4.2
item 1)
(d3) ∆ ⊢ saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r) (from (d2) using Proposition 4.2 item 2)
Step (d1) is understood as HIPAA enforcing Alice’s right, i.e., HIPAA requires Bob to
permit Alice to view her records. In step (d2), Bob acknowledges HIPAA’s authority
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by requiring himself to permit Alice to view her records. Step (d3) shows the utility
of A6, i.e., by forcing Bob to say what he requires himself to say. Due to (d3), Alice
is indeed permitted to view her records! In the Section 4.3.5, we will show how blame
can be assigned to Bob if he fails to introduce (d3) or something that implies it.
In summary, to reason about a right, we had to use utterances from the enforcer
(HIPAA), the person exercising the right (Alice), and the person complying with it
(Bob). The precise manner in which Alice’s utterance is obtained is left unspecified.
In assessing violations of rights, the issue in question is often whether the right was
exercised. For example, Bob may claim that Alice did not request to see her records.
We do not believe that this is a problem for logic, but it is a problem in implementing
a system that allows principals to exercise their rights. However, we do believe that
the logic provides a good intuition for the inferences involved, given the appropriate
utterances.
The reasoning involved in this example is outside the scope of prior access control
logics [1–3, 33, 50, 51, 93], because obligation is not accommodated. We believe that
the reasoning can be accommodated by the counts as frameworks for power [53, 75],
but as discussed in Section 4.2.3, some reformulation is needed.
Semantics, Soundness, and Completeness
In this section, we provide a Kripke semantics for which the axiomatization is sound
and complete. Semantic completeness is used mainly as a tool, for example, to show
that a statement is not provable. Identifying a compelling semantics for says is an
important open problem in access control logics (see [1]), and we do not address it in
this work.5 We begin by defining models (Kripke structures):
Definition 4.3 (Models). Given countable sets of object names O, principal names
OP ⊆ O, Φ1, ...,Φn (where Φj is a set of predicate names of arity j), identifiers for
5We speculate that a good semantics for says has to come from an application other than access
control and conformance. In these applications, saying arises via policies, which are expressed using
formulas. There does not seem to be a corresponding computational interpretation.
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rules ID, and l : OP → 2
ID, a model M(O,OP ,Φ1, ...,Φn, ID, l), abbreviated as M ,
is the tuple (S, IΦ1, ..., IΦn , δL, δO) where:
• S is a set of states
• IΦj : Φj × S → 2
Oj is the interpretation of predicates of arity j. Given p ∈ Φj,
we will say that p(o1, ..., oj) is true at state s iff (o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj(p, s).
• δL : S × 2
ID → 2S. δL(s, Id) corresponds to a description of s according to the
laws labeled with identifiers in Id (taken conjunctively).
• δO : S × OP → 2
S. δO(s, A) corresponds to an idealization of s, for which the
principal A is held responsible.
For the axioms A3-A6 we need the following constraints C3-C6 (resply). For all
s ∈ S:
C3 δL(s, IdA) ⊇ δL(s, Id
′
A) for all A ∈ OP and IdA ⊆ Id
′
A ⊆ l(A)
C4 δO(s, A) 6= ∅ for all A ∈ OP
C5 For all {A,B} ⊆ OP , IdA ⊆ l(A), IdB ⊆ l(B), and s
′ ∈ δL(s, IdA):
1. s′ ∈ δL(s, IdB), or
2. There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, B), s
′ ∈ δL(s2, IdB)
C6 For all A ∈ OP , IdA ⊆ l(A), and s
′ ∈ δL(s, IdA):
There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, A), s
′ ∈ δL(s2, IdA)
C5 and C6 can be understood in the context of soundness (Lemma B.1). Given
the object names O, OP ⊆ O, predicate names (Φ1, ...,Φn), identifiers ID, and the
function l, the space of models is denoted by M(O,OP Φ1, ..., Φn, ID, l), abbreviated
as M. We can now define satisfaction and validity, and we restrict attention to the
propositional fragment of L:
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Definition 4.4 (Semantics). Given a model M = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO), s ∈ S and
a propositional ϕ ∈ L, the relation (M, s) |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
• (M, s) |= p(o1, ..., oj) iff (o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj(p, s).
• The semantics of conjunction and negation is defined in the usual way.
• (M, s) |= saysId ϕ iff (M, s
′) |= ϕ, for all s′ ∈ δL(s, Id).
• (M, s |= OAϕ iff (M, s
′) |= ϕ, for all s′ ∈ δO(s
′, A).
We can now define validity:
• ϕ is valid in a model M (M |= ϕ) iff for all s ∈ S, (M, s) |= ϕ
• ϕ is valid (|= ϕ) iff for all M ∈ M, M |= ϕ
We state the main results that can be proved using the semantics. Proofs can be
found in Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness and Completeness). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L:
⊢ ϕ iff |= ϕ
Corollary 4.1 (Compactness). An infinite set of formulas is satisfiable iff every finite
subset is satisfiable.
Theorem 4.2 (Decidability). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, the problem of checking
whether ⊢ ϕ is decidable
Theorem 4.3 (Complexity). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, deciding whether ϕ is
satisfiable is NEXPTIME-complete
NEXPTIME is the class of problems that can be decided in non-deterministic
exponential time. In Section 4.3.6, we will identify a fragment of the logic (motivated
by access control examples), for which provability can be decided in polynomial time.
We now turn to the formalization of policies.
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4.3.3 The Saying Component - Policies
In this section, we modify Refl to accomodate the new axioms. The formalization
is essentially identical to that in Chapter 2. We briefly review the definitions and
then discuss the example from HIPAA introduced in Section 4.3.2. The syntax of
regulation is defined as follows:
Definition 4.5 (Syntax of Regulation). Given countable sets of identifiers ID, prin-
cipal names OP , and a function l : OP → 2
ID, a law is a statement of the form
(id) ϕ 7→ ψ, where ϕ ∈ Lϕ, ψ ∈ Lψ, and there exists A ∈ OP such that id ∈ l(A).
The set of all possible laws is denoted by Laws(OP , l, L), abbreviated Laws.
A body of regulation Reg ⊆ Laws is a finite set such that for all id ∈ ID, there
exists at most one pair (ϕ, ψ) ∈ Lϕ × Lψ such that (id) ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg
(id) ϕ 7→ ψ is read as: “If ϕ is true, then A says ψ via the law (id)”, where
id ∈ l(A). To evaluate laws, we need a way to evaluate preconditions (ϕ ∈ Lϕ).
There are two kinds of atoms in Lϕ – predicates and formulas of the form saysIdy ϕ.
The predicates are evaluated against a state, and formulas of the form saysIdy ϕ are
evaluated provability (as defined in Section 4.3.2) from a set of utterances. We begin
by defining states:
Definition 4.6 (States and Assignments). Given countable sets O of object names,
principal names OP ⊆ O, and predicate names Φ1, ... ,Φn, a state s(O, OP , Φ1, ...,Φn),
abbreviated s, is the tuple (IΦ1 , ... , IΦn) where IΦj : Φj → 2
Oj is the interpretation of
predicates of arity j. Given p ∈ Φj, we will say that p(o1, ..., oj) is true at state iff
(o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj (p). The set of all states is denoted by S.
Given a set of variablesX, and principal variablesXP , an assignment is a function
v : X → O, such that for all x ∈ XP , we have v(x) ∈ OP . The set of all assignments
is denoted by V (X,XP , O,OP ), abbreviated V .
A state s ∈ S is a description of operations, and gives us information, for example,
about the accesses to records that actually happened. The definition of utterances
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relies on propositionalizing formulas:
Definition 4.7 (Propositionalization). Given φ ∈ L and an assignment v ∈ V , the
propositionalization of ϕ w.r.t. v, denoted v(φ), is defined inductively as follows:
• v(p(y1, ..., yn)) = p(o1, ..., on), where oi = v(yi) if yi ∈ X and oi = yi otherwise
(yi ∈ O).
• v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∧ v(ψ), and v(¬ϕ) = ¬v(ϕ)
• v(Oyϕ) = OA(v(ϕ)), where A = v(y) if y ∈ XP and A = y otherwise.
• v(saysIdy ϕ) = saysIdA(v(ϕ)), where IdA = l(v(y)) if y ∈ XP and IdA = Idy
otherwise.
We can now define utterances:
Definition 4.8 (Utterances). Given a body of regulation Reg, and an assignment
v ∈ V , an utterance is a statement v(says{id} ψ) such that id ∈ ID and (id) ϕ 7→ ψ ∈
Reg. The set of all utterances is denoted by U(Reg, V ).
Next, we define the function η which assigns truth values from B3 = {⊤, ?,⊥} to
preconditions:
Definition 4.9 (Evaluating Preconditions). Given a body of regulation Reg and a
pair utterance sets (U,U ′) such that U ⊆ U ′ ⊆ U(Reg, V ), the function η(U,U ′) :
Lϕ × S × V → B
3 is defined as follows:
Predicates are evaluated to true or false. Conjunction and negation are handled
using the Kleene semantics.
η(U,U ′)(saysIdy ψ, s, v) =









⊤ if U ⊢ v(saysIdy ψ)
⊥ if U ′ 6⊢ v(saysIdy ψ)
? otherwise
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One observation about Definition 4.9 is that we are using the notion of syntactic
provability (e.g., U ⊢ v(saysIdy ψ)) in a place where semantic entailment is more
appropriate (e.g., U |= v(saysIdy ψ)). From a technical perspective, the two notions
are equivalent due to soundness and completeness (Theorem 4.1). However, from an
intuitive standpoint, we wish to illustrate that we determine whether or not something
has been said by looking at other statements. In other words, it is theorem proving
questions that are of central interest. While semantics is useful as a tool to establish
non-provability and decidability, assigning an intuitive semantics to saying is an open
problem in access control.
As in Chapter 2, we are interested in utterances that are sound and complete
w.r.t. a state:
Definition 4.10 (Sound and Complete Utterances). Given a regulation Reg and a
state s ∈ S, the utterance pair (U,U ′) is sound w.r.t. s iff for all φ ∈ U(Reg, V ) :
US1 If φ ∈ U , then there exists (id) ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id} ψ) =
φ and tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊤.
US2 If φ 6∈ U ′, then for all (id) ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id} ψ) = φ,
we have tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊥.
Similarly, (U,U ′) is said to be complete w.r.t. s iff for all φ ∈ U(Reg, V ) :
UC1 If there exists (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id} ψ) = φ and
η(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊤, then φ ∈ U .
UC2 If for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id} ψ) = φ and
η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥, then φ 6∈ U
′.
As we showed in Chapter 2, the space of sound utterance pairs has a least and
maximal fixed points. The fixed points are sound and complete pairs. A state s
together with a sound utterance pair forms the basis for all decision problems. We
define a notion of validity at a state, which we will use to formalize access control
and conformance decisions (in Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 resply.):
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Definition 4.11 (Validity at a State). Given a state s, a body of regulation Reg, a
consistent utterance pair (U,U ′) ∈ CsU(Reg,V ) and a propositional ϕ ∈ Lϕ, we say that ϕ
is valid at s w.r.t. Reg and (U,U ′), denoted (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ, iff tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊤
for all v ∈ V .
The choice of which utterance pair to use depends on the application. If there
is a unique (least) fixed point, then it is the appropriate choice. However, matters
are not so clear when there are multiple fixed points. We conclude this section with
a discussion of the example from HIPAA to build intuition about the definitions of
access control and conformance.
Example 1: Consider the statements from HIPPA in Section 4.3.1. Let H ∈ OP
stand for the regulatory authority behind HIPPA, and l(H) = {1, 1a, 1b}. As we
discussed in Section 4.3.2, the phrase has the right is analysed as a power. We use
the following abbreviation:
hasRight(x, z, ϕ) = Px saysl(x) Oz saysl(z) Pxϕ
The HIPAA rule is formalized as follows:
(23) pat(x) ∧ rec(y, x, z) ∧ ¬ says{23a,23b} e(y) 7→ hasRight(x, z, access(x, y))
(23a) psyNotes(y1) 7→ e(y1)
(23b) compForLegal(y2) 7→ e(y2)
The law (23) is read as follows: “If x is a patient (pat(x)), and y is a record of
x maintained by z (rec(y, x, z)), and HIPPA does not say that there is an exception
applying to y (¬ says{23a,23b} e(y)), then HIPAA says that x has the right to access
her records via the law (23)”.
The law (23a) is read as follows: “If y1 is a record of psychotherapy notes
(psyNotes(y1)), then HIPAA says that an exception applies to y1 via the law (23a)”.
And, the law (23b) is read as follows: “If y2 is a record compiled for legal proceedings
(compForLegal(y2)), then HIPAA says that an exception applies to y2 via the law
(23b)”.
104
We set aside the important problem of defining these predicates further, i.e., the
definitional aspects of the law [73]. For example, HIPPA provides rules describing
who counts as a patient, and the interpretation of pat(x) is dependent on these rules.
In addition, the predicate e(y) could be interpreted as a permission to the maintainer
of y not to grant access.6 Such extensions are easily accommodated.
Suppose Alice (A) wants to view her records (r) which are maintained by Bob
(B). Alice introduces the following rule:
(24) Bob must show me my records.
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the manner in which this rule arises is left unspecified.
For example, Alice may send an e-mail to Bob, requiring to see her records. Alice’s
law is formalized as follows. Let A ∈ OP stand for Alice, and B ∈ OP stand for Bob.
In addition, l(A) = {24}. Law (24) is formally expressed as:
(24) ⊤ 7→ OB saysl(B) PBaccess(A, r)
Bob complies with this request via his access control policy. Suppose Bob’s policy
consists of the following rule:
(25) HIPAA is permitted to require me to permit a patient to access her records.
Let l(B) = {25}. Law (25) is formally expressed as:
(25) pat(x3) ∧ rec(y3, x3, B) 7→ PH saysl(H) OB saysl(B) Px3access(x3, y3)
Table 4.1 shows a state together with the fixed point utterances obtained from
l(H), l(A), and l(B). Here, r is a record about Alice maintained by Bob (rec(r, A,B)),
which has been compiled for legal proceedings (compForLegal(r)). The precondition
of HIPAA’s law (23b) is true, and we obtain the utterance says{23b} e(r). As a result,
the precondition of (23) is false, and no right is granted to Alice. The preconditions
of Alice’s and Bob’s laws ((24) and (25) resply.) are true, and the corresponding
utterances are obtained.
6Our understanding of the HIPAA rule is that (23a) and (23b) are only meant to cancel the right
provided by (23), and do not entail any explicit permission to the maintainer of the records.
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Objs Predicates Fixed Point Utterances
H pat(A), rec(r, A,B) says{23b} e(r)
A, r ¬psyNotes(r) says{24} OB saysl(B) PBaccess(A, r)
B compForLegal(r) says{25} PH saysl(H) OB saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r)
Table 4.1: A state and fixed point utterances for the HIPAA example.
Let us consider the questions of access control and conformance informally, given
the state and fixed point in Table 4.1. Is Alice permitted to access her record? No,
because HIPAA does not require Bob to permit her to access it. Is Bob conformant?
On one hand, HIPAA doesn’t require anything of Bob, so yes. On the other hand,
Alice says that Bob is required to permit her to access her records, and he does not
comply with this request. Thus, conformance is better seen as a relation between two
principals w.r.t. a set of laws. In Section 4.3.5, we will say that B conforms to A
w.r.t. the laws l(A) iff B satisfies the obligations imposed by those laws.
4.3.4 Non-interference in Access Control
An access control decision is made when a principal A requests the performance
of action p which is controlled by B. Given a state s, regulation Reg and fixed
point (U,U ′) resulting from the evaluation of policy, the decision problem is whether
(s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysl(B) PA(p), i.e., does B say that A is permitted to perform p.
A problem with this definition is that the policies in access control are usually
distributed. It is unreasonable to expect (U,U ′) to reside on a single system. Given
that we wish to evaluate saysl(B) PA(p), the question is whether a smaller set of
utterances suffice to answer this question. In other words, the evaluation should be
carried out locally by B or a designated evaluator for B, as in [15].
Non-interference properties are used to obtain such results, and to demonstrate
that the logic protects the rights of each principal [2, 51]. In our case, the access
control decision is of the form (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdB ψ, and this holds iff U ⊢
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saysIdB ψ. The goal is to identify a subset of utterances (U
∗ ⊆ U), such that U ⊢
saysIdB ψ iff U
∗ ⊢ saysIdB ψ.
Let us consider an example to build some intuition. Suppose we have four prin-
cipals A, B, C, and D, with l(A) = {id1}, l(B) = {id2}, l(C) = {id3}, and
l(D) = {id4}. Suppose C is a patient, and A and B maintain records about C.
A only permits C to access her records, while B permits C to permit her mother (D)
to access her records. Let U consist of the following utterances:
(u1) says{l(A)} PCaccess(C, r)
(u2) says{l(B)} PC saysl(C) PDaccess(D, r1)
(u3) says{l(C)} PDaccess(D, r1)
Now, suppose D wants to access C’s records that are maintained by A. It is easy
to see that U 6⊢ says{l(A)} PDaccess(D, r). But, do we need all of the utterances is
U to make this determination? Intuitively, no, because the only utterance from A is
(u1) and there is no representation conveyed via (u1). So, (u1) alone should suffice
to make this determination. In this case, we say that (u2) and (u3) do not interfere
with the access control decision.
Next, suppose D wants to access C’s records that are maintained by B. It follows
that U ⊢ says{l(B)} PDaccess(D, r1), and so D is indeed granted access. Here, (u2)
is certainly relevant, and since it gives the power of representation to C, (u3) is also
relevant. However, no mention of A is made by (u2) or (u3), and so, (u1) does not
interfere with the access control decision.
We begin by defining the subset of utterances that are relevant to an access control
decision:
Definition 4.12 (Reachable Utterances). Given a set of utterances U and a formula
saysIdB ψ, U
∗
IdB
is the smallest set such that:
• If idB ∈ IdB and says{idB} ϕ ∈ U , says{idB} ϕ ∈ U
∗
IdB
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• If says{idB} ϕ ∈ U
∗
IdB
and saysIdA ψ
′ is a subformula of ϕ, then U∗IdA ⊆ U
∗
IdB
If we think of formulas saysIdB ψ as pointing to utterances in U (labeled IdB), then
U∗IdB is the set of utterances that are pointed to directly (the first clause), or pointed
to by subformuls of utterances that are pointed to (the second clause). In these
terms, the computation of the set U∗IdB corresponds to a reachability computation
on a graph, and hence, we call it the set of reachable utterances. We believe that
it is reasonable to restrict to the reachable utterances, because given the question
saysl(B) ψ, U
∗
l(B) is determined by B and the principals to whom she grants the power
of representation. We can now show the following:
Theorem 4.4 (Non-interference). Given a set of utterances U , for all saysIdB ψ ∈ L,
we have U ⊢ saysIdB ψ iff U
∗
IdB
⊢ saysIdB ψ
The proof is discussed in Appendix B.5. We note that the distinction between
the inference component and the saying component allows us to restrict attention
to inferences of the form U ⊢ saysIdB ϕ, where U only has formulas of the form
saysIdA ψ. If the set U could contain arbitrary formulas, non-interference would have
a more complex characterization, as in [51]. For example, if we allowed formulas of
the form ¬ saysIdA ψ in U , then any principal can render U inconsistent.
The non-interference theorem also tells us that the axioms provide an exact gen-
eralization of the predicative definition of says in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.4). If there
are no nested occurences of says in U , then U ⊢ saysIdB ψ iff UIdB ⊢ saysIdB ψ.
4.3.5 Conformance
We now turn to the definition of conformance. While the definition of conformance
has some variation between the various formalisms [4, 44, 54, 56, 60, 62, 88], all
of them require a principal to satisfy the obligations that are imposed on her. In
the context of contracts, several works [56, 60, 62, 88] accommodate reasoning about
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mitigating actions such as “paying a fine” if an obligation is not satisfied. The analysis
of such mitigating actions is left to future work.
We define conformance as a relation between a principal and another principal
w.r.t. a set of laws:
Definition 4.13 (Conformance). Given a state s with a set of objects O, a body
of regulation Reg, and {A,B} ⊆ OP , we say that A conforms to B w.r.t. the laws
IdB ⊆ l(B) and a fixed point (U,U
′) with U = U ′ iff for all propositional ϕ ∈ LϕA :
If (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OAϕ, then (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ
In other words, conformance is the satisfaction of all obligations. The syntactic
restrictions in Definition 4.2 justify the restriction to ϕ ∈ LϕA , as these are the
only formulas that can appear within the scope of OA. The restriction to fixed points
(U,U ′), where U = U ′, ensures that all formulas are either true or false. Definition 4.13
is not appropriate when U 6= U ′, since classically provable formulas, e.g. ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ,
may be ungrounded. In such cases, the principal would be found (trivially) non-
conformant. One way to accomodate these cases is to modify Definition 4.13 so that
if (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OAϕ, we require only that ϕ be true or ungrounded. With
this modification, our proof of decidability over to the case where U 6= U ′.
Let us apply Definition 4.13 our example from HIPAA in Table 4.1 (Section 4.3.3).
As we discussed, we are interested in the conformance of Bob (B). Bob does not
conform to Alice (A) w.r.t. the laws l(A) = {24}, because:
(s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysl(A) OB saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r) and
(s,Reg) 6|=(U,U ′) saysl(B) PAaccess(A, r)
However, it can be shown that Bob conforms to HIPAA (H), w.r.t. the laws l(H) =
{23, 23a, 23b}. Additional examples are discussed in Section 4.4.2.
We can show that conformance checking is decidable:
Theorem 4.5 (Decidability of Conformance). Given a state S, a body of regulation
Reg, a fixed point (U,U ′) where U = U ′ and |U | is finite, principals {A,B} ⊆ O, and
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identifiers IdB ⊆ l(B), there is a procedure to decide whether A conforms to B w.r.t.
the laws IdB.
See Appendix B.6 for the proof. Note that given a state S and a fixed point
(U,U ′), there are potentially infinitely many formulas ϕ ∈ LϕA such that S |=(U,U ′)
saysIdB OAϕ. For example, if there is some ϕ such that S |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OAϕ, then
for all ϕ′ ∈ LϕA , we have (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OA(ϕ ∨ ϕ
′). We prove that it
suffices to restrict attention to a single formula, which may be understood as a prime
implicant of all the obligations imposed on A via the laws IdB.
4.3.6 A Polytime Fragment
Logic programming approaches to access control and conformance enjoy some compu-
tational benefits in comparison to our approach (at the cost of expressive power). The
main benefit comes from the restriction of heads/postconditions of rules to atomic
predicates. In this section, we identify a fragment of the logic that is decidable in
polynomial time. We begin by defining the syntax of chain formulas:
Definition 4.14 (Chain formulas). Given a countable set Φ (of proposition names),
countable sets of principal names OP , a finite set of identifiers ID, and a function
l : O → 2Id, the language L(Φ, O,OP , l, ID), abbreviated as L, is defined as follows:
ϕA ::= ⊥ | p | saysl(A) ψB (∀B ∈ OP )
ϕ ::= ϕA (∀A ∈ OP )
ψA ::= ⊥ | p | OAϕA | PAϕA
ψ ::= ψA (∀A ∈ OP )
where p ∈ Φ. The set of formulas generated by each BNF rule are referred to as LϕA ,
Lϕ, LψA and Lψ respectively, and L = Lϕ ∪ Lψ.
Given a set of formulas ∆ ⊆ L and ψ ∈ L, our goal is to determine if ∆ ⊢ ψ
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in polynomial time. Let us consider an example, where ∆ contains the following
formulas:
• saysl(A4) PA3 saysl(A3) PA2 saysl(A2) p
• saysl(A3) PA1 saysl(A1) ⊥
• saysl(A1) p
It follows that ∆ ⊢ saysl(A3) p, since A3 permits A1 to speak for her. However, we will
show that ∆ 6⊢ saysl(A4) p, since A3 has not established the appropriate delegation
chain via A2. We briefly discuss the restrictions imposed by chain formulas, and then
turn to the decision procedure.
Discussion of Restrictions: Chain formulas are a generalization of the construc-
tions used in the language Secpal [16]. In particular, we accomodate obligation and
speaking for. Many of the examples in the access control literature can be expressed
in this fragment. From the conformance perspective, however, we lose the capability
to express probhibitions. Consider the following statement:
(26) A bloodbank must not ship a donation, if it tests positive for HIV.
This can be expressed as law, using the formalism in Section 4.3.3. However, the
utterances that arise will be of the form: says{26}OB¬ship(B, d), i.e., the regulator
says (via law (26)) that the bloodbank B must not ship the donation d. The presence
of negation over the atomic proposition ship keeps it outside the chain fragment. We
conjecture that negation can be accommodated with polytime decidability, but leave
an investigation to future work. We note that even the presence of falsity (⊥) poses
challenges. When ∆ 6⊢ ψ, we do not know if there is a model of polynomial size to
demonstrate that it is not provable. However, the existence of a model (of worst-case
exponential size) can be shown, and we can avoid explicitly constructing it.
We now discuss the other restrictions imposed by chain formulas (Definition 4.14).
says is restricted to formulas of the form saysl(A) ψ and formulas saysIdA ψ for IdA ⊂
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l(A) are not allowed. This is done only to simplify the notation in proofs and all the
techniques that we discuss are adapted easily to accomodate such formulas.
Conjunctions are not allowed within a chain. However, using the following equiv-
alences, we can allow conjunctions under saying:
⊢ saysl(A)(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ (saysl(A) ϕ ∧ saysl(A) ψ)
This equivalence lets us turn formulas with conjunctions into chains, and hence, all
the techniques that we discuss are easily adapted to accomodate this case. Conjunc-
tions can also be used within obligations, due to a similar property. However, for
permissions, we have:
⊢ PA(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇒ (PAϕ ∧ PAψ)
But, the converse is not necessarily true. We do not know if conjunctions under
permissions can be accomodated with polytime decidability.
The next restriction is the exclusion of negation, and in particular, negation does
not appear over atomic propositions. In a modal logic without the axioms A5 and
A6, negations can be easily accomodated in chains (with polytime decidability) due
to the tree-model property [146]. However, with A5 and A6, the models are trees
with edges between siblings. The presence of these sibling edges make it difficult
to accomodate negation. In fact, the presence of ⊥ poses challenges as well. When
∆ 6⊢ ψ, we do not know if there is a model of polynomial size to demonstrate that
it is not provable. However, the existence of a model (of worst-case exponential size)
can be shown, and we can avoid explicitly constructing it.
The final restriction is the strict alternation between saying and permission. For-
mulas of the form saysl(A) saysl(B) ψ are excluded. The algorithm presented below can
be extended (with some difficulty) to accomodate this case.
In applications where there are a mix of chain and non-chain formulas, we can use
the non-interference (Theorem 4.4) to decide if the polytime procedure can be used
for a particular decision, i.e., when the non-chain formulas do not interfere.
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Polytime Decision Procedure: We now turn to the design of the algorithm to
decide whether ∆ ⊢ ψ, starting the a notion of structural implication:
Definition 4.15 (Structural Implication). The relation ⊲⊆ L × L (written infix as
ϕ ⊲ ψ and read ϕ structurally implies ψ) as the smallest set such that:
1. ⊥ ⊲ ϕ
2. ϕ ⊲ ϕ
3. OAϕ ⊲ XAψ if ϕ ⊲ ψ, where X = O or X = P
4. PAϕ ⊲ PAψ if ϕ ⊲ ψ
5. XA⊥ ⊲ ϕ, where X = O or X = P
6. saysl(A) ϕ ⊲ saysl(A) ψ if ϕ ⊲ ψ, for all A ∈ O
7. saysl(A) XA saysl(A) ϕ ⊲ ψ if saysl(A) ϕ ⊲ ψ, for all A ∈ O, where X = O or
X = P
Given a set of formulas ∆ and a formula ψ, ∆ ⊲ ψ iff there exists ϕ ∈ ∆ such that
ϕ ⊲ ψ.
We mention some properties of structural implication:
Proposition 4.3. The following hold:
• If ϕ ⊲ ψ, then ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ
• If ∆ ⊲ ψ, then ∆ ⊢ ψ
• If ϕ ⊲ ψ, ψ ⊲ φ, then ϕ ⊲ φ
The proof follows easily by induction on the clauses of Definition 4.15. We now
define closed sets which form the basis for the polynomial time decision procedure:
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Definition 4.16 (Closed sets). A set of formulas ∆ is said to be closed iff for all
{saysl(A) ϕ, saysl(B) ψ} ⊆ ∆ and A 6= B, we have:
• If OB saysl(B) ψ ⊲ ϕ, saysl(A) ϕ ∈ ∆.
• If ϕ ⊲ PB saysl(B) ψ, saysl(A) ψ ∈ ∆.
Given a set of formulas ∆, the closure of ∆, denoted by ∆∗, is the smallest set such
that ∆ ⊆ ∆∗ and ∆∗ is closed.
We will prove the following:
Theorem 4.6. Given a finite set of formulas ∆ and a formula ψ:
1. ∆∗ ⊲ ψ iff ∆ ⊢ ψ.
2. ∆∗ can be computed in polynomial time.
3. ∆∗ ⊲ ψ can be decided in polynomial time.
Proof. Item 1: The soundness, i.e., if ∆∗ ⊲ ψ, then ∆ ⊢ ψ, follows easily from the
proof of item 2 below. The completeness, i.e., if ∆ ⊢ ψ, then ∆∗ ⊲ ψ, is, as usual,
more difficult, and the proof is given in Appendix B.7.
Item 2: We first consider the complexity of computing ϕ ⊲ ψ. If we turn Defini-
tion 4.15 directly into a (recursive) procedure, we get a worst-case exponential bound
(due to clause (7)). This needs to be handled by comparing prefixes of ϕ and ψ.
Given a formula saysl(A) φ and A ∈ O, the A prefix of φ, denoted w
A
φ , is defined as
follows:
• wAφ = ǫ if φ is ⊥, atomic, of the form XBφ
′, where B 6= A, or XAψ, where ψ is
atomic or ⊥. The A suffix of φ is φ− wAφ = φ.
• Otherwise, wAφ = (X
1
A, ....,X
n
A), where φ = X
1
A saysl(A) ...X
n
A saysl(A) φ
′ and wAφ′ =
ǫ. In this case, the A suffix of φ is φ− wAφ = φ
′.
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|wAφ | denotes the lenght of the A prefix, where |ǫ| = 0. w
A
φ (i) denotes the i
th
element of the prefix for 1 ≤ i ≤ |wAφ |. Given saysl(A) ϕ and saysl(A) ψ, w
A
ϕ and w
A
ψ
are the A prefixes. We say that wAϕ (j) matches w
A
ψ (i), denoted w
A
ϕ (j) ⊲ w
A
ψ (i), if
wAϕ (j) = O, or w
A
ϕ (j) = w
A
ψ (i). The matching relation is extended to suffixes of
strings. (wAϕ , j) ⊲ (w
A
ψ , i) if j ≤ |w
A
ϕ | and:
• i > |wAψ |, or
• i ≤ |wAψ |, w
A
ϕ (j) ⊲ w
A
ψ (i) and (w
A
ϕ , j + 1) ⊲ (w
A
ψ , i+ 1), or
• i ≤ |wAψ |, w
A
ϕ (j) 6⊲ w
A
ψ (i) and (w
A
ϕ , j + 1) ⊲ (w
A
ψ , i)
And, finally, the matching relation is extended to strings: wAϕ ⊲ w
A
ψ iff (w
A
ϕ , 1) ⊲
(wAψ , 1). We can now turn Definition 4.15 into a recursive procedure. Clauses (1)-(5)
remain, and clauses (6) and (7) are replaced with the following:
• saysl(A) ϕ ⊲ saysl(A) ψ if:
– |wAϕ | = 0 and ϕ ⊲ ψ, or
– wAϕ ⊲ w
A
ψ and ϕ− w
A
ϕ ⊲ ψ − w
A
ψ
The equivalence to Definition 4.15 is established easily by induction. Note that each
application of the third clause of (wAϕ , j) ⊲ (w
A
ψ , i) corresponds to an application of
clause (7) in Definition 4.15. The complexity of this procedure is O(n+m) where n
is the depth of ϕ and m is the depth of ψ.
To compute the closure of ∆, we initalize ∆∗ to ∆ and repeatedly apply the two
clauses of Definition 4.16 until covergence. Let A be the set such that A ∈ A iff
saysl(A) ψ is a subformula of ∆. In the worst case, at each iteration, we add just one
formula, and achieve convergence at |A|× s, where s is the number of subformulas in
∆. The complexity of each iteration is O(s2 × n), where n is the depth of ∆. And,
as a result, the complexity of computing ∆∗ is O(|A| × s3 × n).
Item 3: The size of ∆∗ is O(|A| × s) and the depth is n. Thus ∆∗ ⊲ ψ can be
decided in O(|A| × s×m) where m is the maximum of n and the depth of ψ.
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4.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how various constructs from the literature are expressed
in our framework. In Section 4.4.1, we discuss access control examples. Section 4.4.2
discusses conformance in the presence of nested obligations and permissions. Finally,
in Section 4.4.3, we connect the logical work to speech act theories.
4.4.1 Access Control
We discuss two access control examples in this section. The first example highlights
an important restriction of the policies in Section 4.3.3, i.e., a policy lets us conclude
what has been said, but not what actually happens. The second example illustrates
how the delegation operator of Li et al. [93] can be defined in our framework.
Example 1: We begin with an example from Garg and Abadi [50]. Consider a file-
access scenario with an administrating principal (A), a user (B), a file (file1), and
the following policy:
1. If A says that file1 should be deleted, then this must be the case.
2. A trusts B to decided whether file1 should be deleted.
3. B wants to delete file1.
We introduce a new principal F for the file system. The following are the utter-
ances (U) obtained at the fixed point:
1. saysl(F ) PA saysl(A) OF (delfile1)
2. saysl(A) PB saysl(B) OF (delfile1)
3. saysl(B) OF (delfile1)
The first utterance is read as follows: The file system F says that A is permitted
to require it (F ) to delete file1. The second utterance is the delegation from A to B,
and the third utterance is B’s wish to delete file1. Using A5, we will conclude that
U ⊢ saysl(F ) OF (delfile1). In other words, we conclude that the system requires itself
to delete file1.
Our analysis differs in an important way from Garg and Abadi [50]. We do not
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conclude that file1 is actually deleted, i.e., U 6⊢ delfile1. In fact, we can show that there
is no policy (as defined in Section 4.3.3) that lets us make this conclusion. delfile1 is
true at a state where F conforms to l(F ), as per Definition 4.13. In some cases, it
may be warranted to assume/axiomatize self-conformance, i.e., (saysl(F ) OF (ϕ)) ⇒ ϕ.
However, conflicting self-imposed requirements would make U inconsistent.
Example 2: The delegation operator of Li et al. [93] has a compelling definition in
our framework. The syntax (in Li et al. [93]) for delegation is “x delegates (ϕ)d to
y”, where d is the depth of delegation. We define the schema ps(ϕ, x, d), where x is
used to generate variable names, and d ∈ N :
ps(ϕ, x, 1) = Px1 saysl(x1) ϕ
ps(ϕ, x, d) = Pxd saysl(xd)(ϕ ∧ ps(ϕ, x, d− 1)), for d > 1
The statement “A delegates (delfile1)2 to B” is interpreted as follows: A says
delfile1 if B says it or anyone that B trusts says it. Suppose, in addition, that B
delegates (delfile1)1 to C, and C says delfile1. We express this with the following
rules:
(1) (x2 = B) 7→ ps(delfile1, x, 2)
(2) (y1 = C) 7→ ps(delfile1, y, 1)
(3) ⊤ 7→ delfile1
We assume that 1 ∈ l(A), 2 ∈ l(B) and 3 ∈ l(C). At the fixed point, we will have
U ⊢ saysl(A) delfile1, i.e., A says delfile1. Further re-delegations by C (by modifying
statement 3) will not be attributed to A.
In the logic of Li et al. [93], a representation statement is used to grant permission
to speak without consuming delegation depth. If C represents B on delfile1, then C
should be permitted to at most one re-delegation. Statement 2 is modified as follows:
(2) (y2 = C) 7→ ps(delfile1, y, 2)
With this modification, a delegation by C will be attributed to A. The reader may
have noticed the similarity between statement 1 and the modified version of statement
2. In our approach, delegation is just a special kind of representation. A delegates
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(ϕ)d to B iff B represents A on “delegating (ϕ)d−1 to anyone”. If C represents B on
“delegating (ϕ)d−1 to anyone”, then she represents A as well.
As Li et al. [93] point out, in the presence of representation, delegation depth does
not have much meaning. For example, A may not wish to trust C to the same extent
as B. There are a few options to address this issue by modifying the representation
axiom. One way is to keep track of the delegation depth in the axiom, as in the
Secpal language [16]. Yet another way is to keep track of the principal on behalf of
whom a statement in made. We avoid these modifications, to simplify presentation.
4.4.2 Nested Obligations and Permissions
We discuss two examples of conformance in the presence of nested obligations and
permissions. The first example illustrates how several fine-grained notions of confor-
mance can be captured, and is intended to supplement the example from HIPAA in
Section 4.3. The second example points out an important practical difficulty.
Example 1: Consider the following law:
(27) The owners of parking lots ought to forbid parking near the entrance.
What does it mean to conform to (27)? We analyze this sentence as follows: “The
owners of parking lots ought to (introduce laws that) forbid parking near the en-
trance.”. In other words, (27) is an obligation to introduce a prohibition. If the
owner introduces such a law, then the person parking is viewed as non-conformant,
but it is the owner that needs to conform to (27). We can represent (27) in logic as
follows:
(27) own(x) ∧ p(y) 7→ Ox saysl(x) Oy¬pk(y, x)
Here own(x) is true iff x is the owner of a parking lot, p(y) is true iff y is a person,
and pk(y, x) is true iff y parks near the entrance of the lot owned by x. l(x) refers to
the laws that are introduced by x.
Let us assume a state S = (IΦ1 , ..., IΦn) in which A is the owner of a parking lot,
and B parks near the entrances of A’s lot. The true predications are: {own(A), p(B),
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pk(B,A)}. In addition, A is assigned the identifier 28, i.e., l(A) = {28}. We will
now consider two scenarios – (a) A does not introduce any laws, and (b) A introduces
a law forbidding parking near the entrance. We are interested in the conformance
(Definition 4.13) of the owner A and the driver B.
Scenario 1: Suppose that A does not introduce any laws. The fixed point utterance
pair is:
U = U ′ = {says{27} OA says{28}OB¬pk(B,A)}
In this case, A does not conform to {27} because:
• U ⊢ says{27} OA says{28}OB¬pk(B,A), but
• S 6|=(U,U ′) says{28} OB¬pk(B,A)
However, it can be shown that B conforms to {27}.
Scenario 2: Now suppose that A introduces the law:
(28) p(y) 7→ Oy¬pk(y, A)
The fixed point utterance pair is:
U = U ′ = {says{27} OA says{28}OB¬pk(B,A), says{28}OB¬pk(B,A)}
It can be shown that A conforms to {27}. What about B? It is clear that B does
not conform to {28}, but what about {27}? Observe that U ⊢ says{27} OB¬pk(B,A)
(using the transfer axiom A28), but (S,Reg) 6|=(U,U ′) ¬pk(B,A). Hence, B does not
conform to {27}. In other words, the statement (27) conveys an obligation to A and if
A conforms, the embedded obligation is conveyed to B. As we noted in Section 4.2.2,
we are formalizing the notion of speaking on someone’s behalf, i.e., the obligation (28)
issued by A is understood as being on behalf of the issuer of (27). Some applications
may need a distinction between the different senses of saying.
Example 2: Consider the following example:
(29) You are required to allow a patient to see his records.
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By our analysis, (29) is an obligation on the hospital to provide a permission. Sup-
pose that a hospital introduces such a permission in its policy. Has it conformed to
(29)? The problem arises in distinguishing between claimed permission, and actual
permission. A hospital claims that it permits a patient to see his records, by making
an appropriate rule. On the other hand, a hospital actually permits a patient to see
his records, by taking an action, e.g., sending the records via mail.
We suggest that a formalization of actual permission needs notions of bringing
about or seeing to it that (e.g., [17, 70]). If a principal A says that she permits an
action p, we need to check if she prevents p either by some other action or non-
action. We can capture such notions by introducing laws that require facilitation.
For example, (id) saysl(A) PB(p) 7→ OA(ϕ), where ϕ is understood as a prerequisite
for p, which is in the control of A. Thus, actual permission can be determined during
conformance checking. However, listing the prerequisites for all the actions is quite
difficult in practice, and notions of control and responsibility could lead to a more
elegant solution.
4.4.3 Speech Act Theory
Speech act theories are concerned with providing an informal but precise account of
the consequences of an utterance. The study of speech acts was initiated by Austin [8],
and has subsequently received much attention (cf. [133]). In this section, we briefly
discuss connections between speech act theory and the logic that we have developed.
Austin [8] distinguished between three kinds of acts that are associated with an
utterance – (a) locutionary acts, (b) illocutionary acts, and (c) perlocutionary acts.
The three types of acts are best understood using an example. Suppose John and
Mary are getting married in a church, and the priest utters the words “I pronounce
you man and wife”. The locutionary act is the construction of sounds in making the
utterance. The illocutionary act is that John and Mary are married (according to
the church and/or state). And, the perlocutionary act is that “People who witness
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the wedding consider John and Mary to be married”. How are these acts reflected
in the logic? The locutionary acts are obtained during the creation of utterances
via policies (Section 4.3.3). The illocutionary and perlocutionary acts/effects are
obtained via inferences, as we discussed in the context of reasoning about rights in
Section 4.3.2. Note that for the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects to be obtained
in the example above, we need corresponding utterances from the church or state, and
the people witnessing the wedding, to the effect that they permit the priest to say
(on their behalf) that John and Mary are married. The logic does not distinguish
between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects.
Searle [135] classifies illocutionary acts into the following types:
(a) Assertives, which are used to convey the truth of the expressed proposition.
For example, “John has good credit”.
(b) Directives, which are used to guide behavior. Examples include commands,
advice, etc.
(c) Commissives, which commit the speaker to some future action, e.g., promising
or making a bet.
(d) Expressives, which convey an attitude to a proposition. For example, “I am
glad that John and Mary are married”.
(e) Declaratives, which change reality in accordance with the proposition of the
declarion, e.g., baptisms, pronouncements, etc.
Four of these illocutionary effects that can be achieved using statements in the
logic. Facts are asserted. For example, a branch of a company may assert the cred-
itworthiness of customers. Obligations give rise to directives. The granting of power,
via permission to speak, is a commissive, as the principal granting the power is com-
mitted to making a statement if the power is excercised. For example, if the state
permits a priest to say that John and Mary are married, and the priest says so, then
we conclude that the state says that John and Mary are married. And, finally, the
exercise of power corresponds a declarative, e.g., the priest declares John and Mary
121
to be married on behalf of the state.
We have connected the logic to speech act theory at a coarse-grained level. An
investigation of more fine-grained connections is left to future work.
4.5 Conclusions
We have motivated and described a logic for access control and conformance. The
focus was on the interaction between saying and permission, as needed for these appli-
cations. We proposed two axioms to characterize their interaction (Section 4.3.2), and
showed how these axioms could be incorporated into a logic programming approach
(Section 4.3.3).
A combined analysis of saying and permission yielded benefits to both applica-
tions. For access control, we find a way to avoid the problematic interaction between
hand-off and classical reasoning. Our axioms yield a decidable logic with a com-
plete semantics (Section 4.3.2), and we hope that they have intuitive appeal to the
reader. For conformance, we provide a novel account of recursive notions of power.
We showed, in Section 4.3.5, that conformance checking is decidable. In Section 4.3.6,
we identified a fragment of the logic, called chain formulas, in which provability can
be decided in polynomial time.
We believe that the joint study of access control and conformance is a rich area
for research. In Chapter 6, we will identify several avenues for further inquiry.
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Chapter 5
Annotating and Computing Logical
Form
5.1 Introduction
Regulatory bodies are large and complex. Manually translating the regulation to logic,
as needed for conformance checking, is time-consuming. A long term goal of our work
is to use natural language processing (NLP) techniques to assist in this translation.
The problem of translating natural language sentences to logic has been of interest for
several years in linguistics (cf. [67]), and more recently in NLP [24, 149, 150]. There
are many open problems in the design of an appropriate logic and in the translation
procedure. In previous chapters, we have motivated and designed features in a logic
to accomodate a sentential translation of regulation. In this chapter, we turn our
attention to the translation procedure with two objectives:
1. Identifying additional features that are needed in the logic – There are many
features that are needed in a logic, to accommodate a sentential translation
of regulation. While we have identified some features in previous chapters, an
empirical approach is needed to determine whether there are important/frequent
constructions which cannot be translated directly.
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2. Defining a component of the translation that can be evaluated – Since the logic is
a subject of research, it is difficult to make progress on the translation procedure
at the same time. We will assume that the end goal is to translate sentences
into a variant of the logic that we have developed in previous chapters. The
short-term goal is to compute some representation from the text that could
serve as an intermediate step in the translation to logic.
5.1.1 Approach
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, following recent works in NLP [149, 150], we
approach the translation to logic by analogy to syntax-based machine translation.1 A
syntax-based translation system can be decomposed into two interacting components:
(A) The lexical component provides (a part of) the translation of a word or phrase
into logic. Function words may be translated into operators in the logic, e.g.,
some as an existential quantifier and must as an obligation modality. Other
words, e.g., donation and test, may be translated as predicates w.r.t. an ontology
or schema, as we saw in Chapter 3.
(B) The structural component rearranges the constituents of a sentence to be syn-
tactically similar to the logical translation. We focus on this component of the
translation, and discuss examples in the following sections.
The Lexical Component: Before we narrow our focus to the structural com-
ponent, we briefly mention a few lines of research that have bearing on the lexical
component. The problem of creating/extracting an ontology from text has been stud-
ied under a variety of guises. In NLP, there have been several efforts to create lexicons
(both manually and automatically) that capture various relationships between words,
1In NLP, machine translation refers to the task of translating sentences in one natural language
to another, e.g., English to French. Approaches differ in what are considered the basic units of
translations, e.g., words, phrases, or syntactic trees.
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such as, synonyms, antonyms, and hypernymns (see, for example, [31, 46, 121]). Such
lexicons may be used to ensure, for example, that synonyms receive the same trans-
lation into logic and that hypernyms correspond to subclasses/subtypes. In require-
ments and knowledge engineering, the focus has been on extracting class hierarchies
from text [27, 32, 109, 118], much like the schemas that we created (manually) for our
case study in Chapter 3. The translation of a word or a phrase may be determined by
aligning it to the ontology, e.g., a noun may refer to a class or an attribute of a class.
There are many challenging problems in adapting such resources and techniques to
assist in the translation of regulation to logic, and we leave an exploration of these
issues to future work.
The Structural Component: In this work, we focus on the structural component
of the translation of regulatory sentences to logic. We assume that sentences in
regulation are expressed formally as statements of the form:
(id) ϕ 7→ ψ
Furthermore, we assume that the language for expression preconditions (ϕ) and post-
conditions (ψ) is an appropriate extension of the logic developed in Chapter 4. Note
that the distinction between preconditions and postconditions is a non-trivial as-
sumption, and entails, for example, that all existential quantification and negation is
restricted to being within either the precondition or the postcondition. This distinc-
tion is not unique to our work, and most formalisms that accomodate exceptions to
laws, e.g., [26, 56, 60, 105, 134, 136], make a similar distinction.
Given the distinction between pre/postconditions, our goal is to transform a reg-
ulatory sentence into a structure that lets us determine: (I) the constituents of
a sentence that contribute to the pre/postcondition, and (II) the structure of the
pre/postcondition. The structures that we use are called abstract syntax trees (ASTs),
and we provide a definition using an example in Section 5.2. Linguistic theories have
argued for the transformation of a sentence into a structure called logical form (LF)
as an intermediate step in translating a sentence to logic [103]. LF encodes the resolu-
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tion of scope ambiguities. ASTs can be understood as a restricted kind of logical form
for regulatory texts. An AST describes, for example, whether negation has scope
within the precondition or postcondition of a law.
5.1.2 Contributions and Outline
We see our contributions as follows:
• Annotating ASTs – We develop a modest-sized corpus (of about 200 sentences)
of regulatory sentences annotated with ASTs. To our knowledge, ours is the
first study in annotating scope phenomena. We place our work in the context
of prior work in Section 5.9.
• Computing ASTs – The main step in the computation of ASTs is the ordering
or ranking of operators. We adapt learning models for ranking to compute
ASTs. Features are designed by studying subproblems, such as, disambiguating
between de re and de dicto interpretations. The algorithms are evaluated using
adapted versions of metrics developed for parsing.
Sections 5.2-5.4 describe the annotation. In Section 5.2, we define ASTs using an
example. The guidelines for annotating ASTs are discussed in Section 5.3. We then
give a quantitative description of the corpus in Section 5.4.
Sections 5.5-5.7 describe the computation of ASTs. We begin, in Section 5.5, by
giving an overview of our two-step approach to computing ASTs. We then design
features for the two subproblems in Section 5.6. In Section 5.7, we consider the
problem of finding the optimal AST. We design metrics to evaluate the computed
ASTs, and compare the performance of different algorithms.
We evaluate agreement in Section 5.8, discuss related work in Section 5.9, and
conclude in Section 5.10.
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5.2 Abstract Syntax Trees
In this section, we describe abstract syntax trees (ASTs) using an example from the
CFR Section 610.11:
(30) A general safety test for the detection of extraneous toxic contaminants shall
be performed on biological products intended for administration to humans.
We will discuss the translation in logic and the AST for the fragment of (30) that
appears in black. In most examples in this chapter, we will restrict attention to a
fragment of a sentence by graying out the rest. We do this to focus attention on
particular phenomena of interest, and to keep the figures to a manageable size.
Translation in Logic: The sentence (30) is formally expressed as:
(30) bio prod(x) 7→ Om(x)(∃y : test(y) ∧ proc(y, gen saf) ∧ ag(y,m(x)) ∧ obj(y, x))
The predicates and function symbols are read as follows. bio prod(x) - “x is a
biological product”. m(x) denotes the manufacturer of x. test(y) - “y is a general
safety test (event)”. proc(y, gen saf) - “y is a general safety procedure”. ag(y,m(x))
- “the agent of y is m(x)”, and obj(y, x) - “the object of the event y is x”. The
formalized version of the law is read as follows: “If x is a biological product, then
the regulator says via law (30) that the manufacturer m(x) is required to perform a
general safety test y which has x as its object”.2
As we mentioned in Section 5.1, there is an important restriction to existential
quantification. We assume that existential quantifiers have scope within the precon-
dition or postcondition of a law. In the example above, the quantifier (∃y) has scope
within the postcondition. The formal evaluation procedure for laws (which is similar
2We assume a thematic role-based representation of events [47, 72]. The use of an existential
quantifier for the event variable is an oversimplification. For the test procedures in Section 610 of
the CFR, it is assumed that exactly one test of a particular type is carried out, and repeat tests
are permitted in the case of errors. The assumption of uniqueness is used to prescribe additional
properties of the test in separate sentences. We ignore such issues as they do not affect the ASTs.
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to logic programming) uses fixed point techniques that do not generalize to existential
quatifiers with scope over both the precondition and postcondition. Our guidelines
for annotating ASTs aim to preserve this restriction. In the following sections, we
will identify constructions for which we do not have an adequate formalization, and
these will be left to future work.
Abstract Syntax Tree: The AST for (30) is shown in Figure 5.1. There are three
types of nodes: terminals, pre-terminals, and internal nodes. We discuss each of these
types below, and introduce notation that is useful in discussing ASTs. We remind
the reader that we will only be producing the AST shown in Figure 5.1 and not the
logical translation of the sentence given above. The translations in logic are given
purely to motivate the annotation, and we leave the conversion of ASTs to logic to
future work.
λx
D
all
R
bio. prod.
λ
O
Post
λ
M
shall
λ
M
be
λy
D
A
R
gen. saf. test
.
y performed on x
Figure 5.1: Example of an abstract syntax tree (AST).
5.2.1 Terminals
Terminals form the leaves of the AST. There are three types of terminals – explicit
tokens, implicit tokens, and variables. We briefly describe each of these types, using
examples from Figure 5.1. Explicit tokens correspond to single words that appear in a
128
sentence, e.g., the leaves “A”, “product”, and “perform”. Implicit tokens are inserted
during annotation, e.g., “all” and “Post”. We will motivate the use of the implicit
tokens in Section 5.2.4. Finally, we have variables which correspond to a contiguous
sequence of tokens which have moved, e.g., the leaves x and y .
5.2.2 Preterminals
Preterminals are the parents of a contiguous sequence of one or more terminals. There
are three types of preterminals, based on the function of the terminals that they
dominate – operators, restrictors, and the main predicate. We illustrate these types
using examples from Figure 5.1. Operators are labeled with their part-of-speech, e.g.,
“D” for determiner, “M” for modal, and “O” for other. The operators in Figure 5.1 are
all single words, but multi-word operators are possible, e.g., only if. Implicit operators
are introduced as needed. For example, the implicit determiner all is associated with
“biological products”. The tokens correponding to operators are written in sans serif
typeface, and implicit operators are underlined. Restrictors are labeled “R”, e.g., the
restrictor of the determiner “A” is the noun phrase “general safety test”. The main
predicate is an unlabeled node and the parent of the rightmost terminal in the AST,
i.e., the parent of the terminals “ y be performed on x ”.
5.2.3 Internal Nodes
There are two sorts of internal nodes – internal restrictors and other internal nodes.
Internal restrictors have a unique child which is the root of an AST, except that
it need not contain a postcondition marker. Such internal restrictors are needed, for
example, for prepositional phrase modification of noun phrases, and we will discuss
examples in later sections.
Other internal nodes have atleast 2 children. An internal node with n+1 children
corresponds to an n-ary operator. The first child of the internal node is the operator,
and the remaining n children are its arguments (which may be preterminals or internal
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nodes). We use the term nuclear scope to refer to the last (nth) argument of the
predicate, and the term restrictor to refer to any other argument. For example, the
phrase “biological products” is in the restrictor of the implicit operator all, and the
variable x is in its nuclear scope. The operators in Figure 5.1 have at most one
restrictor. We treat co-ordinating conjuctions, e.g., and, or, and but, as operators
which have muliple restrictors.
Non-unary operators typically bind a variable (displayed on the internal node, e.g.
λx for all). This indicates that the variable x in the nuclear scope is bound by
the operator. Unary operators, e.g., shall and Post, do not bind a variable, and the
corresponding internal node is labeled with λ .
5.2.4 Implicit Tokens Revisited
Implicit tokens are used to describe operators for which there is no overt word or
phrase in the sentence. The two main types of implicit operators are determiners and
the postcondition marker. The implicit determiner “all” in Figure 5.1 denotes that
the noun phrase ”biological products” should be interpreted generically/universally.
The postcondition marker is the operator associated with the implicit token Post, and
has the catch-all part-of-speech ”O” for other. It corresponds to the postcondition
of the logical translation of the sentence, i.e., Om(x)(∃y : gen saf test(y) ∧ obj(y, x)).
In Figure 5.1, there is a unique postcondition marker. In general, we will use one
postcondition marker for every matrix verb phrase, and as a result, sentences with
coordinated matrix verb phrases will have a postcondition for each coordinate. We
will discuss some other uses of implicit operators in later sections.
5.2.5 Notation for Scope Ordering
We develop some notation that is useful in describing ASTs. Given an AST for a
sentences, we say that an operator oi scopes over oj, denoted oi ≫ oj, if oj appears in
the nuclear scope of oi. For example, in Figure 5.1, we have all ≫ Post, all ≫ shall, all
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≫ A, Post ≫ A, and shall ≫ A. In addition, we say that the restrictor of oi scopes over
oj, denoted R(oi) ≫ oj, if oj appears in the restrictor of oi. Such configurations occur,
for example, with PP-modification of noun phrases, and we will discuss examples in
later sections.
5.3 Operators
In this section, we discuss the operators whose scope we are interested in, and our
guidelines for determining which operators scope over others. The operators are di-
vided in to four types – auxiliary verbs (Section 5.3.1), determiners (Secion 5.3.2),
clause and verb phrase modifiers (Section 5.3.3), and coordinating conjunctions (Sec-
tion 5.3.4). In addition to the operations, in each section, we present guidelines to
determine the scopes over relation w.r.t. other nodes in the AST. The guidelines were
developed by making several passes over sentences from Section 610 of the FDA CFR.
5.3.1 Auxiliary Verbs and The Postcondition Marker
The auxiliary verbs in a matrix clause mark the start of the postcondition, and are
placed directly below the postcondtion marker in the AST (in the order in which
they appear in the sentence). The only exception is when negation is involved, and
negation can appear before, between, or after all auxiliaries. Consider the following
sentences, where the operators of interest are shown in sans serif typeface:
(31) The general safety test shall be performed as specified in this section, unless
modification is prescribed in the additional standards for specific products, or
variation is approved as a supplement to the product license under Sec. 610.9.
(32) The general safety test is required in addition to other specific tests prescribed
in the additional standards for individual products in this subchapter, except
that, the test need not be performed on those products listed in paragraph (g)
of this section.
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(33) Upon notification by the Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Re-
search, a manufacturer shall not distribute a lot of a product until the lot is
released by the Director, Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research.
The relevant fragments of the ASTs for (31)-(33) are shown in Figure 5.2, from
left to right. In the AST for (31), we have Post ≫ shall ≫ be. Since (32) conveys a
permission, we have Post ≫ not ≫ need ≫ be, and need is understood as obligation
in this sentence. By contrast, (33) conveys a prohibition, and we have Post ≫ shall ≫
not.
.
... λ
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...
Figure 5.2: A sequence of auxiliary verbs or negation appear directly below the
postcondition marker.
5.3.2 Determiners – De Re and De Dicto
The most frequent types of determiners in the CFR are: (a) universal or generic, e.g.,
every, all, (b) existential, e.g., some, and (c) deictic or bound, e.g., the.3 We will focus
3“The” is interpreted deictically if it draws its interpretation from the context or world knowledge,
e.g., in the phrase “the FDA. A bound interpretation is possible when it is dependent on another
determiner, e.g., “the test dose for each rabbit”, in a case where each ≫ the. We note that “the”
can also have a universal interpretation, e.g., “the donations”, and in such cases, the guidelines for
universal determiners apply.
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on these three types of determiners, and discuss other determiners at the end of this
section.
Most of the sentences in the CFR are normative, i.e., they convey obligations and
permissions via, for example, the words must and may. Given a determiner d and
a modal (auxiliary) m, we need to decide whether the determiner has de re scope
(d ≫ m) or de dicto scope (m ≫ d). The default guidelines for the three types of
determiners are as follows:
• A universal or generic determiner d has de re scope, unless there is another
operator w that has de dicto scope and w ≫ d in the logical translation of the
sentence.
• An existential determiner d has de dicto scope. We do not allow for de re scope
in this case.
• We do not analyse deictic or bound determiners as having scope properties,
and their position in the AST respects the syntax of the sentence with the
proviso that all operators that are needed to obtain the reference (for bound
determiners) have scope over it. In effect, we defer the analysis of deixis to the
(manual) procedure for translating an AST into logic.
The de re scope of universals and the de dicto scope of existentials are consequences
of the formalism that we are working with. It may be possible to design a logic that
accommodate other scope orders4, and the AST for such a logic would be different.
The main obstacle in applying the above guidelines is that determiners, e.g., a
and any, are ambiguous. Even if we are given the context in which a sentence occurs,
there are different translations to logic depending on whether we interpret a deter-
miner generically or existentially. In such cases, we adopt default rules for assigning
4To our knowledge, there has not been an attempt to design a logic for conformance checking
that gives de dicto scope to universals, while accomodating priorities of exceptions over (default)
rules.
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interpretations to determiners based on the type of noun phrase or the syntactic
configuration. We discuss some of the frequent cases.
Nominalizations: A noun phrase is said to be a nominalization if it denotes an
event or a property (approximately, if there is an equivalent verb or adjective phrase).
Consider again the sentence (fragment) from CFR Section 610.11:
(30) A general safety test for the detection of extraneous toxic contaminants shall
be performed on biological products intended for administration to humans.
The noun phrase a general safety test in (30) is a nominalization. The determiner
a is ambiguous between the existential reading (for each product, there must be a
test), and a definite reading (a specific kind of test must be performed). We choose
the existential reading as the default, and assign de dicto scope to the determiner
a, i.e., must ≫ be ≫ a, as shown in Figure 5.1. The motivation for this decision is
to treat such sentences isomorphically to the cases where the verb equivalent of the
noun is used:
(34) You are not required to test donations of Source Plasma for evidence of infec-
tion due to the communicable disease agents listed in paragraphs (a)(5) and
(a)(6) of this section.
The AST for (34) is shown in Figure 5.3. Observe that in the AST for (30) in
Figure 5.1, and in the AST for (34) in Figre 5.3, the word test appears de dicto,
thereby treating the verb and noun forms of “test” isomorphically. In addition, we
note that the noun “donations” in (34) is also a nominalization, but it occurs de
re, because the implicit determiner associated with the noun is a universal one (all
in Figure 5.3). We will discuss the annotation of prepositional phrase modification
of noun phrases, e.g., “of source plasma” modifying “donations” in (34), after we
consider a few more examples of nominalizations.
The reader may have noticed the implicit operator “VP” in Figure 5.3. We use such
implicit operators to provide syntactic structure, and in this case, “VP” correspondes
to the verb phrase complement of “required”. We do not claim that verb phrases
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Figure 5.3: AST for (34)
are scope taking operators. However, they are annotated as operators, because it
simplifies the definition of ASTs. Notice that the operator “all” moves out of the verb
phrase, and takes scope over it, i.e., all ≫ VP in Figure 5.3. This is because verb
phrases are not islands for quantifier scope. However, clauses are typically islands.
The only syntactic operators that we have found the need for are clauses, verb phrases,
and adjective phrases. In other cases, the necessary syntax is encoded in the AST.
Let us now return to the discussion about nominalizations. The descriptions of
tests for products follow a common pattern in the CFR. The sentences in a section
describing a test can be divided into the following types:
S1 A sentence requiring the performance of the test for all products, such as (30)
above
S2 Sentences providing exemptions from performing the test, and
S3 Sentences describing the procedure for a particular product
The guidelines that we have discussed above suffice for the nomializations in the
sentences of type S1 and S2. The following are sentences of type S3 that appears
after (30) in Section 610.11 of the CFR:
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(35) The general safety test shall be conducted upon a representative sample of
the product in the final container from every final filling of each lot of the
product.
(36) The duration of the test shall be 7 days for both species, except that a longer
period may be established for specific products in accordance with Sec. 610.9.
We consider the problem of assigning scope to the uses of the determiner “the”
in (35) and (36). In Section 610.11 of the CFR, the noun phrase “the product” in
(35) does not refer to a contextually salient product. Rather, we have a sentence of
type S1 which requires the performance of tests on certain types of products. We
understand (35) as a paraphrase for the following:
(35) If a general safety test is required to be performed on a product (via another
law), then the general safety test shall be conducted upon a representative
sample of the product in the final container from every final filling of each lot
of the product
The paraphrase is translated into logic as follows:
gen saf(x) = ∃y : test(y) ∧ proc(y, gen saf) ∧ ag(y,m(x)) ∧ obj(y, x)
(35) prod(x) ∧ saysl(FDA)(Om(x)gen saf(x)) 7→ Om(x)(∃z : samp(z, x) ∧ gen saf(z))
The schema gen saf(x) is read as “a general safety test is perfomed on x by the man-
ufaturer (m(x))”. The subformula saysl(FDA)(Om(x)gen saf(x)) in the precondition
checkes whether the test is required via another law, and if so, the law (35) requires
the test to be performed on a sample of the product.
Note that “the general safety test” and “the product” are both interpreted de dicto
in this analysis. The contribution of “the general safety test” is the schema instance
gen saf(z) in the postcondition, and the contribution of “the product” is the variable x
in the postcondition. The differing translations of noun phrases introduced by the is an
instance of the broader problem of the interaction between naming and modalities [86].
136
“The product” is understood as a rigid designator for a particular product, and is
translated to a variable. “The general safety test” is not rigid, and refers to a test
that is required (but may not exist in non-conforming implementations). It is possible
to treat these differences in translation as a problem for scope. However, to our
knowledge, current linguistic theories treat it as an orthogonal problem to scope, i.e.,
as a problem of sense (cf. [125]).
Prepositional Phrase Modifiers: We revisit an example that we discussed in the
context of nominalizations:
(34) You are not required to test donations of Source Plasma for evidence of infec-
tion due to the communicable disease agents listed in paragraphs (a)(5) and
(a)(6) of this section.
The logical translation of (34) is given by:
(34) don(x) ∧ mat(x, SPlasma) 7→ ¬Obb(x)(∃y : test(y) ∧ obj(y, x))
The predicates are read as follows. don(x) - x is a donation. mat(x, SPlasma) - the
material of x is source plasma. test(y) - y is a test. obj(y, x) - the object of y is x.
bb(x) denotes the bloodbank that collected the donation x.
The noun phrase “donations of source plasma” forms the precondition of the law.
The noun “donations” contributes the predicate don, the preposition “of” contributes
the predicate mat, and the noun phrase “Source Plasma” contributes the constant
symbol “SPlasma”. We interpret the noun phrase “donations of source plasma” as
being equivalent to “all donations of the source plasma kind”, with the determiners
“all” and “the” being implicit. The AST is shown in Figure 5.3, and the (implicit)
determiner “the” has scope inside the restrictor of the (implicit) determiner “all”,
denoted R(all) ≫ the. This ordering respects the surface ordering of the determiners,
i.e., all appears before the both in the noun phrase and in the AST, and we use this
as the default scope for prepositional phrase modification.
We now define the default scope schematically, and then discuss examples which
do not obey this scope. Figure 5.4 shows an example parse tree of a noun phrase with
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Figure 5.4: Example parse tree of a noun phrase with nested prepositional phrase
modifications. d with subscripts denote determiners, n with subscripts denote nouns
and p with subscripts denote prepositions.
nested prepositional phrase modifications. There are four determiners d, d1, d2 and d3
whose scope we are interested in. The default AST for the noun phrase respects the
surface order of the determiners, and is shown in Figure 5.5. Since d1 is associated
with a prepositional phrase modifying the noun n (which is in turn associated with
d), d1 has scope within the restrictor of d, denoted R(d) ≫ d1. Similarly, we have
R(d1) ≫ d2, and R(d) ≫ d3.
Orders that are different from the surface order are typically needed when an
embedded determiner is universal. We illustrate this with an example to explain our
annotation procedure for ambiguous determiners. Consider the following sentence
from CFR Section 610.2:
(37) Samples of any lot of a licensed product, except for radioactive biological
products, together with the protocols showing results of applicable tests, may
at any time be required to be sent to the Director, Center for Biologics Eval-
uation and Research.
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Figure 5.5: Default AST for the noun phrase in Figure 5.4. The determiners d, d1, d2,
and d3 appear in the same order as they do in the parse tree/sentence, corresponding
to a surface scope orderning.
The translation in logic is as follows:
sent(x) = ∃z : samp(z, x) ∧ (∃e : send(e) ∧ ag(e,m(x)) ∧ obj(e, z) ∧ recep(e, dir))
(37) lot(x) ∧ (∃y : prod(y) ∧ material(x, y)) 7→ Pdir saysl(dir) Om(x)sent(x)
sent(x) is read as “some samples of x are sent by the manufacturer (m(x)) to the
Director (dir)”. The law (37) conveys a power via the nested modalities may be
required, which is formalized in the postconditon as “the Director (dir) is permitted
to say via her laws (l(dir)) that the manfacturer (m(x)) is required...” . We refer the
reader to Chapter 4, where we discuss examples that involve reasoning about powers.
The AST for (37) is shown in Figure 5.6. The main decisions involve the noun
phrase “samples of any lot of a licensed product”. The determiner “any” is interpreted
generically, as the Director has the power to require that any lot that she chooses be
sent to her. The determiner “a” can be interpreted universally or existentially, and
we choose the existential interpretation to preserve the surface scope w.r.t. “any”. As
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a result, the noun phrase “samples of any lot of a licensed product” is understood as
“some samples of every lot of some licensed product”. By our guidelines for universal
and existential determiners, the noun phrase “every lot of some licensed product” is
given de re scope, while “some samples” is given de dicto scope.
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...
Figure 5.6: Fragment of the AST for (37)
The scopal interactions between the determiners involved in prepositional phrase
modification has been extensively studied in linguistics. The term inverse linking [102]
is used to describe cases where a determiner within a prepositional phrase has scope
outside the enclosing noun phrase, e.g., any ≫ some in Figure 5.6. Larson [90] has
proposed a constraint that no other scopal operators occur between inversely linked
determiners. However, in Figure 5.6, we have any ≫ may ≫ some, and “may” occurs
between the inversely linked determiners, violating the constraint. The violation
occurs because of our guideline to treat universal determiners de re and existential
determiners de dicto. In the examples that we have annotated so far, all violations
of Larson’s constraint involve the de re-de dicto distinction, and in other cases, we
adhere to the constraint. We do not make any claims about the general applicability of
Larson’s constraint, as the violations we observe may be an artifact of the restrictions
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in the logic that we are translating to. An investigation of these issues is beyond the
scope of this work.
Other cases: We have discussed the scope of universal, existential, and deictic
determiners w.r.t. the modal auxiliaries. There are other kinds of determiners and
noun phrases, and we now discuss two examples to illustrate some of the issues.
Consider the following sentence:
(38) No lot of any licensed product shall be released by the manufacturer prior
to the completion of tests for conformity with standards applicable to such
product.
(38) is translated into logic as follows:
released(x) = ∃z : rel(z) ∧ ag(z,m(x)) ∧ obj(z, x)
(38) lot(x) ∧ (∃y : lic prod(y) ∧ material(x, y)) 7→ Om(x)¬released(x)
released(x) is read as “x is released by the manufacturer (m(x))”. The determiner
“no” makes two contributions to the translation – (I) A universal quantification over
lots in the precondition (lot(x)), and (II) A negation in the postcondition to convey
the prohibition. The AST for (38) is shown in Figure 5.7. To describe both the
contributions of no, we split it into two operators ∀No denoting the universal quantifi-
cation (associated with the overt word no), and ¬No denoting the negation (assumed
to be implicit). Following our previous guidelines, ∀No is given de re scope, and ¬No
is given de dicto scope. The splitting of no into two operators is motivated purely
by the formalism we are translating into. Other cases of split operators arise with
certain adverbs, e.g., “only” and “at most”.
We conclude this section with an example involving a measure phrase:
(39) Inject intraperitoneally 0.5 milliliter of the liquid product or the reconstituted
product into each of at least two mice, and 5.0 milliliters of the liquid product
or the reconstituted product into each of at least two guinea pigs.
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Figure 5.7: AST for (38)
(39) is translated into logic as follows:
inj(x, y) = ∃z : 0.5ml(z, x) ∧ ∃e : inject(e) ∧ ag(e,m(x)) ∧ obj(e, z) ∧ pat(e, y))
(39) liq prod(x) 7→ Om(x)∃Y : mice(Y ) ∧ (|Y | ≥ 2) ∧ (∀y : y ∈ Y ⇒ inj(x, y))
inj(x, y) is read as “the manufacturer (m(x)) injects 0.5ml of x into y”. The quan-
tification over (appropriate) liquid products in the precondition of the law and the
obligation in the postcondition are assumed to be implicit.
The AST is shown in Figure 5.8. First, consider the phrase each of at least two
mice. In the logical translation, this phrase is mapped to ∃Y : mice(Y ) ∧ (|Y | ≥
2)∧ (∀y : y ∈ Y ⇒ ...). “At least two” is understood as a quantification over sets (Y )
of cardinality greater than or equal to 2, and “each” quantifies over the elements in this
set. Ideally, we would treat “at least two” as a determiner in the AST in Figure 5.8.
However, for simplicity, we mark noun phrases with complex determiners with the
Penn Treebank syntactic category “QP” (for quantifier phrase). The entire noun
phrase “at least two mice” appears in the restrictor of this “QP”. Observe that this QP
outscopes the universal determiner “each” in the logical translation of the sentence.
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Figure 5.8: AST for (39)
Thus, “each” has de dicto scope in Figure 5.8. Next, consider the measure phrase
“0.5ml of the liquid product”, which is translated to (∃z : 0.5ml(z, x) ∧ ...). Here,
again, we annotate the syntactic category QP and leave the determiner unspecified.
A proper analysis of such measure phrases needs a refined representation of ob-
jects. For example, if we inject 0.5ml of a liquid product into an animal, the volume
of the product reduces by 0.5ml. Exceptions can also apply to amounts or measures:
(40) The test dose for each rabbit shall be at least equivalent proportionately, on
a body weight basis, to the maximum single human dose recommended, but
need not exceed 10 milliliters per kilogram of body weight of the rabbit.
(40) conveys requires the test dose for a rabbit to be the minimum of (I) the equiv-
alent proportionately, on a body weight basis, to the maximum single human dose
recommended, and (II) 10 milliliters per kilogram of its body weight. In the logic
that we have developed, exceptions are binary in the sense that they either apply
or do not apply. Examples, such as (40), suggest that there needs to be a notion of
scale or degrees to which exceptions apply. We leave an investigation of these logical
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aspects to future work.
5.3.3 Clause and Verb Phrase Modifiers
In addition to auxiliary verbs, we consider the following types of clause and verb
phrase modifiers:
• Conditional - which are introduced, for example, by “if”.
• Exceptional - which are introduced by “except for”, “notwithstanding”, etc.
• Temporal - which are introduced by “before”, “after”, etc.
• Purpose - which are introduced by “for”, “so as to”, etc.
• Other - which have a specialized function in the CFR, and are typically intro-
duced by as and in accordance with.
We begin by discussing examples to give an intuition of the issues involved, and
then generalize from the examples to form guidelines for annotation.
Example 1: Consider the following sentence from Section 610.1 of the CFR:
(41) Each applicable test shall be made on each lot after the completion of all
process of manufacture...
We begin by discussing the logical translation of (41). There are two difficulties –
(A) the translation of “applicable”, and (B) the translation of the temporal modifier
introduced by after. We discuss each of these in turn.
The phrase “applicable test” is understood as follows. Section 610 of the CFR
prescribes tests for various purposes, e.g., “ensuring general safety” and “detecting
HIV”. Given a lot x and a test purpose z, a test is applicable to x for z iff x is required
(via other laws) to be tested for z. Formally, we define the following schemas:
test for(x, z) = ∃y : test(y) ∧ obj(y, x) ∧ purp(y, z)
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appl test for(x, z) = saysl(FDA) Om(x)(test for(x, z))
test for(x, z) is read as “x is tested for z”, and appl test for(x, z) is read as “a test is
applicable to x for z”. The use of says in the schema appl test for(x, z) captures the
intuition that a test is applicable if it is required by other laws (l(FDA)).
Next, we consider the temporal modifier. (41) is paraphrased as follows:
(41) For each lot x, if all processes of the manufacture of x have been completed
at time t, then each applicable test shall be made on x after t.
Thus, we need to check if all processes of manufacture have been completed, and if so,
we assign the time of completion to t. The logic needs to be extended to accomodate
such assignments of times. We sketch how it can be defined:
compl(x) = ∀y : proc of manuf(y, x) ⇒ complete(y, x)
compl time(x) = sup{end time(y, x)|proc of manuf(y, x)}
assign(t, x) = (compl(x))? (t := compl time(x);⊤) : ⊥
compl(x) is read as “all processes of the manufacture of x have been completed”.
compl time(x) is a function denoting the time of completion (which is the supremum
of end times of all the processes). assign(t, x) is read as “if compl(x), assign the
completion time to t and return true, else return false”.
We are now ready to complete the translation:
test after(x, z, t) = ∃y : test(y) ∧ obj(y, x) ∧ purp(y, z) ∧ time(y) ≥ t
(41) appl test for(x, z) ∧ lot(x) ∧ assign(t, x) 7→ Om(x)(test after(x, z, t))
The schema test after(x, z, t) is read as “x is tested for z after time t”.
We now turn our attention to the AST for (41) shown in Figure 5.9. In the logical
translation, “after” is analysed in a similar way to de re determiners. There are two
pieces – (A) The conditional assignment of the time in the precondition (assign(t, x))
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Figure 5.9: AST for (41)
analogous to the position of a de re determiner and its restrictor, and (B) The com-
parison of times in the postcondition (time(y) ≥ t in the schema test after(x, z, t))
analogous to the variable associated with the determiner in the nuclear scope. As a re-
sult, in Figure 5.9, after ≫ Post and “the completion of all processes of manufacture”
appears in the restrictor of after, i.e., R(after) ≫ the.
We note that for (41) a de dicto analysis of “after” is also possible. However,
we prefer the de re interpretation as it keeps the logic for the postconditions simple.
Since the postconditions enter into validity tests (e.g., for exceptions), we need the
postcondition logic to be decidable. Preconditions are evaluated against a state or
trace of an organization’s operations, and we need only the decidability of the model-
checking question.
Example 2: We now consider examples of modifiers that are given de dicto scope:
(42) The contents of a final container of each filling of each lot shall be tested for
identity after all labeling operations have been completed.
(43) The general safety test shall be performed as specified in this section
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The relevant operators are in sans serif typeface, and the restrictors are italicized.
In (42), the operator “for” is given de dicto scope, i.e., Post ≫ shall ≫ be ≫ for,
and in (43), the operator “as” is given de dicto scope. We do not know if there is an
appropriate de re interpretation for such operators. In addition, we note that there is
a strong preference for such operators to appear (immediately) after the main verb of
the sentence, e.g., “for” appears after “tested” in (42). By contrast, the conditional,
temporal and exceptional operators can also appear at the start of the sentence. This
syntactic preference suggests that the de re intrepretation is not available.
At this time, we only have an approximate analysis of the modifier introduced by
“as” in (43). The sentence (43) is understood as a requirement to conform to the
other laws in Section 610 of the CFR. In previous chapters, we studied conformance
as decision problem, but it can also be understood as a predicate. For example,
conform(A, l(B)) can be used to denote the conformance of principal A to principal
B w.r.t. the laws l(B). However, (43) also conveys a notion of topic, i.e., it is a
requirement to conform to “the requirements about the general safety test”. The
notion of conformance needs to be extended to capture this notion of topic, and we
leave an investigation to future work.
Guideline: Modifiers can be understood as operators taking two arguments, written
schematically as op(ϕ, ψ), where ϕ is the restrictor, and ψ is the nuclear scope. The
operator op is from one of the five types – conditional, exceptional, temporal, purpose,
and other. Using this schema, we divide operators (informally) into two classes:
• Operators for which op(ϕ, ψ) does not entail ψ - The conditional, temporal and
exceptional operators fall into this class. And, for such operators we use the de
re scope.
• Operators for which op(ϕ, ψ) entails ψ - Purpose and other operators typically
fall into this class. And, for such operators we use the de dicto scope.
The operators that appear within the syntactic argument of a modifier typically have
scope within the restrictor. The only exception is when a de re determiner appears
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in the argument of a modifier that has de dicto scope, in which case, the determiner
scopes over the operator.
5.3.4 Co-ordinating Conjunctions
Co-ordinating conjunctions, e.g., “and”, “but”, and or, are analysed as operators that
have two or more (in the case of lists) restrictors. The restrictors can be constituents,
e.g., clauses, verb phrases, or noun phrases, or parts of constituents, e.g., nouns,
verbs, or adjectives. We discuss two examples to develop intuition, and then discuss
the guidelines.
Example 1: Consider the following sentence:
(44) Bulk and final container material shall be tested for sterility as described
above in this section, except as follows:.
In (44), and is said to have a distributive interpretation (cf. [148]), which means
that the sentence can be paraphrased by the following two sentences taken conjunc-
tively:
(44a) Bulk material shall be tested for sterility
(44b) Final container material shall be tested for sterility
(44a) and (44b) can be translated into logic as follows:
(44a) bulk mat(x) 7→ Om(x)(∃y : test(y) ∧ obj(y, x) ∧ purp(y, sterility))
(44b) final cont mat(x) 7→ Om(x)(∃y : test(y) ∧ obj(y, x) ∧ purp(y, sterility))
The predicates are read as follows: bulk mat(x) – x is bulk material, final cont mat(x)
– x is final container material, test(y) – y is a test, obj(y, x) – the object of y is x, and
purp(y, sterility) – the purpose of y is to ensure sterility. Note that the postconditions
of both laws are identical, and the variantion is in the precondtion. In the AST shown
in Figure 5.10, “and” appears in the restrictor of the implicit determiner “all”, i.e.,
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the noun phrase is interpreted as “all bulk and final container material”. We refer
the reader to [129] for a discussion of how distributive conjunctions are mapped from
logical form to logic.5
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Figure 5.10: AST for (44).
Example 2: Consider the following sentence:
(45) The inoculum and medium shall be mixed thoroughly and incubated at a
temperature of 30 to 35 deg.C for a test period of no less than 14 days and
examined visually for evidence of growth on the third, fourth, or fifth day,
and on the seventh or eighth day, and on the last day of the test period.
In (45), the conjunction “and” in the phrase “the inoculum and medium” has
a collective interpretation (cf. [148]), which is signalled by the verb “mixed”. In
this case, we cannot split the co-ordinated nouns into separate sentences, e.g., “the
inoculum shall be mixed” is ungrammatical. Note, however, that the second occurence
5Approximately, translating a distributive conjunction to logic involves creating two new ASTs.
Each new AST would contain one restrictor of the conjunction, and could be translated to logic
separately.
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of “and” in (45) is distributive, and we can paraphrase the sentence with the following
two sentences taken conjunctively:
(45a) The inoculum and medium shall be mixed thoroughly.
(45b) The inoculum and medium shall be incubated at a temperature of 30 to 35
deg.C, after mixing thoroughly.
In (45b), we add the temporal modifier after mixing thoroughly, because there is an
addition temporal relation conveyed by and (parphrasable by and then). We refer the
reader to Section 5.3.3 for the logical translation of such modifiers. Here, we consider
the other aspects of the translation:
mix(y, Y ) = ∃e : mix tho(e) ∧ ag(e, y) ∧ obj(e, Y )
(45a) liq prod(x) ∧X = {inoc(x),med(x)} 7→ Om(x)(mix(m(x), X))
incub(y, Y ) = ∃e : incub(e) ∧ ag(e, y) ∧ obj(e, Y ) ∧ 30◦C ≤ temp(e) ≤ 35◦C
(45b) liq prod(x) ∧X = {inoc(x),med(x)} 7→ Om(x)(incub(m(x), X))
The schema mix(y, Y ) is read as “y mixes Y thoroughly” and incub(y, Y ) is read
as “y incubates Y at a temperature of 30 to 35 deg.C”. As with previous examples,
we assume that there is an implicit universal quantification over appropriate liquid
products in the translation of the paraphrases. The collective phrase, i.e., the in-
oculum and medium, is understood as denoting a set which represents their mixture
(X = {inoc(x),med(x)}). We note that additional machinery may be needed to give
a proper treatment of plurals and collectives (see, for example, [148]). However, in
the CFR, the problems associated with collectives seem to be largely independent of
scope, and we leave the details of their logic to future work.
The AST for (45) is left as an exercise to the reader. The scope of both con-
junctions is determined by the scope of their syntactic arguments. We conclude this
section by describing the guideline for coordinating conjunctions.
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Guideline: The scope of coordinating conjunctions are determined by the scope of
the operators in their syntactic arguments. The operators in both arguments often
have the same scope. If they do not, the conjunction is given the scope of the lowest
operator, and all other operators scope over the conjunction. For example, in the
phrase “every man and his mother”, we would have every ≫ and.
5.4 Corpus and Distribution of Operators
In previous sections, we have described the annotation of ASTs using examples. In
this section, we give a more quantitative description of the corpus. We classify op-
erators into types and subtypes and discuss their distribution. This classification of
operators plays a useful role in the computation of ASTs.
We have annotated ASTs on Section 610 of the CFR. A total of 195 ASTs are
available. There are 6599 tokens (and 6013 tokens excluding punctuation) in these
195 sentences. Thus, we have an average of 33.8 tokens (and 30.8 tokens excluding
punctuation) per sentence.
The operators in an AST are divided into the following types – determiners,
modal auxiliaries, clause and verb phrase modifiers, coordinating conjuctions, and
other operators (which includes negation, adverbs like “only”, and the postcondition
marker “Post”).
Number of D M S/VP Mod C Other
Instances
Explicit 1827 37.6% 20.7% 18.2% 15.2% 8.3%
Implicit 797 71.1% 0% 0% 0% 28.9%
Table 5.1: Types of Operators. D stands for “determiner”, M for “modal auxil-
iary”, S/VP Mod for “clause and verb phrase modifiers”, and C for “coordinating
conjunctions”.
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There are 2624 operators of which 1827 are explicit and 797 are implicit, as shown
in Table 5.1. Explicit operators are those which are associated with a word or phrase.
Implicit operators are used mainly for noun phrases without an explicit determiner,
and the postcondition marker. The implicit operators comprise mainly of determiners
(71.1%) and other operators (28.9%). Eact type of operator is further divided into
subtypes that are useful in computing the AST, and we will discuss these subtypes
below.
Number of Universal Existential Ambiguous Deictic Other
Instances
Explicit 687 9.6% 0% 29.8% 60.6% 0%
Implicit 562 17.1% 20.6% 0% 42.3% 20%
Table 5.2: Subtypes of determiners.
Table 5.2 shows the distribution of the subtypes of determiners. Universal deter-
miners contain the words “all”, every”, and “each”, and comprise 9.6% of the explicit
determiners, and 17.1% of the implicit determiners. Note that the implicit determin-
ers are inserted during annotation, and determining the subtype is a sense disam-
biguation problem that needs to be resolved during the computation of the ASTs.
The existential determiner “some” is never used explicitly, but comprises 20.6% of
the implicit determiners. The determiners are “a” and “an” are ambiguous between
existential and universal/generic senses, and comprise 29.8% of the explicit deter-
miners. The deictic determiners include “the” and “those”. We note that “the” can
also have a universal/generic flavor, e.g., “the products” can be used to mean “all the
products”. The counts reported in Table 5.2 are based on the occurence of strings,
and do not distinguish between various senses.
Table 5.3 shows the subtypes of modal auxiliaries, which are all explicit. Obliga-
tion (35.8%) is signalled by “must”, “shall”, or “need”. Permission (10.6%) is signalled
by “may”. Not all obligations and permissions are conveyed by auxiliary verbs. The
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Number of Obligation Permission Be Other
Instances
378 35.8% 10.6% 46.4% 7.2%
Table 5.3: Subtypes of modal auxiliaries.
words “required” and “permitted” occur as main verbs, and are not treated as oper-
ators. Auxiliary forms of the verb “be” comprise 46.4% of all auxiliaries. And, the
other auxiliaries (7.2%) mostly consist of forms of “have”.
Number of Temporal and Purpose References to Other
Instances Conditional Laws
333 29.1% 28% 30.2% 12.7%
Table 5.4: Subtypes of clause and verb phrase modifiers.
Table 5.4 breaks down clause and verb phrase modifiers into subtypes. Temporal
and conditonal modifiers (29.1%) include, for example, “before”, “after”, “if”, and
“except as”. The purpose modifiers (28%) are signalled by “for”. Modifiers which
refer to laws (30.2%) are introduced by “as”, “under”, and “according to”. The other
modifiers include cases which we have not categorized yet, e.g., “regardless”, “notwith-
standing”.
Number of S VP QP ADJP Other
Instances
316 60.1% 16.8% 13% 6% 4.1%
Table 5.5: Types of syntactic categories annotated. S stands for sentence or clause,
VP stands for verb phrase, QP stands for quantifier phrase, and ADJP stands for
adjective phrase.
In addition to the operators, there are some syntactic annotations in the corpus,
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which are used to capture scope islands. Table 5.5 nodes gives the distribution of the
syntactic categories used. Clauses (60.1%) mostly consist of relative clauses. Verb
phrases (16.8) are used for the complements of certain verbs, e.g., “required” and
“permitted”. We borrow the term quantifier phrase (13%) from the Penn Treebank,
where it is used for noun phrases with complex determiners, e.g., “no more than
5”. The remaining cases comprise mostly of adjective phrases and possessive noun
phrases.
5.5 Computing ASTs – Overview
In this section, we give an overview of our approach to computing ASTs. We will
assume as given a Processed Parse Tree (PPT) of a sentence, with the operators and
their restrictors identified. Examples are given below. Given such a PPT, the AST
is computed in two steps:
1. Finding the preterminal at which an operator takes scope
2. Ordering the operators associated with a preterminal.
We begin by describing the second step in Section 5.5.1, and then consider the first
step in Section 5.5.2. The steps are described in reverse order, because in most
cases, the operators associated with a preterminal are determined directly by syntactic
attachment.
5.5.1 Ordering Operators
The problem of learning to order a set of items is not new. Cohen et al. [35] give a
learning theoretic perspective, and Liu [96] surveys information retrieval applications.
The approach that we use can be seen as a probabilistic version of [35]. We will discuss
other connections to the literature in Section 5.9.
We explain the step of ordering operators using an example. Consider again the
following sentence from the CFR 610.13:
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(30) A general safety test for the detection of extraneous toxic contaminants shall
be performed on biological products intended for administration to humans.
Input: We will assume as input a Processed Parse Tree (PPT) of a sentence, as
shown in Figure 5.11. Given the correct parse of the sentence, the PPT is obtained
by identifying the operators and their restrictors. For example, the determiner “a”
has the restrictor general safety test. The phrase biological products has no explicit
determiner associated with it, and the corresponding operator in the processed parse
tree is labeled “IMP” for implicit. In addition, the postcondition marker “Post” is also
identified. We will not investigate the computation of parse trees or their conversion
to PPTs in this work.6
There are two main types of nodes in the PPT – operators and preterminals. The
nodes labeled with the symbol λ, e.g., λ and λx , correspond to operators. The
root of the PPT and the restrictors of the operators, are the preterminals.
We now introduce some notation which is useful in describing the computation of
ASTs. We will use τ (with subscripts) to denote PPTs, p (with subscripts) to denote
preterminal nodes, and o (with sub/superscripts) to denote operators. A PPT τ is
viewed as a set of preterminal nodes, and we will write – (a) p ∈ τ to denote that p
occurs in τ , and (b) |τ | to denote the number of preterminals in τ . A preterminal p
is viewed as an ordered set of operators p = (o1, ..., o|p|). For example, in Figure 5.11,
the root preterminal p has |p| = 5, and the operators o1 = Post, o2 = A, o3 = shall,
and so on.
Output: Given the PPT in Figure 5.11, the goal is to compute the AST in Fig-
ure 5.12. This involves determining, for example, that the implicit determiner associ-
ated with biological products is universal, and hence, we have IMP ≫ Post. However,
the determiner “A” associated with general safety test is interpreted existentially, and
hence, we have Post ≫ A.
6The PPTs, in this work, are obtained by removing all scope decisions from the AST. To a first
approximation, we start by removing all operators from the AST, and then, replace the corresponding
variables by the operators.
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Figure 5.11: Processed parse tree (PPT) for (30).
We now develop some notation to describe the scopal ordering of operators. Given
a preterminal p = (o1, ..., o|p|), we use r(p), with subscripts, to denote an ordering or
ranking of the operators in p. A ranking r(p) = (i1, ..., i|p|) is a permuation of indices
indicating the order in the AST, i.e., for all 1 ≤ j < k ≤ |p|, ij 6= ik, 1 ≤ ij ≤ |p|
and 1 ≤ ij ≤ |p|. We will abuse notation and write r(p) = (o
1
i1
, ..., o
|p|
i|p|
) to denote a
ranking of p.
ASTs are denoted by α (with subscripts). An AST α contains a ranking of opera-
tors associated with each preterminal, denoted rα(p). Let p = (o
1, ..., o5) be the root
preterminal of the PPT in Figure 5.11. The reordering of the AST α in Figure 5.12 is
given by rα(p) = (o
1
2, o
2
5, o
3
3, o
4
4, o
5
1). For example, o
2
5 = A denotes that the determiner
“A” appears second in the surface order (Figure 5.11) and fifth or lowest in the scope
order (Figure 5.12). Similarly, o51 = IMP denotes that the implicit determiner appears
fifth or last in the surface order (Figure 5.11) and first or highest in the scope order
(Figure 5.12). Note that given a preterminal node and an AST either the subscript
or superscript suffices to uniquely identify the operator, and we will often use only
the sub or superscripts. In the example, o2 and o5 both refer to the determiner “A”.
Computing ASTs: The computation of ASTs is investigated in a supervised
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Figure 5.12: AST for (30).
machine learning setting. Given a PPT τ , let A(τ) be the set of all possible ASTs.
Our goal is to find the AST which has the highest probability given the PPT:
α∗ = arg max
α∈A(τ)
P (α|τ)
The conditional probability of an AST is defined as:
P (α|τ) =
∏
p∈τ
P (rα(p)|τ)
P (rα(p)|τ) =
|p|−1
∏
i=1
|p|
∏
j=i+1
P (oi ≫ oj|τ)
In other words, P (α|τ) is modeled as the ranking of each preterminal. And, the
probability of a ranking is the product of the probabilities of the pairwise ordering
decisions. The model falls under the class of pairwise ranking approaches [96].
As with all machine learning tasks, there are two steps. The training step involves
estimating the probabilities P (oi ≫ oj|τ). The search step is to use the estimated
probabilities to find the best AST. We will consider the training in Section 5.6, and
the search in Section 5.7.
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5.5.2 Finding the Scope Preterminal
In the example that we discussed in the previous section, there were no embedded
operators, i.e., an operator or its variable located in the restrictor of another. An
embedded operator can either – (a) take scope within the restrictor of the embedding
operator, or (b) outscope the embedding operator. To account for the second case,
we need to determine whether it is appropriate to lift an embedded operator to a
higher preterminal than the one to which it is associated syntactically.
We discuss an example to illustrate the problem. Consider the following sentence:
(37) Samples of any lot of a licensed product, except for radioactive biological
products, together with the protocols showing results of applicable tests, may
at any time be required to be sent to the Director, Center for Biologics Eval-
uation and Research.
The PPT and AST for (37) are shown in Figures 5.13 and 5.14 resply. Consider
the noun phrase “IMP Samples of any lot of a licensed product”. The three operators
are related as follows in the AST: any ≫ IMP and R(any) ≫ a. The important
observation is that the embedded determiner “any” outscopes the implicit determiner
“IMP” associated with samples in Figure 5.14, but it appears in the restrictor of IMP
in Figure 5.13. As a result, the PPT in Figure 5.13 cannot be converted to the AST
in Figure 5.14 simply by ranking sibling operators (as we did in the previous section).
To resolve this issue, we will convert the PPT in Figure 5.13 to another PPT
(shown in Figure 5.15). Observe that the determiner “any” is a sibling of the implicit
determiner “IMP” in the PPT in Figure 5.15. As a result, this PPT can be converted
to the AST by reordering sibling operators.
Notation: We now develop some notation to describe the process of converting the
initial PPT to the second one. Given an initial PPT τ , a PPT τ ′ is a possible second
PPT iff (a) τ ′ has the same preterminals as τ , and (b) if o ∈ p in τ and o ∈ p′ in τ ′,
then p′ = p or p′ is an ancestor of p in both τ and τ ′. The second condition ensures
that there are only two possibilities for an embedded operator – (I) it remains in
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Figure 5.14: AST for (37)
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Figure 5.15: Second PPT for (37), obtained from the PPT in Figure 5.13, by finding
the right scope preterminals.
the restrictor of the embedding operator or (II) it outscopes the embedding operator.
The set of possible second ppts for a given intial PPT τ is denoted by T (τ). Note
that τ ∈ T (τ), i.e., it is possible that the intial PPT remains unchanged.
Given an operator o, let oπ denote the embedding operator of o in τ if one exists
(otherwise, oπ is undefined). For example, given o = any in Figure 5.13, oπ = IMP.
However, given o = IMP, oπ is undefined as IMP is not embedded. Given an operator
o and τ ′ ∈ T (τ), we use p(o, τ ′) to denote the preterminal such that o ∈ p(o, τ ′)
in τ ′. Finally, we define two sets of operators. [p(o, τ ′) ↓ oπ] is the set of operators
encountered on the path from p(o, τ ′) to oπ, provided that oπ exists and is a descendant
of p(o, τ ′). Otherwise, [p(o, τ ′) ↓ oπ] is taken to be the empty set. [ ↓ p(o, τ
′)] is the
set of operators on the path from the root of τ ′ to p(o, τ ′).
Computing the second PPT: Given an intial PPT τ , our goal is to find the
second PPT which has the highest probability given the initial PPT:
τ ∗ = arg max
τ ′∈T (τ)
P (τ ′|τ)
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The conditional probability of a second PPT is defined as:
P (τ ′|τ) =
∏
o∈τ
1 ×


∏
o′∈[p(o,τ ′)↓oπ ]
P (o ≫ o′|τ)

×


∏
o′∈[↓p(o,τ ′)]
P (R(o′) ≫ o|τ)


The probability is expressed as a product of two inner products for each operator.
The inner products are understood as follows. For each operator o and every AST
that can be computed from τ ′, we have o ≫ o′ for all o′ ∈ [p(o, τ ′) ↓ oπ] . For example,
given o = any in Figure 5.15, we have [p(o, τ ′) ↓ oπ] = { IMP }, and we will ensure
during reordering that any ≫ IMP. Similarly, the second inner product captures the
fact that in all ASTs computed from τ ′, we have R(o′) ≫ o for all o′ ∈ [↓ p(o, τ ′)]. In
Figure 5.15, given o = a, we have [↓ p(o, τ ′)] = { any }, and R(o′) ≫ o in all possible
ASTs.
We do not impose any linguistically motivated restrictions in the transformation
of the intial PPT to the second PPT, and subsequently, to the AST. Larson [90]
discusses examples where unrestricted movement of embedded determiners can lead
to ASTs (or logical forms) which do not correspond to any possible interpretation of
a sentence. An investigation of appropriate restrictions is left to future work. We
now turn to the steps of training and search in Sections 5.6 and 5.7 respectively.
5.6 Feature Design
In this section, we consider the training step, i.e., estimating the probabilities that
are needed for computing the ASTs. The estimated probabilities are tested on ap-
propriate subproblems. We begin, in Section 5.6.1, by giving an overview of binary
classifiers, and narrow our focus to the problem of feature design. We also describe
the experimental setup. Section 5.6.2 considers the problem of designing features
for classifying operators as de re or de dicto, which is an important subproblem in
ordering operators. In Section 5.6.3, we generalize these features to accommodate
pairwise ordering of operators, and to handle embedded operators.
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5.6.1 Binary Classifier
We give a brief overview of the classifier or model that we use to learn the desired
probabilities. The reader familiar with discriminative classifiers may skim or skip this
section.
We start with some notation and terminology that is useful in describing the
experiments. An observation is a triple x = (o, o′, τ), where o and o′ are operators
in the PPT τ . The set of observations for a given experiment is denoted by X. For
example, we may consider observations where o and o′ are associated with the same
pre-terminal in τ . A binary labeling function l : X × A → {0, 1} associates a label
with each observation given the AST. For example, an observation x = (o, o′, τ) may
receive the label y = l(x, α) = 1 iff o ≫ o′ in the AST α. Finally, a family of binary
feature functions F are used to predict the label from the observation. Each feature
function fi ∈ F has the type fi : X → {0, 1}. For example, we may have a feature
such that given x = (o, o′, τ), fi(x) = 1 iff o and o
′ are determiners and o′ is in a
prepositional phrase modifying o.
The specific model that we will use is the log-linear model, in which the condi-
tional probabilities have the exponential form described below. Such models have
the nice property that the maximum likelihood estimate preserves the maximum en-
tropy principle (see [116]), and they are commonly used for NLP tasks. Given an
observation x, we associate a weight wyΛ(x) for each label y ∈ {0, 1}:
wyΛ(x) = exp
(
∑
fi∈F
λyi fi(x)
)
Each λyi ∈ Λ is a real-valued parameter associated with a particular feature for a
particular label. For example, a high positive value for λyi would indicate that the
feature fi has a strong correlation with the label y. The conditional probability of
the label given the observation is defined as:
PΛ(y|x) =
wyΛ(x)
w0Λ(x) + w
1
Λ(x)
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Training and Testing: We now describe the experimental set-up that we will use
in this section. The input is a set of labeled instances I, where each element of I is
a label-observation pair (y, x). We partition I into two disjoint sets Itr for training,
and Ite for test. During the training phase, the learning algorithm attempts to find
the parameters which maximizes the probability of the training data:
Λ∗ = arg max
Λ
∏
(y,x)∈Itr
PΛ(y|x)
During the test phase, we evaluate the model by comparing the given label to the
label predicted by the model. Given (y, x) ∈ ITe, the predicted label is defined as:
y∗ = arg max
y′∈{0,1}
PΛ∗(y
′|x)
The accuracy of the model is the fraction of the test instances for which the predict
label is correct, i.e., y∗ = y. We note that there are well-established algorithms
for training the models described here. We use the implementation provided by the
Mallet toolkit [104]. Our only focus is on the design of appropriate features.
Cross-validation: We will use the method of cross-validation for all our experi-
ments. Cross-validation is typically used when the number of instances are few, to
avoid “lucky” choices of traning and test data. In 10-fold cross-validation, the labeled
instances I are divided into 10 equal sized partitions (I1, I2, ..., I10). We perform 10
iterations of training an testing. In the jth iteration, Ij is treated as the test set, and
I − Ij is treated as the training set. We will report the average accuracy over the 10
iterations.
5.6.2 De Re vs De Dicto
In this section, we consider an important subproblem in the pairwise ordering of
operators. The observations and labels are defined as follows:
1. Observations x = (o, o′, τ) are such that there is a preterminal p ∈ τ , {o, o′} ⊆ p,
and o′ = Post. In other words, we are considering operators (o) that are siblings
of the postcondition marker (o′).
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2. Labels y = l(x, α) = 1 iff o ≫ o′ in α. Otherwise, y = 0.
If an observation x = (o, o′, τ) has the label 1, then o is said to have de re scope, i.e.,
o outscopes the postcondition marker o′ = Post. Otherwise, o is said to have de dicto
scope. For example, in the AST in Figure 5.12, the implicit determiner “IMP” has de
re scope IMP ≫ Post, while the determiner “A” has de dicto scope Post ≫ A.
Operator Number of De Re Scope
Type Instances Percentage
Determiner 277 59.9%
Modal Auxiliaries 268 0%
Clause/VP Modifier 132 68.2%
Coordinating Conjunctions 36 22.2%
Negation 33 0%
Other 74 17.6%
Table 5.6: De Re scope distribution. An operator has de re scope iff it outscopes the
postcondition marker.
We begin by looking at the distribution of de re scope, to develop some intuition
for the problem. Table 5.6 shows the percentage of each type of operator that has
de re scope. Modal auxiliaries and negation are umambigous to this distinction, and
always have de dicto scope. Note that a type of operator with 50% occuring de re
is ambiguous, while 0% or 100% are unambiguous. Thus, from Table 5.6, we can
conclude that determiners, and clause/VP modifiers are the most ambiguous types.
And, more features are needed to disambiguate them.
Determiners: Table 5.7 shows the percentage of each subtype of determiner that
has de re scope. As expected, universal and existential determiners are unambiguous,
while ambiguous and deictic determiners are more ambiguous. As we mentioned
previously, the deictic determiner the can have a universal interpretation in the phrase
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Determiner Number of De Re Scope
Type Instances Percentage
Universal 74 100%
Existential 12 0%
Ambiguous 50 28%
Deictic 127 53.5%
Other 14 35.7%
Table 5.7: De Re scope distribution for subtypes determiners.
the products. There are two main types of features that we need to learn the de re-de
dicto distinction for determiners:
1. Features to predict whether ambiguous and deictic determiners are universal or
not
2. Features to determine the type of implicit determiners – In Table 5.7, we assume
that the type of implicit determiners are given. This assumption is unrealistic.
Rather, we need to predict the type of such determiners, during the conversion
of the PPT to the AST.
Clause/VP Modifier Number of De Re Scope
Type Instances Percentage
Temporal and Conditional 73 100%
Purpose 8 0%
References to Laws 33 0.9%
Other 29 65.5%
Table 5.8: De Re scope distribution for S & VP modifiers.
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Clause and VP Modifiers: Table 5.8 shows the percentage of each subtype of
modifier that has de re scope. Following the guidelines for annotation, the tempo-
ral and conditional modifiers are always de re, the purpose modifiers and modifiers
conveying references to laws are always de dicto.
Features: We use the following (classes of) features for an observation x = (o, o′, τ):
• Type - The type and subtype of the operator o (only for explicit operators). For
example, for the type determiner, we have the subtypes universal, existential,
ambiguous, deictic and other. The reader is referred to Section 5.4 for the
subtypes of the other operators.
• Pre-Verb and Post-Verb - Tracks whether o appears before or after the
main verb of the sentence. By default, the determiners before the verb are
given de re scope and those that appear after the verb are given de dicto scope.
• Perf - Tracks whether the main verb is perform. The verb perform is frequent
in the CFR, and the subject of perform is typically given de dicto scope, as it
is the main predicate of the sentence.
• Pre-Verb + Perf - Conjunction of the previous two features
• Pos - The part-of-speech of the head word, if o is a Determiner. The Pos tags
are obtained from the Stanford POS tagger (cite), which is trained on the Penn
Treebank (cite). For example, for the noun phrase biological products, the head
word is products, and the Pos is NNS (plural common noun). And, this Pos
tag may indicate that the noun phrase is interpreted generically/universally.
Experiments: We evaluate the features by performing 10-fold cross-validation.
The results are summarized in Table 5.9. The rows describe the subset of observa-
tions considered. “All” includes all observations, “No Modals” excludes the modal
auxiliaries, “Determiners” includes only the determiners, and “Imp. Determiners”
includes only implicit determiners. The columns describe the features used. Ma-
jority is the majority baseline, i.e., the accuracy obtained by predicting the most
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Count Majority Type All
All 823 66.2% 84.1% 89.2%
No Modals 522 53.2% 74.9% 83.7%
Determiners 277 59.9% 62.9% 81.2%
Imp. Determiners 100 69% 76%
Table 5.9: De Re vs De Dicto classification. Average accuracies over 10-fold cross-
validation. The rows describe the subset of observations considered, and the columns
describe the subset of features used.
frequent class or the majority class. The majority class is de dicto when all operators
are considered (the first row), and de re in all other rows. The Type column gives
the accuracy when only the type and subtypes are used as features. This column does
not apply to implicit determiners, as the subtype information is unavailable. And,
finally, the All column gives the accuracy when all features are used.
From Table 5.9, we can conclude that the Type feature is useful in making the
de re-de dicto distinction, and further gains are obtained by using All features.
The most dramatic improvement is for Determiners, and indeed, our features were
designed for this case. However, the performance gains are not very high for implicit
determiners, and further investigation is needed.
5.6.3 Ordering Sibling and Embedded Operators
In this section, we consider the problem of learning the probabilities for computing
ASTs, as described in Section 5.5. We need probabilities for two purposes – (a)
pairwise ordering of siblings, and (b) determining whether an embedded operator
scopes over its embedding operator. We consider these problems in turn.
Ordering Siblings: The observations and labels are defined as follows:
1. Observations x = (oi, oj, τ) are such that there is a preterminal p ∈ τ , {oi, oj} ⊆
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p, and i < j. In other words, we are considering operators that are siblings.
The condition that i < j implies that oi occurs to the left of oj in the sentence,
and ensures that we have exactly one observation for every pair of operators.
2. Labels y = l(x, α) = 1 iff oi ≫ oj in α. Otherwise, y = 0.
Observe that this is a generalization of the de re-de dicto problem, where one of the
operators was restrict to be Post. For each operator, we use the features that we
described in the previous section. In addition, we use all pairwise conjunctions of
the features. For example, the conjuction of the Pos feature would track where both
noun phrases have plural head nouns.
Count Majority Type All
(All, All) 2793 76.1% 83.3% 87.5%
(Det, Det) 159 89.9% 89.9% 92.4%
(Det, Modal) 332 70.5% 72.6% 77.7%
Table 5.10: Pairwise ordering of sibling operators. Average accuracies over 10-fold
cross-validation. The rows describe the subset of observations considered, and the
columns describe the subset of features used.
Table 5.10 gives the average accuracies for ordering siblings, using 10-fold cross-
validation. As before, rows correspond to subsets of observations. (All, All) includes
all pairs of operators, (Det, Det) includes only pairs of determiners, and (Det, Modal)
considers pairs where one operator is a determiner and the other is a modal auxiliary.
The columns are interpreted identically to Table 5.9. Majority is the majority
baseline, which correspons to a prediction of oi ≫ oj for the observation x = (oi, oj, τ).
In other words, the outscopes relation has a tendency to respect the surface order of
the sentence. The Type column gives the accuracy using only the type feature for
each operator and their conjunction. The All column gives the accuracy using all
features.
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The use of All features provide an improvement over the Type feature, which
in turn improves over the Majority baseline. While we obtain significant improve-
ments for all pairs of operators, the gains are less for pairs of determiners. The
Majority baseline for determiners is quite high (89.9%), making it harder to detect
the non-majority cases. The accuracy for determiner-modal pairs is, as expected,
comparable to the accuracy obtained for the de re-de dicto classification for deter-
miners.
Embedded Operators: The observations and labels are defined as follows:
1. Observations x = (o, o′, τ) are such that o′ occurs in the restrictor of o in τ . In
other words, o′ is syntactically embedded in (the restrictor of) o.
2. Labels y = l(x, α) = 1 iff R(o) ≫ o′ in α. Otherwise (o′ ≫ o), y = 0.
We refer the reader to Section 5.5.2 for an example. The features used in this task
are the same as those used to order siblings. In addition, we use the word appearing
immediately prior to the operator. For example, in the noun phrase “Samples of any
lot”, the word “of” would be the previous word for the operator “any”. The idea is
that such function words may lead to different biases in the scope of the embedded
operator.
Count Majority Type All
(All, All) 5081 95% 95.3% 96.4%
(Det, Det) 867 90.3% 91.5% 92.8%
(VP, Det) 108 70.4% 68.4% 87%
Table 5.11: Scope of embedded operators w.r.t. embedding operators. Average
accuracies over 10-fold cross-validation. The rows describe the subset of observations
considered, and the columns describe the subset of features used.
Table 5.11 gives the average accuracies over 10-fold cross-validation. The rows are
understood as follows. (All, All) includes all pairs, (Det, Det) includes only pairs of
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determiners, and (VP, Det) considers pairs where the embedding operator is a verb
phrase and the embedded operator is a determiner. We note that, strictly speaking,
verb phrases are not really operators. But, it is convenient to treat them as such
for the purposes of the experiments, as syntactic nodes serve as islands for quantifier
scope.
Using All features provides an improvement over the Majority baseline. For
the (VP, Det) pairs, we see a dramatic improvement, partly because the Majority
baseline is lower. In general, the overwhelming majority of cases respect syntactic
attachment, and this may be a function of the guideline to preserve syntactic scope
by default. We hope to undertake a more careful investigation of this issue in future
work.
5.7 Search
We now consider the search problem, i.e., computing the AST given the estimated
probabilities. Section 5.7.1 describes the algorithms used. In Section 5.7.2, we extend
the metrics developed for parsing [21] to evaluate ASTs. We conclude, in Section 5.7.3,
by evaluating different algorithms using the metrics developed.
5.7.1 Algorithms
In this section, we describe the algorithms that we use to compute the AST, given the
appropriate probabilities. We begin by discussing the intractability of the problem of
ranking or ordering operators. Then, we sketch a beam search procedure to compute
a ranking. The ranking so computed is not optimal in general, but is optimal for
most instances in the corpus (which have certain size restrictions). Finally, we briefly
discuss the heuristic used to handle embedded operators.
Intractability: The decision version of the ranking problem is NP-complete. A
similar result is established by Cohen et al. [35] in the context of a boosting approach
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to ranking.
Theorem 5.1. The following problem is NP-complete:
Input: A PPT τ , a preterminal p ∈ τ , probabilities P (oi ≫ oj|τ), and c ∈ [0, 1]
Output: Yes, if there is an ordering r such that P (r(p)|τ) ≥ c
The proof, given in Appendix C, is by reduction from Acyclic Subgraph [80].
Ordering Siblings: We now describe the beam search procedure that we use to
compute a ranking. Let us assume as given a PPT τ and a preterminal p ∈ τ such that
p = (o1, o2, o3). In other words, we have a preterminal consisting of three operators.
Suppose, in addition, that we have trained a classifier, as described in Section 5.6, to
give us the probabilities shown in the following matrix:
M =





.8 .2
.2 .55
.8 .45





The entry M(i, j) corresponds to P (oi ≫ oj|τ) for i 6= j. As a result, M(i, j) =
1 −M(j, i). The specific probabilities can be informally understood as follows. It
is likely that o1 ≫ o2, since M(1, 2) = .8. It is also likely that o3 ≫ o1, since
M(3, 1) = .8. However, the model is not sure whether o2 ≫ o3, since M(2, 3) = .55.
As we discussed in Section 5.5.1, the goal is to compute a ranking of the operators.
A ranking of p is a sequence r(p) = (i1, i2, i3), where the items are all distinct and
between 1 and 3. The idea is that ij corresponds to the position of o
j in the AST.
For example, (2, 3, 1) corresponds to reordering the operators as (o3, o1, o2). And, the
probability of a reordering is the product of the probabilities of the pairwise ordering
relationships:
P ((o3, o1, o2)|τ) =
∏
j∈{1,2}
P (o3 ≫ oj|τ) × P (o1 ≫ o2|τ)
We leave it to the reader to verify that this reordering is indeed the best one. The
main observation, for this example, is that even though the model is unsure how to
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order o2 and o3 w.r.t. each other, it can use information about their ordering w.r.t.
o1 to select one of the two orders.
We now cast reordering as a search problem. A state s = (U,R) is a pair, where
U ⊆ p is a set of unranked operators, and R ⊆ {1, ..., |p|} × {1, ..., |p|} is a partial
ranking such that – (a) for all (j, k) ∈ R, 1 ≤ k ≤ |p − U |, and (b) (j, k) ∈ R iff
oj ∈ p − U . For example, a state s with U = {o1, o2} and R = {(3, 1)} is one where
o1 and o2 have not been ordered w.r.t. each other, but o3 has been assigned the rank
1, since (3, 1) ∈ R. As a result, o3 ≫ o1 and o3 ≫ o2 w.r.t. s. Writing U and R
explicitly for example states is verbose, and we will adopt an abbreviated notation
for states. For the example state s, we will simply write s = (o1, o2, o31) – only the
operator(s) with subscripts have a rank assigned, and in thise example o3 has the
rank 1.
Given a state s = (U,R), the state s′ = (U ′, R′) is a candidate next state iff U ⊃ U ′
and |U ′ − U | = 1. In other words, at a next state, exactly one more operator has
been ordered. We use next(s) to denote the set of next states from s. The (unique)
initial state s0 = (p, ∅), i.e., all operators are unordered. And, a final state has the
form sF = (∅, R), i.e., all operators are ordered. The set of all final states is denoted
by F .
We will now define the cost of a state, which is the probability of the pairwise
decisions that have been made. Given s = (U,R) and an operator oi such that
(i, k) ∈ R, let J(i) ⊂ {1, ..., |p|} be the set such that j ∈ J(i) iff oj ∈ U or there exists
(j, k′) ∈ I and k < k′. Then, the cost of a state:
g(s) = 1 ×
∏
oi∈p−U
∏
j∈J(i)
P (oi ≫ oj|τ)
For a final state sF ∈ F , g(sF ) is the probability of the corresponding ranking. Given
this set-up, we can now use breadth-first search to enumerate all rankings:
1. Let i = 0 and S be a set of states (called the beam), initialized to s0, i.e.,
S = {s0}
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2. Repeat while i ≤ |p|
(a) Let S ′ be the set such that s′ ∈ S ′ iff s′ ∈ next(s) for some s ∈ S
(b) Let S = S ′ and i = i+ 1
3. Return s∗ such that s∗ ∈ S and for all s ∈ S, g(s∗) ≥ g(s)
It is easy to see that the algorithm terminates, and in theory, it computes the optimal
reordering. However, in the worst case, we may have to examine O(|p|!) states, i.e.,
the factorial of the number of operators. To address this issue, we adopt the standard
technique of placing a bound on the beam width. When we compute S ′, we sort the
vertices in descending order of cost (g), and keep at most the best n. We used n = 104
in our experiments. In most cases, the number of operators per preterminal is less
than 6, and a size of 104 is sufficient to find the optimal solution (since 104 > 6!).
s0 = (o
1, o2, o3), g = 1
s01 = (o
1
1, o
2, o3), g = 0.4 × 0.2 ... s03 = (o
1, o2, o31), g = 0.8 × 0.45
s031 = (o
1
2, o
2, o31), g = 0.8 × 0.45 × 0.8
s0312 = (o
1
2, o
2
3, o
3
1), g = 0.8 × 0.45 × 0.8
...
Figure 5.16: Portion of the state space encountered during beam search.
Figure 5.16 shows a portion of the state space encountered while ordering the
operators in our example preterminal. We remind the reader that superscripts on the
operators correspond to their surface order, and subscripts correspond to their scope
order or rank. The root node is the initial state s0. Since there are three operators,
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it has three successors (|next(s0)| = 3). The first child, s01 = (o
1
1, o
2, o3), places o1 in
the first position (indicated by the subscript), and the cost is P (o1 ≫ o2|τ)×P (o1 ≫
o2|τ), given by the matrix M above. Similarly, the last child, s03 = (o
1, o2, o31)
places o3 in the first position (again indicated by the subscript). The algorithm then
computes the next states for s01, s02, and s03. We show only the children form s03
in Figure 5.16. Since there are only two unordered operators remaining, s03 has only
two children. s031 = (o
1
2, o
2, o31) ranks o
1 second. The search proceeds, and at the end,
we obtain the optimal ranking s0312 = (o
1
2, o
2
3, o
3
1).
Embedded Operators: To handle embedded operators, we use a simple greedy
heuristic. We enumerate the operators in the initial PPT τ corresponding to an in-
order traversal of the PPT. For each operator, we attach it to the most likely ancestor,
given the attachment decisions for the previous nodes. This heuristic is optimal for
the case where the depth of embedding is at most 1, which is the common case.
5.7.2 Metrics
In this section, we adapt the metrics that have been developed for parsing [21] to
evaluate the computation of ASTs. Let τ be the initial PPT, α the correct AST, and
α∗ the computed AST. We define accuracy at various levels.
The simplest metric is to define accuracy at the level of ASTs, i.e., by computing
the fraction of cases for which α = α∗. However, this metric is harsh, in the sense that
it does not give algorithms partial credit for getting a portion of the AST correct.
The next possible metric is to define accuracy at the level of preterminals. Let
p be a preterminal. Note that τ , α and α∗ share the same set of preterminals, but
may associate different operators with them. We say that p is correct in α∗, if it is
associated with the same set of operators as in α, and for all {o, o′} ⊆ p, we have o ≫
o′ w.r.t. α∗ iff o ≫ o′ w.r.t. α. In other words, the preterminals are identical, both
in terms of the set of operators and the ordering between pairs of operators. While
preterminal-level accuracy gives partial credit, it is still a little harsh, in the sense
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that an algorithm which makes one ordering mistake at a preterminal is penalized
the same as an algorithm which makes multiple mistakes.
Finally, we consider metrics to define accuracy at the level of pairs of operators,
starting with some notation. Let p be a preterminal. The set Pairs(p, α) consists
of pairs of operators (o, o′) such that o and o′ are both associated with p in α, and
o = o′ or o ≫ o′. The set Pairs(p, α∗) is defined similarly using α∗ instead of α. Note
that we consider pairs (o, o′) in which the two elements are identical (o = o′) or in
which the first outscopes the second (o ≫ o′). The reason for including pairs with
identical elements is to extend the evaluation metrics to cases where a preterminal is
associated with just a single operator. Given the sets Pairs(p, α) and Pairs(p, α∗), we
can define precision (p), recall (r), and f-score (f) in the usual way:
p =
|Pairs(p, α) ∩ Pairs(p, α∗)|
|Pairs(p, α∗)|
, r =
|Pairs(p, α) ∩ Pairs(p, α∗)|
|Pairs(p, α)|
, f =
2
1
p
+ 1
r
Informally, precision is the fraction of the computed ordering relationships that are
correct, recall is the fraction of correct ordering relationships that have been com-
puted, and the f-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
5.7.3 Results
We evaluate the following algorithms:
1. No Embedding – The AST is computed purely by reordering operators within
a preterminal in the PPT.
(a) Surface – No reordering is performed, i.e., the order of operators in the
AST respects the surface order
(b) Type – Using only type and subtype information for the operators
(c) All – Using all the features described in Section 5.6.3
2. All + Embed – The initial PPT is transformed into a second PPT before
reordering (as described in Section 5.5.2). All features are used in reordering.
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Precision Recall F-score Preterminals ASTs
Surface 86.9% 82.7% 84.6% 81% 4.2%
Type 90.4% 86% 88.1% 83.6% 24.7%
All 92% 87.6% 89.8% 85.1% 33.5%
All + Embed 91.9% 89.4% 90.6% 85.9% 36.2%
Table 5.12: Performance of the algorithms in computing the ASTs. Averaged over
10-fold cross-validation. 195 ASTs in total, an average of 8.6 preterminals per AST,
and 1.8 operators per preterminal.
Table 5.12 summarizes the performance of the algorithms, under the various met-
rics. The accuracies are averaged over 10-fold cross-validation. A total of 195 ASTs
are used. The average number of preterminals per AST is 8.6, with an average of 1.8
operators per preterminal. The best number under each metric is shown in bold-face.
By adding features, we improve the precision from 86.9% to 90.4% to 92% in moving
from Surface to Type to All. By handling embedded operators, we improve the
recall from 87.6% to 89.4% in moving from All to All + Embed. As we saw in
Section 5.6.3, in 95% of the cases, the embedded operators respects syntactic scope,
and as a result, we obtain only modest gains from handling embedded operators.
Precision Recall F-score Preterminals
Surface 84.6% 79.1% 81.8% 48.4%
Type 89% 83.2% 86% 57.4%
All 91.1% 85.2% 88.1% 62.3%
All + Embed 90.9% 87.5% 89.1% 64.2%
Table 5.13: Performance of the algorithms in computing the ASTs. We restrict
attention to preterminals with at least two operators. The measurements are averaged
over 10-fold cross-validation. 195 ASTs in total, an average of 2.6 preterminals per
AST, and 3.5 operators per preterminal.
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One curious result in Table 5.12 is that the Surface order baseline gets 81%
of the preterminals correct, but only 4.2% of the ASTs. The number of correct
preterminals is inflated by preterminals with only one operator in the initial PPT.
A better indication can be obtained by restricting attention to preterminals with at
least two operators. And, for this case, the performance of the algorithms under the
various metrics is shown in Table 5.13.
We conclude this section by comparing our results to accuracies obtained in de-
pendency parsing. McDonald [107] reports a dependency accuracy of about 80% in
parsing biomedical texts, with 200 sentences of training data. We obtain an F-score
of 90.6% with training data of similar size. The disparity is due to two reasons. First,
the number of ordering decisions per AST (approximately 8) is significantly less than
the number of parent-child decisions per dependency tree (approximately 30). The
lower number of decisions leads to less cascading of errors in ordering. Second, the
F-score on the set of pairwise ordering decisions is inflated by the inclusion of reflexive
pairs, of the form (o, o). Such reflexive pairs need to be included to handle embedded
operators appropriately. But, since 95% of the cases respect syntactic scope (Sec-
tion 5.6.3), the F-score is high even for the algorithms which do not handle embedded
operators. Thus, it is better to consider the relative improvement in F-score over the
Surface order baseline. We believe that the most indicative metric, in the absolute
sense, is the preterminal accuracy when restricted to those preterminals with two or
more operators (Table 5.13).
5.8 Agreement
The corpus of ASTs has been annotated by a single annotator (the author of this
work). It is desirable to have multiple ASTs for a sentence, annotated by different
humans, for two reasons – (a) to evaluate the guidelines, and (b) to provide greater
assurances of the quality of annotations. Guidelines can be evaluated by treating one
human annotation as “gold standard” and another human annotation as “computed”,
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and comparing the ASTs using the metrics described in Section 5.7.2. Disagreements
between the human annotators would be resolved during an “adjudication” phase,
providing greater quality assurance. In this section, we discuss agreement on a small
scale, and identify ways to improve the guidelines. We hope to perform a larger scale
study of agreement, to give better quality assurance, in future work.
The text used for the agreement evaluation is CFR 610.40. The reason for choosing
this particular text is that the sentences are long and complex. A total of 32 sen-
tences were used, with an average of 39.8 tokens per sentence (36.3 tokens excluding
punctuation). We considered two agreement experiments.
The first experiment that we consider is self-agreement, which measures the agree-
ment of the author of this work with himself at different points in time! It provides
an approximate upper bound on what one can hope to achive with inter-annotator
agreement, i.e., if the intent of the author was well-codified in the guidelines. The
first annotation of CFR 610.40, used as “gold standard”, was done in April 2010, and
the second annotation, used as “computed”, was done in August 2010.
In the second experiment, we consider inter-annotator agreement, which measures
the agreements between different annotators. We used one (other) annotator with
a background in linguistic syntax and semantics. A one hour meeting was used to
discuss guidelines, demonstrate the tool, and annotate two practice sentences. A
further 15 hours was needed by the annotator to annotate the 32 ASTs. While the
annotator has a general background in logic, we did not provide too many of the
specifics of our formalism. Rather, we only showed sketches of the formalization,
as we did earlier in this chapter. We wished to evaluate whether it was necessary
to understand all the logical details, in order to annotate the ASTs. During the
annotation phase, the only communication between the author and the annotator
was about usage of the tool, and no other “advice” was given.
For each experiment, we evaluate the following notions of agreement:
(a) Agreement on the AST given just the sentence,
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AST Agreement PPT Agreement
p r f p α p r f τ
S.All 88% 85.2% 86.6% 84.9% 34.4% 96% 93.8% 94.9% 40.6%
S.Root 94% 88.8% 91.3% 68.8% 96.6% 94.7% 95.7% 81.3%
S.All∗ 98.1% 97.8% 98% 98% 75% 100% 100% 100% 100%
I.All 58.6% 55.1% 56.8% 60% 0% 83.8% 80.4% 82.1% 3.1%
I.Root 86.2% 76.7% 81.2% 31.3% 79.6% 87.5% 83.4% 50%
I.All∗ 95.7% 92.8% 94.3% 96% 56.3% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 5.14: Agreement evaluation.
(b) Agreement on the processed parse tree (PPT) given the sentence, and
(c) Agreement on the AST given the PPT.
Note that the experiments that we have described in the previous sections corre-
spond to Item (c). Item (a), which involves computing the AST from the sentence, is
a harder problem, as the PPT also needs to be computed. Item (b), which involves
just computing the PPT, can be viewed a task analogous to parsing. The metrics
described in Section 5.7.2 are sufficient to compare (agreement between) ASTs. A
PPT can be viewed as a set of constituents, where each constituent is an operator
and its restrictors. We then have analogous precision and recall measures of ASTs.
Table 5.14 summarizes the results of evaluating agreement. The columns of the ta-
ble are divided into two groups, corresponding to evaluating ASTs and PPTs. Under
the AST group of columns, p, r, and f correspond to the precision, recall, and F-score
respectively of pairwise ordering decisions (as discussed in Section 5.7.2). However,
the two ASTs may not agree on the set of operators, and as a result, if there is a
mismatch between the PPTs, the errors cascade into the ASTs. For example, an op-
erator in the “gold standard” PPT which is not found in the “computed” PPT would
result in false negatives for all pairwise ordering relationships that it is involved in.
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The columns p and α give the preterminal and AST level accuracies.7 Under the
PPT group of columns, p, r, and f correspond to the precision, recall, and F-score
respectively of the set of constituents. We remind the reader that a constituent is an
operator together with its restrictors. And, the column τ gives the accuracy at the
level of PPTs.
We now discuss the results in Table 5.14, given by the rows. The rows are divided
into two groups, those prefixed with “S.” for self-agreement, and those prefixed with
“I.” for inter-annotator agreement. The suffixes are understood as follows.
The row suffix All gives the agreement on the AST given the sentence (the first
group of columns), and the agreement on the PPT given the sentence (the second
group of columns). In the self-agreement experiment, an F-score of 86.6% is obtained
for AST agreement, and an F-score of 94.9% for PPT agreement. This corresponds to
an accuracy of 34.4% at the level of ASTs and 40.6% at the level of PPTs. Similarly,
in the inter-annotator agreement experiment, an F-score of 56.8% is obtained for
ASTs, and 82.1% for PPTs. And, here, no ASTs were entirely correct.
To explain the low agreement in the rows suffixed by All, we perform two further
evaluations. The row suffix Root is the same type of evaluation as All, except
that we restrict attention to operators that take scope at the root preterminal of
the PPT. We now obtain F-scores and AST-level accuracies of 91.3% and 68.8% for
self-agreement (81.2% and 31.3% for inter-annotator agreement). Analogous improve-
ments are obtained in the PPT accuracies. Thus, we may conclude that many of the
problems in the first row are caused by embedded operators.
There are two sorts of errors/disagreements that can occur with (embedded) op-
erators – syntactic disagreements, which reflect in both the PPT and the AST, and
scope disagreements, which reflect only in the AST. To get an estimate of the scope
(dis)agreement, we corrected the PPTs annotated in the second phase to match the
“gold standard”. The correction was done by viewing only the PPT in the “gold stan-
7The “gold standard” and “computed” ASTs may not have the same set of preterminals. The
total number of preterminals is take to be the union of those found in the two ASTs.
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dard” and correcting the “computed” PPT to match it. The results of comparing
the corrected ASTs to the “gold standard” are shown in the rows suffixed All∗. We
now obtain an F-score and AST-level accuracies of 98% and 75% for self-agreement
(94.3% and 56.3% for inter-annotator agreement). We conclude that the low AST
agreement in the rows suffixed by All are mainly due to syntactic errors.
We now discuss the sorts of syntactic corrections that we needed to make. In
the self-agreement experiment, there were two main types of corrections – (a) typos,
which were unintentional omissions or mistakes, and (b) real disagremements, which
arise mostly in the usual cases of coordination and prepositional/adverbial phrase
attachment. In the inter-annotator case, in addition to the aforementioned types of
corrections, the main source of disagreement was in the method for annotating relative
clauses and verb phrase modifiers. We conclude that the syntactic annotation and/or
operator identification is an important deficiency our guidelines. The long sentences
in CFR 610.40 make parsing (computing the PPT) a non-trivial task!
The inter-annotator agreement in producing the AST from the PPT (the row
I.All∗) is lower than the self-agreement (the row S.All∗). One repeated case of
disagreement was phrases of the form “the communicable disease agents”, which
occur at various places in the CFR. These phrases were given de re scope in the
“gold standard”, but were given de dicto scope by the annotator. Many of the AST-
level disagreements were simply due to this single scope disagreement. The de re
scope assigned in the “gold standard” and self-agreement was influenced in part by
the author’s knowledge of the workings of the logic. Howevever, the annotator was
given the instruction to preserve surface scope by default, and there did not seem
to be particularly good reasons to violate it. One of the more difficult aspects of
developing guidelines for ASTs is to clarify which occurences of the determiner “the”
are to be treated universally. We hope to improve this aspect of the guidelines in
future work.
181
5.9 Related Work
In this section, we place our work in the context of related work in NLP. Section 5.9.1
relates the annotation of ASTs to other works that translate natural language to logic.
In Section 5.9.2, we discuss some alternatives to ASTs, to clarify some methodological
decisions. We then discuss work related to the computation of ASTs (Section 5.9.3).
5.9.1 Annotating ASTs
The analysis of scope can be seen as a middle ground between two lines of research
in translating sentences to logic.
At one end of the spectrum, we have methods that achieve good accuracy on
restricted texts. The two main corpora that have been considered are the GeoQuery
corpus [142] and the ATIS-3 corpus [41]. The GeoQuery corpus consists of queries
to a geographical database. The queries were collected from students participating
in a study and the average sentence length is 8 words. The ATIS corpus is collected
from subjects’ interaction with a database of flight information, using spoken natural
language. The utterances have be transcribed, and the average sentence length is
10 words [19]. Algorithms, which achieve good accuracy, have been developed to
compute the logical translation for these queries [149–151]. The annotated sentences
in the FDA CFR Section 610.40 are longer (about 30 words on average), and contain
modalities which are not present in these corpora.
At the other end of the spectrum, Bos et al. [24] have developed a broad-coverage
parser to translate sentences to a logic based on discourse representation theory. The
applications of broad-coverage parsers include tasks like textual entailment, where
errors in the logical translation are expected. In addition, there is no method to
evaluate the correctness of the translation produced by such broad-coverage parsers.
To summarize, there are NLP techniques that either produce an accurate trans-
lation for sentences in a limited domain, or produce some translation for sentences
in many domains for appications where errors in the logical translation are expected.
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ASTs offer a middle ground between these two approaches. We set aside the problem
of translating every phrase into logic, and focus instead on the position of the phrases
in the logical translation. This approach lets us make progress on the procedure for
translating sentences to logic, while leaving open the investigation of (parts of) the
logic itself.
5.9.2 Alternatives to ASTs
As we discussed previously, ASTs are based on May’s idea of logical form [103]. Logi-
cal form is one of several different approaches to account for scope phenomena. In this
section, we discuss some alternatives to logical form, in order to clarify methodological
decisions.
Logical form can be understood as a denotational approach to scope of operators.
It is an explicit intermediate representation that encodes the resolution of scope am-
biguities. In earlier approaches, such as the Montague grammar [112] and Cooper’s
quantifier storage mechanism [38], the resolution of scope is handled operationally,
i.e., via the rules for composing the logical translation. The denotational character
of logical form makes it a convenient starting point for annotating scope.
Kamp and Reyle’s discourse representation theory [78] (DRT) is designed to pro-
vide an account of both sentential scope and some discourse-level anaphora. Our
annotation of logical form has the more modest goal of providing an analysis of scope,
and in the long term, we hope to extend it with DRT-like mechanisms for handling
discourse-level anaphora.
Underspecified representations of scope, such as [39, 68, 128], have been developed
to compactly encode all possible interpretations of a sentence. In this work, we have
focussed on choosing one interpretation of a sentence, given the context. In cases
where there were multiple interpretations, we adopted default rules. For example, in
the phrase “the completion of all tests”, we default to the surface scope, which cor-
reponds to the interpretation that there is a single completion for all tests. However,
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the inversely linked interpretation is also possible, i.e., where we consider separate
completion points for each test. We have not encountered an example where such
differing scopes would result in different answers to conformance. Nevertheless, it
may be better practice to use an underspecified representation rather than default
scope orderings, and we hope to develop such an annotation scheme in future work.
5.9.3 Computing ASTs
Various types of features have been proposed for the scopal ordering of determiners.
Examples include syntactic features [71, 124], such as position (subject or object)
and voice, semantic features [61, 72], such as thematic roles, and pragmatic fea-
tures [91, 114, 132, 140], such as class size (discussed below). In a psycholinguistic
experiment, Kurtzman and MacDonald [87] evaluate syntactic and semantic features
by having humans indicate their preferred reading on sentences such as “every kid
climbed a tree”. They found that no single type of feature was sufficient. In a
machine learning approach, Srinivasan and Yates [140] used pragmatic information
about class size to predict preferred readings. For example, given the sentence “some
person came from every city” and the fact that there are more people than cities,
we may predict that every ≫ some is the preferred reading. We have experimented
with lexico-syntactic features in this work, and leave an investigation of semantic and
pragmatic features to future work.
The problem of ranking or ordering items has been investigated in a variety of
applications. Direct applications include document retrieval [35], collaborative filter-
ing [40, 66], and sentiment analysis [120]. Ranking methods have also been used in
NLP in the context of re-ranking for parsing [36, 137], named entity extraction [37],
and machine translation [138]. The idea with re-ranking is to reorder the output of
an underlying classifier using global features.
Liu [96] divides ranking algorithms into three types – (a) pointwise approaches,
which assign a score to each item and then sort the items based on the score, (b)
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pairwise approaches, which assign orders to pairs of items, and (c) listwise approaches,
which optimize a loss over the entire list. Our approach falls into the class of pairwise
approaches, and can be seen as a probabilistic version of the approach in [35].
5.10 Conclusions
We have proposed abstract syntax trees (ASTs) as an intermediate step in translating
regulatory sentences to logic. In Section 5.3, we discussed guidelines for annotating
ASTs. We annotated a corpus of 195 sentences from Section 610 of the FDA CFR
(Section 5.4). In Sections 5.5-5.7, we developed and tested algorithms to convert
a processed parse tree (PPT) to an AST. The main step in this conversion was to
rank or order the operators at a preterminal. We presented a probabilistic model
for ranking, investigated the design of features, and developed search heuristics. The
best algorithm, which uses all features and handles embedded operators, achieves an
F-score of 90.6%. Finally, in Section 5.8, we discussed an agreement evaluation, which
let us identify areas in which the guidelines need to be improved.
The experimental results suggest that with improved guidelines and a larger scale
annotation, we can achieve reasonable accuracy in converting a processed parse tree
to an AST. We conclude that ASTs (and more generally the computation of logical
form) may be a feasible next step in moving beyond parsing. There are several avenues
for further inquiry, which we discuss in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis, we considered the problem of regulatory conformance checking. We
started, in Chapter 1, by defining conformance as the satisfaction of obligations.
Conformance checking was cast as a problem of runtime verification. Regulations
are translated to logic, and organizations are represented as a trace or run. The
runtime checker outputs an affirmative answer to conformance, or a counterexample
if a violation is detected.
Given this approach, we narrowed our focus to the translation of regulation to
logic. We argued for a sentential translation of regulation to logic, in order to help
in tracing violations, and also to ease the difficulty in translating regulation to logic
(Chapter 2). We studied subproblems in the sentential translation from two angles,
toward the long term goal of developing tools to assist in such a translation:
(a) The design of logics (Chapters 2-4), and
(b) The annotation and computation of logical form (Chapter 5)
We now summarize our contributions and discuss avenues for future work. The
logic aspects are discussed in Section 6.1 and the logical form in Section 6.2.
186
6.1 Logic
We have designed logics to accomodate two features of regulatory texts – (1) references
between laws, and (2) the concepts of obligation and permission. An underlying theme
was the importance of the notion of saying in such constructs. In Chapter 2, we
explored a predicative analysis of says, to provide a unified analysis of various kinds
of inter-sentential references, e.g., priorities of exceptions over rules, and references to
definitions or list items. We then extended the analysis, in Chapter 4, to treat says
as a modal. We provided a new decidable axiomatization of representation in access
control and recursive notions of legal power. A non-interference property was used to
demonstrate that the logic preserves the rights of principals. Conformance checking,
in the presence of nested obligations and permissions, was shown to be decidable. We
also identified a polytime decidable fragment of the logic that accomodates a variety
of access control examples. There are several avenues for future work.
6.1.1 Other Kinds of Intersentential References
As we discussed in Section 3.4.2, there is a frequent class of intersentential references
for which there is no adequate formulation in Refl. Consider again the following
statement:
(21) The general safety test shall be performed as specified in this section...
At this time, we do not have a good understanding of how to formalize the phrase
“as specified in this section” in (21). One can avoid formalizing such requirements by
introducing additional inter-sentential references in other sentences (see Section 3.4.2
Example 4 for a discussion). A question of interest is whether the formalization of
such requirements would let us avoid these additional references.
6.1.2 Excessively Personal Obligations
Consider again the following sentence and its formal representation (from Chapter 5):
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(30) A general safety test for the detection of extraneous toxic contaminants shall be
performed on biological products intended for administration to humans.
(30) bio prod(x) 7→ Om(x)(∃y : test(y) ∧ proc(y, gen saf) ∧ ag(y,m(x)) ∧ obj(y, x))
Sentence (30) appears in passive voice. Yet, we have translated it to logic as an
obligation on the manufacturer Om(x). This is an artifact of our treatment of obliga-
tions in Chapter 4, where there is a principal who is responsible for each obligation. It
is possible to interpret (30) as an obligation, where there is some flexibility in assign-
ing blame. Such an interpretation would interact with delegation. For example, if a
manufacturer hands the product to an appropriate lab for testing, then the lab can be
held responsible for failure to perform the test in an appropriate way. We speculate
that a formalization this form of obligation needs notions of bringing about or seeing
to it that (e.g., [17, 70]). For example, the manufacturer may see to it that a product
is tested by requesting an appropriate lab to do the test. And, the lab assumes the
subsequent obligations. As we discussed in Section 4.4.2, notions of seeing to it that
are needed for other phenomena as well, and we hope to undertake an investigation
in the future.
6.1.3 Permission to Choose a Value
In Chapter 5, we explored a notion of permission to speak, using which a principal
can grant the power of representation to another. While this is adequate for access
control rights, there are related notions which we have not considered:
(46) Parents have the right to name their children
Informally, (46) gives parents the right to choose a name for the child. And, a
choice made by the parents (during an appropriate ceremony) would lead to the name
being legally recognized. We simplify the problem to illustrate the key issue. Suppose
the following statement appears in a principal A’s policy:
(47) B has the right to set the value of p
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Let us assume further that p is a boolean variable. There are two choices to rep-
resent the right in (47) – corresponding to a conjunctive or disjunctive interpretation:
(48) B has the right to set the value of p to true or false
(49) B has the right to set the value of p to true and the right to set the value of p to
false
There are a few ways to formalize (48) and (49) in the logic that we have developed.
However, the translations of (48) turn out to be vacuous, i.e., no right gets conveyed
to B. And, the translations of (49) turn out to be excessive, i.e., B can introduce any
statement on behalf of A. The problems are reminiscent of those that arise with free
choice permissions [77]. Substructural logics, such as linear logic [55], can typically
handle such notions of choice, and it is of interest to explore the interaction of the
representation axiom with the rich notions of disjunction and conjunction provided
by such logics.
6.1.4 Contracts
We have focussed on examples from privacy regulation. A variety of speech acts
arise in the context of business contracts and transactions [81–84]. Promises can be
understood as a self-imposed obligation, e.g., saysl(A) OAϕ can be read as “A promises
ϕ”. Such promises can be enforced by a higher authority by issuing a statement of the
form saysl(B) PA saysl(A) OAϕ, i.e., “B empowers A to promise ϕ on her own behalf”.
If A promises ϕ, then we will conclude using A5 that saysl(B) OAϕ, i.e., “B requires
ϕ of A”. Thus, if A fails to carry out her promise, she will not conform to the laws
issued by B. In reasoning about contracts, it is useful to relate events, such as the
delivery of goods, to speech acts, such as the promise of delivery (cf. [82]). Such
relationships between events and speech acts may lead to other interactions between
saying and obligation. We hope to study contractual examples in more detail in future
work.
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6.2 Logical Form
In Chapter 5, we described a corpus of regulatory sentences annotated with a variant
of logical form called abstract syntax trees (ASTs). To our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to annotate structures of this kind. We adapted learning algorithms to
compute these ASTs, and obtained an F-score of 90.6% on a Parseval-like evaluation
metric. We also evaluated agreement between human annotators. The results suggest
that converting a parse tree to an AST is a feasible task at the current state-of-the-art.
We conclude by discussing avenues for further research.
6.2.1 Annotation and Computation
There are several avenues for further inquiry in the annotation and computation of
ASTs. It is of interest to build a larger scale corpus, to get a better understanding
of the effort involved, in terms of annotator effort and cost. Several aspects of the
guidelines need to be improved, e.g., the interaction of de-re determiners in subject
position with coordination, and the handling of comparatives. We also hope to study
different regulatory corpora in future work.
In the context of computing ASTs, there are potential gains to be had from bet-
ter feature design. Due to the small size of the corpus, we have not used word or
phrase level features. We plan to investigate semi-supervised techniques to obtain
such information, e.g., by using clusters [122] and appropriate low-dimensional rep-
resentations [22] obtained from unlabeled data. Identifying pragmatic features, such
as information about class size [140], is another important direction for research.
6.2.2 Connecting ASTs and Logic
In Section 3.4.2, we showed that the annotation of ASTs could provide some quanti-
tative evaluation of the coverage of the logic. In particular, the distribution of clause
and verb phrase modifiers revealed constructs for which we do not have an adequate
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formalization. An open question is whether ASTs prove useful in discovering other
examples of constructs which need to be handled by the logic.
A long term goal of our work is to be able to go from the AST to logic. In the
short term, we may be able to extract some approximation to logical translation of
a sentence, by specifying some simple rules to convert AST operators to their logical
counterparts. Such an approximate translation may contain errors, but there may be
information extraction tasks for which it is useful.
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Appendix A
Refl: Proofs
Section A.1 proves the existence of fixed points. The complexity of conformance
checking is discussed in Section A.2.
A.1 Fixed Point
In this section, we build up to a proof of Theorem 2.1. We assume the notational
conventions developed in Chapter 2.
Proposition A.1. Given a poset (SRΥ ,≤), the function I
R
Υ is:
1. Inflationary - For all (u1, u
′
1) ∈ S
R
Υ, (u1, u
′
1) ≤ I
R
Υ(u1, u
′
1)
2. Well-defined - For all (u1, u
′
1) ∈ S
R
Υ, I
R
Υ(u1, u
′
1) ∈ S
R
Υ
3. Monotonic - For all {(u1, u
′
1), (u2, u
′
2)} ∈ S
R
Υ, if (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2), then I
R
Υ(u1, u
′
1) ≤
IRΥ(u2, u
′
2)
Proof. Item 1: Let (u2, u
′
2) = I
R
Υ(u1, u
′
1). We are given that (u1, u
′
1) is sound w.r.t.
R. Hence, for all i ∈ N and (id, φ) ∈ U :
• If (id, φ) ∈ u1(i), then by soundness, there exists (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and
v ∈ V such that v(ψ) = φ and η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤. Therefore, by the defintion
of IRΥ , (id, φ) ∈ u2(i). We can conclude that u1(i) ⊆ u2(i).
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• If (id, φ) 6∈ u2(i), then by soundness, for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V
such that v(ψ) = φ, we have η(u,u′)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥. Therefore, by the definition
of IRΥ , (id, φ) 6∈ u2(i). We can conclude that u1(i) ⊇ u2(i).
Hence, by Definition 2.14, (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2)
Interlude: For the second and third items, we need the following observations. Given
u1(i) ⊆ u
′
1(i) ⊆ U and u2(i) ⊆ u
′
2(i) ⊆ U , if (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2), then for all ϕ ∈ L
′,
i ∈ N and v ∈ V :
(D1) If η(u1,u′1)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤, then η(u2,u′2)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊤
(D2) If η(u1,u′1)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥, then η(u2,u′2)(ϕ,R, i, v) = ⊥
These are established easily by induction over the structure of ϕ. Note that the claims
are for all pairs of utterances, and not just the sound ones.
Item 2: Let (u2, u
′
2) = I
R
Υ(u1, u
′
1). From Item 1, it follows that (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2).
Suppose, for the purpose of contradiction, that (u2, u
′
2) is not sound w.r.t. R. Then,
by soundness, there exists (id, φ) ∈ U such that:
• (id, φ) ∈ u2(i) and for all (id).x : ϕ 7→ ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that
v(says{id} ψ) = φ, we have η(u2,u′2)(ϕ,R, i, v) 6= ⊤. Using (D1), we can conclude
that η(u1,u′1)(ϕ,R, i, v) 6= ⊤. Therefore, by the definition of I
R
Υ , (id, φ) 6∈ u2(i),
giving us a contradiction.
• The second case (where (id, φ) 6∈ u′2) is contradicted similarly using (D2).
The proof of Item 3 is along similar lines.
The existence of fixed points is established using Zorn’s lemma, which applies
to chain-complete posets. Given the poset (SRΥ ,≤), a set S
′ ⊆ SΥ is called a chain
(totally ordered set) if for all (u1, u
′
1), (u2, u
′
2) ∈ Υ
′, we have (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2) or
(u2, u
′
2) ≤ (u1, u
′
1). A poset is chain complete if every chain has a supremum. We now
show that (SRΥ ,≤) is a chain-complete poset:
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Proposition A.2. (SRΥ ,≤) is a chain-complete poset.
Proof. Given a chain S ′ ⊆ SΥ, consider the pair (us, u
′
s) defined as follows. For all
i ∈ N :
us(i) =
⋃
(u,u′)∈S′
u(i)
u′s(i) =
⋂
(u,u′)∈S′
u′(i)
It is immediate from the construction that ∀(u, u′) ∈ S ′ : (u, u′) ≤ (us, u
′
s). It
is also easy to see that if (us, u
′
s) is sound, then it is the supremum of S
′. Thus, it
suffices to show that (us, u
′
s) is sound, and this can be established by an argument
similar to the proof of Proposition A.1.
Lemma A.1 (Zorn (c.f. [131])). Every chain complete poset has a maximal element
The existence of maximal fixed points is immediate from Zorn’s lemma and the
fact that IΥ is inflationary, i.e., (u1, u
′
1) ≤ IΥ(u1, u
′
1). Let (uM , u
′
M) be a maximal
element in SΥ. Since (uM , u
′
M) is maximal and (uM , u
′
M) ≤ IΥ(uM , u
′
M) it follows
that (uM , u
′
M) = IΥ(uM , u
′
M).
To show the existence of a least fixed point, as Kripke [85] notes, we will need to use
the observation that IΥ is monotonic (Proposition A.1, Item 3). With monotonicity,
we obtain the following corollary to Zorn’s lemma:
Corollary A.1. Given (u1, u
′
1) ∈ S
R
Υ, let σ(u1, u
′
1) be the smallest set such that:
(a) (u1, u
′
1) ∈ σ(u1, u
′
1),
(b) If (u, u′) ∈ σ(u1, u
′
1) then IΥ(u, u
′) ∈ σ(u1, u
′
1), and
(c) If C ⊆ σ(u1, u
′
1) is a non-empty chain, then (usc, u
′
sc) ∈ σ(u1, u
′
1), where (usc, u
′
sc)
is the supremum of C w.r.t. SRΥ .
Then:
1. σ(u1, u
′
1) is a chain whose supremum is a fixed point of I
R
Υ
2. σ(u1, u
′
1) contains a unique fixed point
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3. If (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2), then (us1, u
′
s1) ≤ (us2, u
′
s2), where (us1, u
′
s1) and (us2, u
′
s2)
are the suprema of σ(u1, u
′
1) and σ(u2, u
′
2) resply., and
4. IRΥ has a unique least fixed point.
Proof. Fix (u1, u
′
1) and let S
′ = σ(u1, u
′
1).
Item 1: The fact that S ′ is a chain is used to prove Zorn’s lemma, and we refer the
reader to [131] for a proof. Let (us, u
′
s) be the supremum of S
′. Since S ′ contains
its supremum, and IRΥ(us, u
′
s) ∈ S
′ (by definition), we can conclude that (us, u
′
s) =
IRΥ(us, u
′
s). Thus, the supremum of S
′ = σ(u1, u
′
1) is a fixed point of I
R
Υ .
Interlude: For the rest of the items, we will need the following observation:
(∗) (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u, u
′), for all (u, u′) ∈ S ′
Suppose not. Consider the set S ′′ ⊂ S ′ such that (u, u′) ∈ S ′′ iff (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u, u
′).
Then:
(a) (u1, u
′
1) ∈ S
′′,
(b) If (u, u′) ∈ S ′′ then IΥ(u, u
′) ∈ S ′′ (since (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u, u
′) ≤ IRΥ(u, u
′)), and
(c) If C ⊆ S ′′ is a non-empty chain, then (u1, u
′
1) ≤ sup(C), since for all (u, u
′) ∈ C,
we have (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u, u
′). Hence, sup(C) ∈ S ′′.
Thus, we obtain a contradiction to the minimality of S ′.
Item 2: We now claim that (us, u
′
s) is the unique fixed point in S
′. Suppose not. Let
(u, u′) ∈ S ′ be a fixed point. Since (u, u′) 6= (us, u
′
s) and (us, u
′
s) is the supremum,
we have (u, u′) < (us, u
′
s). Consider the set S
′′ such that for all (uA, u
′
A) ∈ S
′,
(uA, u
′
A) ∈ S
′′ iff (uA, uA)
′ ≤ (u, u′). Then:
(a) (u1, u
′
1) ∈ S
′′ (by (∗))
(b) For all (uA, u
′
A) ∈ S
′′, we have IRΥ(uA, u
′
A) ∈ S
′′ (for if not (uA, uA)
′ ≤ (u, u′) and
IRΥ(uA, u
′
A) 6≤ I
R
Υ(u, u
′), contradicting the monotonicity of IRΥ), and
(c) The presence of suprema is similarly verified
We have a contradiction to the minimality of S ′. Hence, (us, u
′
s) is the unique fixed
point in S ′.
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Item 3: Given (u1, u
′
1) ≤ (u2, u
′
2), let (us1, u
′
s1) and (us2, u
′
s2) be the suprema of
σ(u1, u
′
1) and σ(u2, u
′
2) resply. We claim that (us1, u
′
s1) ≤ (us2, u
′
s2). Suppose not.
Consider the set S ′′ ⊂ σ(u1, u
′
1) such that (uA, u
′
A) ∈ S
′′ iff (uA, u
′
A) ≤ (us2, u
′
s2).
Then:
(a) (u1, u
′
1) ∈ S
′′ (by (*))
(b) For all (uA, u
′
A) ∈ S
′′, we have IRΥ(uA, u
′
A) ∈ S
′′ (for if not (uA, u
′
A) ≤ (us2, u
′
s2)
and IRΥ(uA, u
′
A) 6≤ I
R
Υ(us2, u
′
s2), contradicting the monotonicity of I
R
Υ), and
(c) The presence of suprema is similarly verified.
Again, we have contradicted to the minimality of σ(u1, u
′
1). Hence (us1, u
′
s1) ≤
(us2, u
′
s2).
Item 4: Let (u0, u
′
0) be the pair such that, where for all i ∈ N , u0(i) = ∅ and u
′
0(i) =
U (the set of all utterances). It is easy to see that (u0, u
′
0) is sound. Furthermore, for
all sound pairs (u, u′) ∈ SRΥ , (u0, u
′
0) ≤ (u, u
′). Hence, the supremum of σ(u0, u
′
0) is
the least fixed point.
A.2 Complexity
We discuss the proofs of the upper and lower bounds of conformance checking w.r.t.
the least fixed point:
Lemma 2.1 (Upper Bound). Given a finite run R and regulation Reg, R |= Reg can
decided in EXPSPACE (space exponential in the size of Reg)
Proof. (sketch) Corollary A.1 can easily be turned into a decision procedure. We
start with the pair (u0, u
′
0) and repeatedly apply I
R
Υ until a fixed point is reached.
For all i, |u0(i)| = 0 and |u
′
0(i)| = |Reg| × |V (X,O)|. In the worst case, for each
application of IΥ, there is at most one change. And, n× |Reg| × |V (X,O)| steps are
required to reach a fixed point, where |V | is the number of variable assigments. Note
that |V (X,O)| = |O|k where O is the set of objects and k is the largest number of
distinct variables appearing in a regulatory statement.
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To apply IRΥ to (u, u
′), we need to perform validity tests of the form u(i)Id |=
saysId ϕ. The worst-case size of the validity instances is |Reg| × |O|
k. Since validity
for propositional LTL is PSPACE-complete [139], applying IRΥ requires EXPSPACE
(due to the |O|k factor). We note that for the fragment of LTL discussed here (using
only 2 and 3) validity is NP-complete [139], and for this fragment R |= Reg can be
decided in EXPTIME.
Lemma 2.2 (Lower Bound). Given a finite run R and regulation Reg, R |= Reg is
hard for EXPTIME (time exponential in the size of Reg)
Proof. (sketch) We encode formulas in first-order logic as regulations. Let ϕ(~x) be
a first-order formula, where ~x = x1, ..., xm are free variables. If ϕ(~x) contains no
quantifiers, we represent it by a law:
(Aϕ) ϕ(~x) 7→ qϕ(~x)
qϕ(~x) is a predicate symbol that doesn’t appear in ϕ(~x). It is easy to see that
(Aϕ, v(qϕ(~x))) is available as an utterance iff ϕ(~x) is true w.r.t. v.
For quantified statements we proceed inductively. Given ∃y : ϕ(y, ~x), we add two
laws:
(A∃y:ϕ) says{B∃y:ϕ} q
′(~x) 7→ q∃y:ϕ(~x)
(B∃y:ϕ) says{Aϕ} qϕ(y, ~x) 7→ q
′(~x)
Observe that says{B∃y:ϕ} q
′(~x) is true w.r.t. an assignment v iff (B∃y:ϕ, v(q
′(~x)))
is available as an utterance. And, (B∃y:ϕ, v(q
′(~x))) is available as an utterance iff
saysAϕ qϕ(y, ~x) is true w.r.t. some variable assignment v
′ that is identical to v ex-
cept for y. We can then argue inductively that (A∃y:ϕ, v(q∃y:ϕ(~x))) is available as an
utterance iff ∃y : ϕ(y, ~x) is true w.r.t. v.
Given ∀y : ϕ(y, ~x), we use the equivalence ∀y : ϕ(y, ~x) = ¬∃y : ¬ϕ(y, ~x) and
proceed as follows:
(A∀y:ϕ) ¬ says{A∃y:¬ϕ} q∃y:¬ϕ(~x) 7→ q∀y:ϕ(~x)
To complete the construction, given ϕ(~x), we add the obligation:
(1).o : ¬ says{Aϕ} qϕ(~x) 7→ ⊥.
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It can be shown that a run with a single state conforms to the regulation iff ϕ
is valid at the state. Model-checking for first-order logic is PSPACE-complete (cf.
[145]). It follows that computing the least fixed point is PSPACE-hard.
In encoding first-order formulas, we constructed an acyclic regulation. With cir-
cular references, one can encode reachability computations which cannot be directly
expressed in first-order logic:
(id) δ(x, z) ∨ (δ(x, y) ∧ says{id} δ
+(y, z)) 7→ δ+(x, z)
Here, we assume that each point in a run encodes a graph. The edge relation is
given by δ, and δ+ represents the transitive closure of δ. It can be shown that at the
least fixed point v(δ+(x, z)) is available as an annotation iff there is a path from v(x)
to v(z). We can show an EXPTIME lower bound by a reduction from first-order logic
enriched with a least fixed point predicate (the system YF in [145]).
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Appendix B
Permission to Speak: Proofs
B.1 Semantics
We repeat the semantic definitions for convenience.
Definition 4.3 (Models). Given countable sets of object names O, principal names
OP ⊆ O, Φ1, ...,Φn (where Φj is a set of predicate names of arity j), identifiers for
rules ID, and l : OP → 2
ID, a model M(O,OP ,Φ1, ...,Φn, ID, l), abbreviated as M ,
is the tuple (S, IΦ1, ..., IΦn , δL, δO) where:
• S is a set of states
• IΦj : Φj × S → 2
Oj is the interpretation of predicates of arity j. Given p ∈ Φj,
we will say that p(o1, ..., oj) is true at state s iff (o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj(p, s).
• δL : S × 2
ID → 2S. δL(s, Id) corresponds to a description of s according to the
laws labeled with identifiers in Id (taken conjunctively).
• δO : S × OP → 2
S. δO(s, A) corresponds to an idealization of s, for which the
principal A is held responsible.
For the axioms A3-A6 we need the following constraints C3-C6 (resply). For all
s ∈ S:
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C3 δL(s, IdA) ⊇ δL(s, Id
′
A) for all A ∈ OP and IdA ⊆ Id
′
A ⊆ l(A)
C4 δO(s, A) 6= ∅ for all A ∈ OP
C5 For all {A,B} ⊆ OP , IdA ⊆ l(A), IdB ⊆ l(B), and s
′ ∈ δL(s, IdA):
1. s′ ∈ δL(s, IdB), or
2. There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, B), s
′ ∈ δL(s2, IdB)
C6 For all A ∈ OP , IdA ⊆ l(A), and s
′ ∈ δL(s, IdA):
There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, A), s
′ ∈ δL(s2, IdA)
Definition 4.4 (Semantics). Given a model M = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO), s ∈ S and
a propositional ϕ ∈ L, the relation (M, s) |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
• (M, s) |= p(o1, ..., oj) iff (o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj(p, s).
• The semantics of conjunction and negation is defined in the usual way.
• (M, s) |= saysId ϕ iff (M, s
′) |= ϕ, for all s′ ∈ δL(s, Id).
• (M, s |= OAϕ iff (M, s
′) |= ϕ, for all s′ ∈ δO(s
′, A).
We can now define validity:
• ϕ is valid in a model M (M |= ϕ) iff for all s ∈ S, (M, s) |= ϕ
• ϕ is valid (|= ϕ) iff for all M ∈ M, M |= ϕ
B.2 Soundness and Completeness
Lemma B.1 (Soundness). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, if ⊢ ϕ, then |= ϕ
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Proof. We need to show that the axioms are valid, and that the rules preserve validity.
It is well-known that the axioms A1 and A2 are valid, and that R1 and R2 preserve
validity in all Kripke structures. The validity of A3 and A4 can easily be shown
using C3 and C4. We discuss the case for A5.
Suppose A5 is not valid. There exists M , s, ϕ, A, B, IdA and IdB such that:
• (M, s) |= saysIdA(PB saysIdB ϕ)
• (M, s) |= saysIdB ϕ, and
• (M, s) 6|= saysIdA ϕ
Since (M, s) 6|= saysIdA ϕ, there exists s
′ ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that (M, s
′) 6|= ϕ. Since
C5 holds, there are two cases to consider:
1. If s′ ∈ δL(s, IdB), then (M, s) 6|= saysIdB ϕ giving us a contradiction.
2. If there exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, B), s
′ ∈ δL(s2, IdB),
then:
• (M, s1) |= OB¬ saysIdB ϕ
• (M, s) 6|= saysIdA(¬OB¬ saysIdB ϕ)
Hence, (M, s) 6|= saysIdA(PB saysIdB ϕ) (since PBϕ = ¬OB¬ϕ), giving us a
contradiction.
Hence, A5 is valid. The proof for A6 is similar.
Lemma B.2 (Completeness). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, if |= ϕ, then ⊢ ϕ
The rest of this section gives the proof. We will use a canonical model argument
(c.f. [65]). We show the contrapositive, i.e., if 6⊢ ϕ, then 6|= ϕ. In other words, if 6⊢ ϕ
then there exist M and s such that (M, s) |= ¬ϕ. We begin with some terminology.
We say that ϕ is consistent if ¬ϕ is not provable (6⊢ ¬ϕ). A finite set of formulas
{ϕ1, ..., ϕn} is consistent if ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn is consistent. An infinite set of formulas is
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consistent if every finite subset is consistent. A set of formulas ∆ is maximal consistent
if for all ϕ ∈ L−∆, ∆∪{ϕ} is inconsistent. The following are properties of maximal
consistent sets:
Proposition B.1. Given a maximal consistent set ∆:
1. For all ϕ ∈ L, exactly one of ϕ ∈ ∆ or ¬ϕ ∈ ∆
2. If ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ and ϕ ∈ ∆, then ψ ∈ ∆
3. If ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ ∆ and Qϕ ∈ ∆ (for all modalities Q)
The proof is straightforward. We now define the canonical model, in which every
consistent formula is true at some state:
Definition B.1 (Canonical Model). The canonical model M = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn , δL, δO)
is such that:
• S is the set of all maximal consistent sets
• (o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj (p,∆) iff p(o1, ..., oj) ∈ ∆
• ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA) iff for all ϕ, if saysIdA ϕ ∈ ∆, then ϕ ∈ ∆
′
• ∆′ ∈ δO(∆, A) iff for all ϕ, if OAϕ ∈ ∆, then ϕ ∈ ∆
′
We now show that the canonical model satisfies the frame constraints:
Proposition B.2. The canonical model satisfies the frame constraints C3-C6
Proof. The proof that C3 and C4 hold are left to the reader. We discuss the case
for C5. Given the canonical model M = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO), ∆ ∈ S, and suppose
for the purpose of contradiction that there exists ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA) such that:
• ∆′ 6∈ δL(∆, IdB). By construction, there exists saysIdB ψ ∈ ∆ such that ¬ψ ∈
∆′.
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• For all ∆1 ∈ δL(∆, IdA), there exists ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B), ∆
′ 6∈ δL(∆2, IdB). By
Proposition B.3 (below), there exists saysIdA PB saysIdB ϕ ∈ ∆ such that ¬ϕ ∈
∆′.
Using Proposition B.1, saysIdB(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ ∆ and saysIdA PB saysIdB(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ ∆.
So, saysIdA(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ ∆, and hence ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ ∆
′. That is ϕ ∈ ∆′ or ψ ∈ ∆′, which
contradicts the fact that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆′ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆′. The proof of C6 is similar.
Proposition B.3. Given the canonical model M = (S, IΦ1, ..., IΦn , δL, δO), for all
∆ ∈ S, {A,B} ⊆ OP , IdA ⊆ l(A), IdB ⊆ l(B), and ∆
′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA):
• If for all ∆1 ∈ δL(∆, IdA), there exists ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B), ∆
′ 6∈ δL(∆2, IdB), then
there exists saysIdA PB saysIdB ϕ ∈ ∆ and ¬ϕ ∈ ∆
′
Proof. Fix ∆, A, B, IdA, IdB and ∆
′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA). We proceed by contradiction.
Suppose for all ϕ ∈ L, if saysIdA PB saysIdB ϕ ∈ ∆, then ϕ ∈ ∆
′. Let F be the
smallest set such that:
• If saysIdA ϕ ∈ ∆, then ϕ ∈ F , and
• If ¬ψ ∈ ∆′, then OB¬ saysIdB ψ ∈ F .
We claim that F is consistent.1 Suppose not:
(1) There exists {ϕ1, ..., ϕn,OB¬ saysIdB ψ1, ...,OB¬ saysIdB ψm} ⊆ F such that:
⊢ ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ∧OB¬ saysIdB ψ1 ∧ ... ∧ OB¬ saysIdB ψm)
(2) ⊢ ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ⇒ PB saysIdB(ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψm) (from (1) using A1, A4, R1 and
R2)
1Note that if there exists ϕ such that ∆ ⊢ saysIdA ϕ and ∆ ⊢ saysIdA ¬ϕ, then δL(∆, IdA) = ∅,
and C5 and C6 are vacuously satisfied. In Proposition B.3 (and Proposition B.5 in Section B.3),
the contradiction applies only to cases where there exists ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA), and hence, no such ϕ
exists.
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(3) ⊢ saysIdA(ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ⇒ PB saysIdB(ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψm)) ∈ ∆ (from (2) using R2)
(4) By construction, saysIdA ϕi ∈ ∆ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. So, using A2 and (3), we can
derive that saysIdA PB saysIdB(ψ1∨ ...∨ψm) ∈ ∆. As a result, ψ1∨ ...∨ψm ∈ ∆
′,
and there exists ψi ∈ ∆
′ where 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
(5) By construction, ¬ψi ∈ ∆
′ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, which together with (4) contradicts
the consistency of ∆′.
We can extend F into a maximal consistent set ∆1 such that ∆1 ∈ δL(∆, IdA).
PB saysIdB ϕ ∈ ∆1 iff ϕ ∈ ∆
′. So, for all ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B), if saysIdB ϕ ∈ ∆2, then
ϕ ∈ ∆′. This suffices to conclude that ∆′ ∈ δL(∆2, IdB) for all ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B),
giving us a contradiction.
The completeness proof is now finished in the usual way (see, for example, [65]).
Given the canonical model M and a state ∆, it is easy to show that for all ϕ ∈ L,
(M,∆) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ∆. Furthermore, given a consistent ϕ, we can construct a maximal
consistent set ∆ such that ϕ ∈ ∆. As a result, for every consistent ϕ, there exists
a state ∆ in the canonical model such that (M,∆) |= ϕ. Hence, if 6⊢ ϕ, then 6|= ϕ.
We observe that compactness follows as a corollary of the existence of the canonical
model:
Corollary 4.1 (Compactness). An infinite set of formulas is satisfiable iff every finite
subset is satisfiable.
Given an infinite set of formulas ∆, if every finite subset is satisfiable, then by
soundness, every finite subset of ∆ is consistent. And, by definition, ∆ is consistent.
We can extend ∆ into a maximal consistent set, corresponding to a state in the
canonical model.
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B.3 Decidability
In this section, we adapt the completeness proof to show the bounded-model property,
i.e., if φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a model of bounded size (exponential in
the size of φ). We begin by defining the set of subformulas:
Definition B.2 (Subformulas). Given a propositional φ ∈ L, the set of subformulas
sub(φ) is the smallest set such that:
1. φ ∈ sub(φ)
2. If ϕ ∈ sub(φ), then ¬ϕ ∈ sub(φ) (¬¬ϕ is identified with ϕ)
3. If ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ sub(φ), then ϕ ∈ sub(φ) and ψ ∈ sub(φ)
4. If OAψ ∈ sub(φ) or saysIdA ψ ∈ sub(φ), then ψ ∈ sub(φ)
5. If saysIdA ψ1 ∈ sub(φ) and saysId′A ψ2 ∈ sub(φ) such that IdA ⊆ l(A) and Id
′
A ⊆
l(A), then saysIdA∪Id′A ψ1 ∈ sub(φ)
6. If saysIdA(
∨
∆1) ∈ sub(φ) and saysIdB(
∨
∆2) ∈ sub(φ), then
saysIdA(
∨
∆2) ∈ sub(φ) and saysIdA(
∨
(∆1 ∪ ∆2)) ∈ sub(φ)
7. If saysIdA ψ1 ∈ sub(φ) and IdA ⊆ l(A), then PA saysIdA ψ1 ∈ sub(φ)
The last three clauses in Definition B.2 are used to ensure that C5 and C6 hold.
Note that in Clause 5, we consider disjunction over sets of formulas ∆1 and ∆2.
Formulas which are not disjunctions are understood as disjunctions over singleton sets,
e.g., ϕ ∧ ψ =
∨
{ϕ ∧ ψ}. To obtain the analog of Proposition B.2, we need to ensure
that formulas appearing within the scope of says are closed under disjunction. We use
sets of formulas to ensure that only finitely many disjunctions are introduced, i.e., a
disjunct need not be repeated. Due to Clauses 5 and 6, the number of subformulas is
exponential in the size of φ. It is possible to eliminate both these clauses, by filtering
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the model that we construct here. But, this further filtration is not needed for the
results proved in this work. Clause 7 is key to obtaining the analog of Proposition B.3.
Given φ ∈ L, we will consider maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(φ). A set ∆ ⊆
sub(φ) is said to be maximal consistent iff ∆ is consistent and for all ψ ∈ sub(φ)−∆,
∆∪{ψ} is inconsistent. We write ∆ ⊢ ϕ to denote ⊢
∧
∆ ⇒ ϕ. The definition of the
canonical model needs a few changes:
Definition B.3 (Canonical Model of φ). The canonical model of φ, denoted Mφ =
(S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO), is such that:
• S is the set of all maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(φ)
• (o1, ..., oj) ∈ IΦj (p,∆) iff p(o1, ..., oj) ∈ ∆
• ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA) iff for all ψ ∈ sub(φ) and Id
′
A ⊆ IdA, if saysId′A ψ ∈ ∆, then
ψ ∈ ∆′
• ∆′ ∈ δO(∆, A) iff for all ψ ∈ sub(φ), if OAψ ∈ ∆, then ψ ∈ ∆
′.
We will show that the canonical model of φ satisfies the frame constraints. We
adapt Propositions B.2 and B.3 to obtain Propositions B.4 and B.5 resply.
Proposition B.4. The canonical model of φ satisfies the frame constraints C3-C6
Proof. The proof that C3 and C4 hold are left to the reader. We discuss the case
for C5. Given Mφ = (S, IΦ1, ..., IΦn , δL, δO), consider some ∆ ∈ S. If δL(∆, IdA) = ∅,
then C5 is vacuously satisfied. Otherwise, let ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA). There are two cases
to consider.
First, we have the boundary case, where there is no subformula saysId′A ϕ
′ ∈ sub(φ)
such that Id′A ⊆ IdA. By defintion, δL(∆, IdA) = S. Consider the set F ⊆ sub(φ)
such that ψ ∈ F iff ψ is of the form OB¬ saysIdB ϕ and ¬ϕ ∈ ∆
′. We claim that
F is consistent. Since ∆′ is consistent, we can construct a model M ′ with states S ′,
and s′ ∈ S ′ such that (M ′, s′) |=
∧
∆′. Without loss of generality, we can assume
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that there exists s′′ ∈ S ′ such that δO(s
′′, A) = {s′′} and δL(s
′′, IdB) = S
′ for all
B ∈ OP and IdB ⊆ l(B). Note that states, such as s
′′, trivially satisfy the frame
constraints, and can be added to any model. It is easy to see that (M ′, s′′) |=
∧
F ,
and by soundness, F is consistent. We can extend F into a maximal consistent set ∆1
such that for all ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B), we have ∆
′ ∈ δL(∆2, IdB). Since δL(∆, IdA) = S,
we have ∆1 ∈ δL(∆, IdA), and C5 is satisfied.
For the second case we proceed as follows. Let Id∗A be the largest subset of
IdA such that there is a subformula saysId∗A ϕ
′ ∈ sub(φ). The existence of a largest
subset is guaranteed by Clause 5 in Definition B.2. Fix IdB ⊆ l(B). If there is no
subformula saysId′B ψ
′ ∈ sub(φ) with Id′B ⊆ IdB, then δL(∆, IdA) ⊆ δL(∆, IdB) = S,
and C5 is satisfied. Otherwise, let Id∗B be the largest subset of IdB such that there
is a subformula saysId∗
B
ψ′ ∈ sub(φ). We proceed by contradiction analogous to the
completeness proof:
• ∆′ 6∈ δL(∆, IdB). By construction, there exists ψ ∈ sub(φ) such that saysId′B ψ ∈
∆ for some Id′B ⊆ l(B) and ¬ψ ∈ ∆
′. And, using A3, ∆ ⊢ saysId∗B ψ.
• For all ∆1 ∈ δL(∆, IdA), there exists ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B), ∆
′ 6∈ δL(∆2, IdB). By
Proposition B.5 (below), there exists ϕ ∈ sub(φ) such that saysId∗B ϕ ∈ sub(φ),
∆ ⊢ saysId∗A PB saysId∗B ϕ and ¬ϕ ∈ ∆
′.
Since ∆ ⊢ saysId∗B(ϕ ∨ ψ) and ∆ ⊢ saysId∗A PB saysId∗B(ϕ ∨ ψ), we have ∆ ⊢
saysId∗A(ϕ ∨ ψ). Using Clause 6 in Definition B.2, there exists saysId∗A ϕ1 ∈ sub(φ)
such that ⊢ ϕ1 ⇔ (ϕ ∨ ψ). As a result, saysId∗A ϕ1 ∈ ∆, and hence ϕ1 ∈ ∆
′. Since
⊢ ϕ1 ⇔ (ϕ ∨ ψ), we have ϕ ∈ ∆
′ or ψ ∈ ∆′, which contradicts the fact that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆′
and ¬ψ ∈ ∆′. The proof of C6 is similar.
Proposition B.5. Given φ ∈ L, IdA ⊆ l(A) and IdB ⊆ l(B) such that there are
largest subsets Id∗A ⊆ IdA and Id
∗
B ⊆ IdB with formulas saysId∗A ϕ
′ ∈ sub(φ) and
saysId∗B ψ
′ ∈ sub(φ), let Mφ = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO) be the canonical model of φ.
Then, for all ∆ ∈ S and ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA):
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• If for all ∆1 ∈ δL(∆, IdA), there exists ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B) such that ∆
′ 6∈ δL(∆2, IdB),
then there exists ϕ ∈ sub(φ) such that saysId∗B ϕ ∈ sub(φ), ∆ ⊢ saysId∗A PB saysId∗B ϕ
and ¬ϕ ∈ ∆′
Proof. Fix ∆ and ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdA). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose for all
ϕ ∈ sub(φ) with saysId∗B ϕ ∈ sub(φ), if ∆ ⊢ saysIdA PB saysIdB ϕ, then ¬ϕ 6∈ ∆
′. Let
F be the smallest set such that:
• If saysId′A ϕ ∈ ∆ for some Id
′
A ⊆ IdA, then ϕ ∈ F
• If ¬ψ ∈ ∆′ and OB¬ saysId∗B ψ ∈ sub(φ), then OB¬ saysId∗B ψ ∈ F .
We claim that F is consistent (see Footnote 1). Suppose not:
(1) There exists {ϕ1, ..., ϕn,OB¬ saysId∗B ψ1, ...,OB¬ saysId∗B ψm} ⊆ F such that: ⊢
¬(ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ∧ OB¬ saysId∗
B
ψ1 ∧ ... ∧OB¬ saysId∗
B
ψm)
(2) ⊢ ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ⇒ PB saysId∗
B
(ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψm) (from (1) using A1, A4, R1 and
R2)
(3) ⊢ saysId∗A(ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ⇒ PB saysId∗B(ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψm)) ∈ ∆ (from (2) using R2)
(4) By construction, ∆ ⊢ saysId∗A ϕi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. So, using A2 and (3),
we can derive that ∆ ⊢ saysId∗
A
PB saysId∗
B
(ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψm). Using Clause 6 in
Definition B.2, there exists ψ′ ∈ sub(φ) such that saysId∗B ψ
′ ∈ sub(φ) and
⊢ ψ′ ⇔ (ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψm). It follows that ∆ ⊢ saysId∗A PB saysId∗B ψ
′, and by
assumption, ¬ψ′ 6∈ ∆′, i.e., ∆′ ⊢ ψ′. As a result, ∆′ ⊢ ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψm, and there
exists 1 ≤ i ≤ m such that ψi ∈ ∆
′ (since ψi ∈ sub(φ)).
(5) By construction, ¬ψi ∈ ∆
′ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, which together with (4) gives us
a contradiction.
We can extend F into a maximal consistent set ∆1 such that ∆1 ∈ δL(∆, IdA).
Consider ∆2 ∈ δO(∆1, B). We claim that for all Id
′
B ⊆ IdB, if saysId′B ϕ ∈ ∆2, then
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ϕ ∈ ∆′. Suppose not. There exists saysId′B ϕ ∈ ∆2 such that ¬ϕ ∈ ∆
′. Using Clauses
5 and 6 in Definition B.2, it follows that saysId∗B ϕ ∈ sub(φ), and using A3, saysId∗B ϕ ∈
∆2. Since saysId∗B ϕ ∈ sub(φ), by Clause 7 in Definition B.2, OB¬ saysId∗B ϕ ∈ sub(φ).
By construction, OB¬ saysId∗B ϕ ∈ ∆1, and so, ¬ saysId∗B ϕ ∈ ∆2, contradicting the
consistency of ∆2. This suffices to conclude that ∆
′ ∈ δL(∆2, IdB) for all ∆2 ∈
δO(∆1, B), giving us a contradiction.
A standard argument (see, for example, [65]) can be used to show that for all
ϕ ∈ sub(φ), (Mφ,∆) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ ∆. We can now establish decidability:
Theorem 4.2 (Decidability). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, the problem of checking
whether ⊢ ϕ is decidable
Proof. Decidability is established via the bounded model property:
φ is satisfiable in Mφ iff φ is satisfiable
One direction is trivial, i.e., if φ is satisfiable inMφ, then φ is satisfiable (by definition).
For the other direction, we can use a standard filtration argument, to show that Mφ
can be obtained from the canonical model (Definition B.1).
B.4 Complexity
In this section, we show that testing satisfiability in the propositional fragment of the
language L (Section 4.3.2) is NEXPTIME-hard. We proceed by reduction from the
halting problem for non-deterministic Turing machines. Specifically, given a Turing
machine and input w, we will construct a formula ϕ such that ϕ is satisfiable iff the
TM halts on w in at most 2|w| − 1 steps. We begin by giving some intuition for the
complexity, and build some machinery that is needed for the proof.
Halpern and Moses [65] give tableaux algorithms for several modal logics (e.g.,
K, KD, S4, S5), for which the decision problem is PSPACE-complete. The key
idea is that while searching for a state satisfying ϕ, we need to keep track of at
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most one of the accessible states. Suppose saysId was a K modality. Then, given
∆ and {∆′,∆′′} ⊆ δL(∆, Id), ∆
′ and ∆′′ are independent given ∆. In our case, the
constraints C5 and C6 introduce dependence between sibling states.
We begin by defining the notion of a witness which is important in subsequent
proofs:
Definition B.4 (Witness). Given a model M , the states s, s′ and s′′ and {A,B} ⊆
O, we say that s′′ is a witness for s′ w.r.t. s, A and B, denoted Ws(A,B)(s
′′, s′), if
{s′, s′′} ⊆ δL(s, l(A)) and for all s2 ∈ δO(s
′′, B), s′ ∈ δL(s2, l(B)).
We mention some properties of witnesses:
Proposition B.6. Given a model M and state s:
1. For all s′ and s′′ such that Ws(A,B)(s
′′, s′), if (M, s′′) |= OB saysl(B) ϕ, then
(M, s′) |= ϕ.
2. Given s′ ∈ δL(s, l(A)), there exists s
′′ such that Ws(A,A)(s
′′, s′).
3. Given s′ ∈ δL(s, l(A)), for all B ∈ O such that δL(s, l(B)) = ∅, there exists s
′′
such that Ws(A,B)(s
′′, s′).
Item 1 is immediate from the definition of witnesses. Items 2 and 3 are conse-
quences of C6 and C5 resply.
The building blocks for the reduction are n-bit counters. Given a natural number
p such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 2n−1, we express p in binary, using n propositions pn−1pn−2...p0,
where pn−1 is the most significant bit, and p0 is the least significant bit. For example,
p = 2n − 1 iff
∧n−1
i=0 pi, and p = 0 iff
∧n−1
i=0 ¬pi. Equality and comparison tests, e.g.,
p = i and p > i, can be expressed by formulas of size polynomial in the number of
bits n. We will use such formulas without definition.
We now give a schema for an n-bit adder, using a technique from [65]. Informally,
the goal is to create a formula such that ∀0 ≤ i < 2n − 1 : (p = i) ⇒ OA saysl(A)(p =
i+ 1). We start with schemas for flipping a bit (a) and preserving a bit (b):
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a(ψ,A) = (ψ ⇒ OA saysl(A) ¬ψ) ∧ (¬ψ ⇒ OA saysl(A) ψ)
b(ψ,A) = (ψ ⇒ OA saysl(A) ψ) ∧ (¬ψ ⇒ OA saysl(A) ¬ψ)
The adder is given by the following schema:
c+1(p, A, n) =
∧n−1
i=0 ((
∧i
j=0 pj ⇒ a(pi, A)) ∧ (¬
∧i
j=0 pj ⇒ b(pi, A)))
The first clause says that when pi and all the less significant bits are 1, then pi is
flipped (a(pi, A)). Otherwise, the second clause ensures that pi is preserved (b(pi, A)).
We can show the following:
Proposition B.7. Given a model M and state s such that (M, s) |= c+1(p, A, n), if
(M, s) |= p = i, then (M, s) |= OA saysl(A)(p = i+ 1) for all 0 ≤ i < 2
n − 1
The proof is straightforward. We now discuss an example to show how the counter
c+1(p, A, n) is used to construct a formula which is satisfied only in models of size
exponential in the formula. Consider formulas defined by the following schema:
φ(ψ, p, A, n) = φ1(ψ, p, A, n) ∧ φ2(ψ, p, A, n) ∧ φ3(ψ, p, A, n) ∧ φ4(ψ, p, A, n)
φ1(ψ, p, A, n) = saysl(A)(¬ψ ⇒ OA saysl(A)(ψ ⇒ p = 0))
φ2(ψ, p, A, n) = saysl(A)(ψ ⇒ (p 6= 2
n − 1) ⇒ c+1(p, A, n))
φ3(ψ, p, A, n) = saysl(A)(ψ ⇒ (p = 2
n − 1) ⇒ OA saysId⊥)
φ4(ψ, p, A, n) = ¬ saysl(A) ¬(ψ ∧ (p = 2
n − 1))
A model satisfying φ(r, p, A, n) for some atomic proposition r is shown in Fig-
ure B.1. For each state si (for 0 < i ≤ 2
n − 1), we have Ws(A,A)(si−1, si). The
following can be shown:
Proposition B.8. Given a model M and state s such that (M, s) |= φ(r, p, A, n) for
some atomic proposition r, then:
1. If there exists s′ ∈ δL(s, l(A)) such that (M, s
′) |= r ∧ (p = j), then there exists
s′′ ∈ δL(s, l(A)) such that (M, s
′′) |= r ∧ (p = j − 1), for all 0 < j ≤ 2n − 1
2. There exists s′ ∈ δL(s, l(A)) such that (M, s
′) |= r ∧ (p = 2n − 1)
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s = {φ(r, p,A, n), ...}
s′ : {¬r, ...} s0 : {r, p = 0, ...} ... s2n−1 : {r, p = 2
n − 1, ...}
Figure B.1: A model satisfying φ(r, p, A, n). The solid lines correspond to δL, e.g.,
s′ ∈ δL(s, l(A)). The dashed lines correspond to δO, e.g., s
′ ∈ δO(s
′, A). Only the
relevant accessibility relations are shown.
Proof. For Item 1, we proceed as follows. We are given a state s′ such that (M, s′) |=
r ∧ (p = j) for some 0 < j ≤ 2n − 1 By Proposition B.6 Item 2, there exists s′′ such
that Ws(A,A)(s
′′, s′). We claim that (M, s′′) |= r ∧ (p = j − 1). Suppose not. There
are two cases to consider.
If (M, s′′) |= ¬r, then (M, s′′) |= OA saysl(A)(r ⇒ p = 0) (due to φ1(r, p, A, n)),
and by Proposition B.6 Item 1, (M, s′) |= (p = 0), which contradicts the fact that
(M, s′) |= (p = j) for some j > 0.
If (M, s′′) |= r ∧ (p 6= j − 1), then (M, s′′) |= OA saysl(A)(p = j + 1) (due to
φ2(r, p, A, n)). Hence, (M, s
′′) |= OA saysl(A)(p 6= j), and by Proposition B.6 Item 1,
(M, s′) |= (p 6= j), giving us a contradiction.
For Item 2, the existence of the state is guaranteed by φ4(r, p, A, n).
To simulate the position of the read-head of the Turing machine, we will need a
corresponding subtraction operation. Informally, the goal is to construct a formula
such that ∀0 < i ≤ 2n−1 : p = i⇒ OA saysl(A)(p = i−1). We assume, without loss of
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generality, that the tape is bounded on the left, and moving to the left (subtracting)
from position 0 leaves the position unchanged. The schema is as follows:
c−1(p, A, n) =
∧n−1
i=0 ((
∧i
j=0 ¬pj ⇒ a(pi, A)) ∧ (¬
∧i
j=0 ¬pj ⇒ b(pi, A)))
The first clause says that when pi and all the less significant bits are 0, then pi is
flipped (a(pi, A)). Otherwise, the second clause ensures that pi is preserved (b(pi, A)).
We can show the following:
Proposition B.9. Given a model M and state s such that (M, s) |= c−1(p, A, n), if
(M, s) |= p = i, then (M, s) |= OA saysl(A)(p = i− 1) for all 0 < i ≤ 2
n − 1
The counters give us a mechanism to represent the number of steps in the compu-
tation and the position of the read-head. We also need a mechanism for reading from
and writing to the tape. When a symbol is written to the tape, we will guess the next
time at which it will be read. We use (an obligation on) a second principal to hold
the guess. The guess is represented by the following schema, denoted by c>(p, B, n):
c>(p, B, n) =
∨n−1
i=0 (
∧n−1
j=i+1 b(pj , B)) ∧ ¬pi ∧ OB saysl(B) pi
We can show the following:
Proposition B.10. Given a model M and state s such that (M, s) |= c>(p, B, n),
if (M, s) |= p = i, then there exists j such that 0 < j ≤ 2n − 1 and (M, s) |=
OB saysl(B)(p = i+ j), for all 0 ≤ i < 2
n − 1
We now define a Turing maching and its runs:
Definition B.5 (Turing Machine). A (non-deterministic) Turing machine is the tuple
T = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ), where Q is a set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, δ ⊆ Q × Σ ×
Σ × {0, 1} ×Q is the transition relation, qo ∈ Q is the start state, and F ⊆ Q is the
set of accepting states. We assume that for all q ∈ F , there is no (a, b, d, q′) such that
(q, a, b, d, q′) ∈ δ.
Definition B.6 (Runs of a Turing Machine). Given T = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ), a configu-
ration is a tuple σ = (q, i,Γ), where q ∈ Q is the current state, i ∈ N is the position
of the read head and Γ : N → Σ is the tape.
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A run of T of length m on input w is the tuple (σ0, ..., σm), where σ0 = (q0, 0,Γ0),
where Γ0(i) = wi for 1 ≤ i ≤ |w|, and Γ0(i) = 6 b otherwise. In addition, for σi =
(qi, pi,Γi) and σi+1 = (qi+1, pi+1,Γi+1), we require that there exists (qi, a, b, d, qi+1) ∈ δ
such that:
• Γi(pi) = a and Γi+1(pi) = b, and for all j 6= pi Γi(j) = Γi+1(j)
• If d = 0, then pi+1 = pi − 1 if pi > 0, and pi+1 = 0 otherwise. If d = 1, then
pi+1 = pi + 1.
A run (σ0, ..., σm) is said to be accepting iff σm = (q, pm,Γm) for some q ∈ F . T
accepts an input w in at most m steps iff there is an accepting run of length at most
m.
We begin by describing the main ideas in the reduction. Given a turing machine
T and input w, we will construct a formula ϕT,w which is satisfiable iff T accepts w in
at most 2|w|−1 steps. We will use two principals A and B. The obligations on A will
keep track of time and the position of the tape. The obligations on B will ensure that
the next state that reads from the current postion obtains the appropriate alphabet.
Two counters are used t (for time with |w|+1 bits) and p (for position with |w| bits).
The states with time 0 ≤ t ≤ 2|w|−1 will ensure that the input is written at the start
of the tape, and blank symbols (6 b) are written to the right upto position 2|w| − 1.
The states with time 2|w| ≤ t ≤ 2|w|+1−1 will correspond to transitions of T . We will
then require the existence of a final state with 2|w| ≤ t ≤ 2|w|+1 − 1.
We now define the various parts. The first part is before the counters are started,
which is indicated by the falsity of r:
ϕT,w1 = saysl(A)(¬r ⇒ OA saysl(A)(r ⇒ (t = 0 ∧ p = 0)))
ϕT,w2 = saysl(A)(¬r ⇒
∧|w|−1
j=0 OB saysl(B)((r ∧ t = j) ⇒ wj))
ϕT,w3 = saysl(A)(¬r ⇒ OB saysl(B)((r ∧ (|w| ≤ t ≤ 2
|w| − 1)) ⇒6 b))
ϕT,w1 ensures that a state satisfying ¬r can only serve as a C6 witness w.r.t. A for
the first state in the run (with t = 0 and p = 0), analogous to the state s′ in Figure B.1.
214
ϕT,w2 ensures that at t = j in the run, the symbol wj is read for 0 ≤ j ≤ |w|−1. And,
ϕT,w3 ensures that the blank symbol is read at |w| ≤ t ≤ 2
|w| − 1. Next, we specify
the incrementation of the time counter during the run:
ϕT,w4 = saysl(A)(r ⇒ c+1(t, A, |w|+ 1))
The position of the read head is specified as follows:
ϕT,w5 = saysl(A)((r ∧ (t < 2
|w| − 1)) ⇒ c+1(p, A, |w|))
ϕT,w6 = saysl(A)(r ∧ (t = 2
|w| − 1) ⇒ OA saysl(A)((p = 0) ∧ q0))
ϕT,w7 = saysl(A)((r ∧ (t ≥ 2
|w|) ∧ ¬d ∧ (p = 0)) ⇒ OA saysl(A)(p = 0)))
ϕT,w8 = saysl(A)((r ∧ (t ≥ 2
|w|) ∧ ¬d ∧ (p 6= 0)) ⇒ c−1(p, A, |w|))
ϕT,w9 = saysl(A)((r ∧ (t ≥ 2
|w|) ∧ d) ⇒ c+1(p, A, |w|))
ϕT,w5 ensures that the position moves to the right for 0 ≤ t < 2
|w|−1. At t = 2|w|−1,
ϕT,w6 resets the read head position (p = 0) and state (q0), so that the actual run can
start at t = 2|w|. The atomic proposition d gives the direction in which the head will
move (¬d for left and d for right). ϕT,w7 ensures that moving to the left from position
0 leaves the position unchanged. ϕT,w8 and ϕ
T,w
9 do subtraction (resply., addition) on
moving to the left (resply., right).
We specify the reading and writing mechanism:
ϕT,w9 = saysl(A)(r ⇒ c>(t, B, |w| + 1))
ϕT,w10 = saysl(A)(r ⇒
∧|w|−1
j=0 b(pj , B) ∧ b(¬pj , B))
tr(q, a, b, v, q′) = q ∧ r ∧ (d = v) ∧ Ol(A) saysl(A) q
′ ∧OB saysl(B) b
notr = OA saysl(A) ⊥ ∧OB saysl(B) ⊥
ϕT,w11 = saysl(A)(r ∧ (t ≥ 2
|w|) ⇒
∨
(q,a,b,v,q′)∈δ tr(q, a, b, v, q
′) ∨ notr)
ϕT,w9 guesses the time at which the symbol currently written will be read. ϕ
T,w
10
ensures that the position of the read head is the same as the current time. ϕT,w11 we
specify that either (a) a transition is taken (tr(q, a, b, v, q′)), or (b) the (final) state
cannot be a C6 witness for another state (notr).
Finally, we require the uniqueness of state (ϕT,w12 ) and alphabet (ϕ
T,w
13 ), and the
presence of an accepting state (ϕT,w14 ):
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ϕT,w12 = saysl(A)(r ⇒
∨
q∈Q(q ∧
∧
q′∈Q−{q}¬q
′))
ϕT,w13 = saysl(A)(r ⇒
∨
a∈Σ(a ∧
∧
a′∈Σ−{a} ¬a
′))
ϕT,w14 = ¬ saysl(A) ¬(r ∧
∨
q∈F q ∧ (2
|w| ≤ t ≤ 2|w|+1 − 1)) ∧ saysl(B) ⊥
The conjunct saysl(B) ⊥ in ϕ
T,w
14 ensures that all states need to have C5 witnesses.
We can show the following:
Proposition B.11. Given T = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, F ) and input w, ϕ
T,w =
∧16
i=1 ϕ
T,w
i is
satisfiable iff T accepts w in at most 2|w| − 1 steps.
The proof follows straightforwardly from the construction.
B.5 Non-interference
We repeat the definition of reachable utterances, followed by a proof of the non-
interference theorem.
Definition 4.12 (Reachable Utterances). Given a set of utterances U and a formula
saysIdB ψ, U
∗
IdB
is the smallest set such that:
• If idB ∈ IdB and says{idB} ϕ ∈ U , says{idB} ϕ ∈ U
∗
IdB
• If says{idB} ϕ ∈ U
∗
IdB
and saysIdA ψ
′ is a subformula of ϕ, then U∗IdA ⊆ U
∗
IdB
Theorem 4.4 (Non-interference). Given a set of utterances U , for all saysIdB ψ ∈ L,
we have U ⊢ saysIdB ψ iff U
∗
IdB
⊢ saysIdB ψ
Proof. One direction follows easily using propositional reasoning, i.e., if U∗IdB ⊢ saysIdB ψ,
then U ⊢ saysIdB ψ, since U
∗
IdB
⊆ U .
For the other direction, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose U ⊢ saysIdB ψ, and
U∗IdB 6⊢ saysIdB ψ. So, φ = U
∗
IdB
∧¬ saysIdB ψ is satisfiable. LetM = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL,
δO) be a model of φ. Hence:
• There exists sφ ∈ S such that (M, sφ) |= φ for some sφ ∈ S, and
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• There exists s¬ψ ∈ δL(s, IdB) such that (M, s
¬ψ) |= ¬ψ
We will construct a new model M ′ with a state s∗ such that (M ′, s∗) |=
∧
U and
(M ′, s∗) |= ¬ saysIdB ψ. This would contradict the assumption that U ⊢ saysIdB ψ.
The main difficulty with the construction is that ψ may have a subformula saysIdC ψ
′
and a statement says{idC} ϕ ∈ U −U
∗
Id such that idC ∈ IdC . Thus, changing the truth
of says{idC} ϕ could result in a change in the truth of saysIdC ψ
′. Handling this case
makes the construction involved.
We construct a new model M ′ = (S ′, I ′Φ1, ..., I
′
Φn , δ
′
L, δ
′
O) as follows:
The states S ′: For each state s ∈ S, we assign a new state, denoted c(s), which is
to be understood as a copy of s. We assume that c(s) 6∈ S and c(s) = c(s′) iff s = s′.
Given S1 ⊆ S, c(S1) denotes the set of states such that c(s) ∈ c(S1) iff s ∈ S1. In
addition, we add two special states s∗ (at which the contradiction will be obtained)
and sW (which provides witnesses as needed for C5 and C6). As a result:
S ′ = S ∪ c(S) ∪ {s∗, sW}
Interpretation of Predicates: I ′Φ1 , ..., I
′
Φn is the same as IΦ1 , ..., IΦn with the copies
of states having the same assignment as the states in S. No predications hold at s∗
and sW .
Accessibility Relation δ′O: δ
′
O respects δO for s ∈ S. δ
′
O(c(s), A) = c(δO(s, A)), for
all A ∈ OP and c(s) ∈ c(S). In addition, δO(s
∗, A) = {s∗}, and δO(s
W , A) = {sW},
for all A ∈ OP .
Accessibility Relation δ′L: This is the main part of the construction. δ
′
L respects
δL for s ∈ S. For all A ∈ OP and IdA ⊆ l(A), δ
′
L(s
W , IdA) = S
′. We now describe
the construction for the other states, starting with some notation.
Given IdA ⊆ l(A), let Id
∗
A be the set such that for all idA ∈ IdA, idA ∈ Id
∗
A iff
idA ∈ IdB or there exists a subformula saysId′A ϕ ∈ U
∗
IdB
such that idA ∈ Id
′
A.
The state s∗- For all A ∈ O and IdA ⊆ l(A), we have the following cases:
• If Id∗A 6= IdA, then δ
′
L(s
∗, IdA) = ∅
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• Otherwise, δ′L(s
∗, IdA) = δL(s
φ, IdA) ∪ c(δL(s
φ, IdA)).
The first clause is used to ensure that (M ′, s∗) |= says{idA} ϕ for all says{idA} ϕ ∈
U−U∗IdB , since {idA}
∗ = ∅. The second clause adds both the states that are accessible
from sφ and their copies. The accessibility relations associated with a copy (c(s¬ψ))
will be modified in order to preserve C5.
The copies-For all C ∈ O, IdC ⊆ l(C), and c(s) ∈ c(S):
• If c(s) 6∈ δ′O(c(s
¬ψ), C) or Id∗A = IdA, then δ
′
L(c(s), IdC) = c(δL(s, IdC)).
• Otherwise, δ′L(c(s), IdC) = δL(s
φ, IdC) ∪ c(δL(s
φ, IdC)) ∪ c(δL(s, IdC)) ∪ {s
W}.
Note that the second clause does not affect the truth of any subformula in U∗IdB ,
and it ensures that there are witnesses as needed for C5 for the cases where δ′L(c(s
φ), IdA) =
∅.
Frame Constraints: We need to verify that the frame constraints hold in M ′. The
only difficulty is in showing that C5 holds at the copies and s∗. Fix A, C, IdA and
IdC . Given c(s) ∈ c(S), there are two cases:
• c(s) 6∈ δ′O(c(s
¬ψ), A) or Id∗A = IdA. By construction, δ
′
L(c(s), IdA) = c(δL(s, IdA)).
Consider c(s′) ∈ δ′L(c(s), IdA). Since C5 holds at s in M :
– s′ ∈ δL(s, IdC), in which case c(s
′) ∈ δ′L(c(s), IdC), or
– There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) (resply, by construction, c(s1) ∈ δL(c(s), IdA)),
such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, C) (resply, by construction, c(s2) ∈ δ
′
O(c(s1), C)),
we have s′ ∈ δL(s2, IdC) (resply, by construction, c(s
′) ∈ c(δL(s2, IdC)) ⊆
δ′L(c(s2), IdC)).
• c(s) ∈ δ′O(c(s
¬ψ), A) and Id∗A 6= IdA. By construction, s
W ∈ δL(c(s), IdA), and
δ′O(s
W , C) = {sW}. Since δ′L(c(s), IdA) ⊆ δ
′
L(s
W , IdC) = S
′, C5 is trivially
satisfied.
Next we consider the state s∗ for which there are three cases:
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1. Id∗A 6= IdA. δ
′
L(s
∗, IdA) = ∅ and C5 is vacuously satisfied.
2. Id∗A = IdA and Id
∗
C 6= IdC . For each c(s) ∈ δ
′
O(c(s
¬ψ), C), we have δ′L(s
∗, IdA) ⊆
δ′L(c(s), IdC), thereby satisfying C5.
3. Id∗A = IdA and Id
∗
C = IdC . In this case, C5 is satisfied because C5 holds in M
and the copies of states are isomorphic.
Establishing the contradiction: The following are established easily by induction:
(P1) For all s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ L, (M, s) |= ϕ iff (M ′, s) |= ϕ
(P2) For all s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ L such that for all subformulas saysIdA ϕ
′ of ϕ, Id∗A = IdA,
(M, s) |= ϕ iff (M ′, c(s)) |= ϕ.
We can now reason as follows:
1. (M ′, s∗) |=
∧
U∗IdB , since for all says{idA} ϕ ∈ U
∗
IdB
, for all s ∈ δ′L(s
φ, {idA}),
(M ′, s) |= ϕ (using (P1)), and for all c(s) ∈ δ′L(c(s
φ), {idA}), (M
′, c(s)) |= ϕ
(using (P2)).
2. (M ′, s∗) |= says{idA} ϕ, for all says{idA} ϕ ∈ U − U
∗
IdB
(by construction, since
{idA}
∗ 6= {idA} and δ
′
L(s
∗, {idA}) = ∅)
3. Hence, (M ′, s∗) |=
∧
U
4. (M ′, s∗) |= ¬ saysIdB ψ, since s
¬ψ ∈ δL(s
∗, IdB) and (M
′, s¬ψ) |= ¬ψ (using
(P1)).
The last two items contradict the assumption that U ⊢ saysIdB ψ.
B.6 Conformance
We repeat the definition of conformance, followed by a discussion of the proof of its
decidability:
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Definition 4.13 (Conformance). Given a state s with a set of objects O, a body
of regulation Reg, and {A,B} ⊆ OP , we say that A conforms to B w.r.t. the laws
IdB ⊆ l(B) and a fixed point (U,U
′) with U = U ′ iff for all propositional ϕ ∈ LϕA :
If (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OAϕ, then (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ
We now discuss the proof of decidability of conformance. Given a state S and
a fixed point (U,U ′), there are potentially infinitely many formulas ϕ ∈ LϕA such
that S |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OAϕ. For example, if there is some ϕ such that S |=(U,U ′)
saysIdB OAϕ, then for all ϕ
′ ∈ LϕA , we have (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OA(ϕ ∨ ϕ
′).
We will prove that it suffices to restrict attention to a single formula, which may be
understood as a prime implicant of all the obligations imposed on A via the laws IdB.
The proof relies on properties of the canonical model of a formula (Definition B.3).
We begin with some notation. Given φ ∈ L, let Mφ = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO) be the
canonical model of φ. Recall that each state ∆ ∈ S is a maximal consistent set of
subformulas of φ, i.e., ∆ ⊆ sub(φ). Given ∆ ∈ S and IdB ⊆ l(B), ∆IdB is the set
such that ϕ ∈ ∆IdB iff there exists Id
′
B ⊆ IdB such that saysId′B ϕ ∈ ∆. Similarly,
given ∆ ∈ S and A ∈ O, ∆A is the set such that ϕ ∈ ∆A iff OAϕ ∈ ∆.
We now establish some properties of maximal consistent sets that are useful in
the proof.
Proposition B.12. Given φ ∈ L, let Mφ = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO) be the canonical
model of φ. The following hold for all ϕ ∈ LϕA, ψ ∈ Lψ and ∆ ∈ S:
1. If for all ∆′ ∈ δ′L(∆, A), ∆
′ ⊢ ϕ, then ∆ ⊢ OAϕ
2. If for all ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdB), ∆
′ ⊢ ψ, then ∆ ⊢ saysIdB ψ
3. If ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ, then for all ∆
′ ∈ δL(∆, IdB), ∆
′
A ⊢ ϕ
Proof. For the first two items, we will need the following observation. Given Γ ⊆
sub(φ), let SΓ ⊆ S be the set such that ∆ ∈ SΓ iff Γ ⊆ ∆. Then, for all ϕ ∈ L:
(∗) Γ ⊢ ϕ iff for all ∆ ∈ SΓ, ∆ ⊢ ϕ.
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This follows using propositional reasoning, since S is the set of all maximal consistent
states w.r.t. sub(ϕ), and SΓ is the set of all maximal consistent sets containing Γ.
Item 1: Consider ϕ ∈ LϕA such that for all ∆
′ ∈ δ′L(∆, A), ∆
′ ⊢ ϕ. By construction,
δL(∆, A) = S∆A, and by (∗), ∆A ⊢ ϕ. Using R2, ⊢ OA(
∧
∆A ⇒ ϕ). Since ∆ ⊢
OA(
∧
∆A), using A2, ∆ ⊢ ϕ.
The proof of item 2 is similar.
Item 3: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists ϕ ∈ LϕA and ∆ ∈ S
such that ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ, and ∆
′
A 6⊢ ϕ for some ∆
′ ∈ δL(∆, IdB). So, there exists
a model M ′ = (S ′, I ′Φ1 , ..., I
′
Φn, δ
′
L, δ
′
O) and s
¬ϕ ∈ S ′ such that (M ′, s¬ϕ) |=
∧
∆′A and
(M ′, s¬ϕ) |= ¬ϕ. We construct a new model M ′′ = (S ′′, I ′′Φ1 , ..., I
′′
Φn, δ
′′
L, δ
′′
O) combining
Mφ and M
′ as follows:
• S ′′ = S ∪ S ′′. We assume that S and S ′′ are disjoint.
• The interpretation of predicates respects those in Mφ and M
′
• δ′′L respects the accessibility relations δL and δ
′
L
• δ′′O respects the accessibility relations δO and δ
′
O, except that:
δ′′O(∆
′, A) = δO(∆
′, A) ∪ {s¬ϕ}
The satisfaction of the constraints C3-C6 is immediate from the construction,
as the only modification is to δ′′O(∆
′, A). The following are established easily by
induction:
(1) For all s ∈ S ′, (M ′′, s) |= ψ iff (M ′, s) |= ψ
(2) For all ∆ ∈ S and ψ ∈ sub(
∧
U), (M ′′,∆) |= ψ iff ψ ∈ ∆
We can now reason as follows:
(3) (M ′′,∆) |=
∧
∆ (using (2))
(4) (M ′′, s¬ϕ) 6|= ϕ (using (1))
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(5) (M ′′,∆′) 6|= OAϕ (from (4) since s
¬ϕ ∈ δ′′O(∆
′, A))
(6) (M ′′,∆) 6|= saysIdB OAϕ (from (5) since ∆
′ ∈ δ′′L(∆, IdB))
(7) ∆ 6⊢ saysIdB OAϕ (from (3) and (6), by soundness)
Item (7) contradicts the assumption that ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ.
We are now ready to show that conformance checking is decidable:
Theorem 4.5 (Decidability of Conformance). Given a state S, a body of regulation
Reg, a fixed point (U,U ′) where U = U ′ and |U | is finite, principals {A,B} ⊆ O, and
identifiers IdB ⊆ l(B), there is a procedure to decide whether A conforms to B w.r.t.
the laws IdB.
Proof. First, we observe that for all ϕ ∈ LϕA , (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdB OAϕ iff U ⊢
saysIdB OAϕ (by definition). So, it suffices to check that for all ϕ ∈ LϕA , if U ⊢
saysIdB OAϕ, then (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ
The key idea is to show that there is a formula ϕU ∈ LϕA such that:
(P1) U ⊢ saysIdB OAϕU , and
(P2) For all ϕ ∈ LϕA such that U ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ, we have ⊢ ϕU ⇒ ϕ.
Assuming that such a ϕU exists, we can show the following:
• A conforms to B w.r.t. IdB iff (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU
If A conforms to B w.r.t. IdB, since U ⊢ saysIdB OAϕU , we have (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU .
For the other direction, we need the observation that for all φ ∈ LϕA , if ⊢ φ, then
(s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) φ. Note that this claim does not hold when U 6= U
′. When U = U ′,
the claim is easily verified by showing that the axioms A1-A3, A5, and A6 are valid
at s w.r.t. (U,U ′), and that the rules R1 and R2 preserved validity. Instances of
axiom schema A4 are not in LϕA .
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Now suppose that (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU . For all ϕ ∈ LϕA such that U ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ,
we have (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU ⇒ ϕ (using (B)). If (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU , then it follows
that (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ. Thus, if (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU , then A conforms to B w.r.t.
IdB. Since checking whether (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU is decidable, conformance checking
is decidable, provided that such a ϕU exists.
We now turn to the construction of ϕU . Let MU = (S, IΦ1 , ..., IΦn, δL, δO) be the
canonical model for
∧
U . Let SU = {∆1|∆1 ∈ S and U ⊆ ∆1}. We will now define a
formula ϕ∆ for each ∆ ∈ SU , and define ϕU as their disjunction:
ϕ∆ =
∨
∆′∈δL(∆,IdB)
∧
∆′A ϕU =
∨
∆∈SU
ϕ∆
We claim the following for all ∆ ∈ S:
(P3) ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ∆
(P4) For all ϕ ∈ L, if ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ, then ⊢ ϕ∆ ⇒ ϕ
Proof of (P3): Using propositional reasoning, for all ∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdB), for all ∆
′′ ∈
δO(∆
′, A), ∆′′ ⊢ ϕ∆. Hence, for all ∆
′ ∈ δL(∆, IdB), by Proposition B.12 Item 1, we
have ∆′ ⊢ OAϕ∆. And using, Proposition B.12 Item 2, ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ∆.
Proof of (P4): Suppose ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ. By Proposition B.12 Item 3, for all
∆′ ∈ δL(∆, IdB), ∆
′
A ⊢ ϕ. And, using propositional reasoning, ⊢ ϕ∆ ⇒ ϕ
Proof of (P1): Using (P3), for all ∆ ∈ SU , we have ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ∆. And,
by propositional reasoning, U ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ∆ (since SU is the set of all maximal
consistent sets containing U).
Proof of (P2): Using (P4), for all ϕ ∈ L, if U ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ, then ∆ ⊢ saysIdB OAϕ
for all ∆ ∈ SU . Hence, ⊢ ϕ∆ ⇒ ϕ for all ∆ ∈ SU , and by propositional reasoning,
⊢ ϕU ⇒ ϕ.
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B.7 Completeness of the Decision Procedure for
Chain Formulas
To establish completeness, it suffices to show the following:
Lemma B.3 (Completeness). Given a closed set ∆ and a formula ψ, if ∆ ⊢ ψ, then
∆ ⊲ ψ.
The rest of this section gives the proof. As before, we will show the contrapositive,
i.e., if ∆ 6⊲ ψ, then ∆ 6⊢ ψ. We begin with some notation. Given a set of formulas
∆, let ∆l(A) be the set such that ϕ ∈ ∆l(A) iff saysl(A) ϕ ∈ ∆. Similarly, let ∆A be
the set such that ϕ ∈ ∆A iff OAϕ ∈ ∆. For all PAϕ ∈ ∆, let ∆
ϕ
A = ∆A ∪ {ϕ}. And,
finally, X (∆, A) is the class of sets such that ∆′ ∈ X (∆, A) iff ∆′ = ∆A or ∆
′ = ∆ϕA
for some PAϕ ∈ ∆.
We mention some properties of closed sets, which are useful in establishing induc-
tive properties:
Proposition B.13. Given a closed set ∆:
• ∆l(A) is closed.
• For all ∆′ ∈ X (∆, A), ∆′ is closed.
Proof. ∆l(A) contains only formulas that are atomic, ⊥, or of the form OBϕ. Similarly,
for all ∆′ ∈ X (∆, A), ∆′ contains only formulas that are atomic, ⊥, or of the form
saysl(A) ϕ. In both cases Definition 4.16 is vacuously satisfied.
Completeness is a consequence of the following proposition:
Proposition B.14. Given a closed set ∆, if ∆ 6⊲ ψ, there exists a model M =
(S, π, δL, δO) and state ∆ ∈ S such that:
(M,∆) |=
∧
∆ and (M,∆) 6|= ψ
We say that B is permitted to speak in ∆, denoted pspeak(B,∆), if for all
XB saysl(B) ϕ ∈ ∆, we have ϕ ∈ ∆. We require that for all B ∈ OP :
224
M1 ∆ 6∈ δO(∆, B)
M2 If pspeak(B,∆), then for all s′ ∈ δO(∆, B) and C ∈ OP , ∆ ∈ δL(s
′, l(C)).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of ψ.
Case 1: If ψ = q is atomic (or false), we construct M = (S, π, δL, δO) as follows:
• S = {∆}
⋃
A∈OP
X (∆, A)
• For all atomic propositions p ∈ Φ, ∆ ∈ π(p) iff p ∈ ∆. In addition, for all p ∈ Φ,
A ∈ OP and ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, A), we have ∆′ ∈ π(p) iff p ∈ ∆′.
• For all B ∈ OP , δL(∆, l(B)) = ∅. For all B ∈ OP , ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, B):
– If pspeak(B,∆), then δL(∆
′, l(C)) = {∆} (for all C ∈ OP )
– Otherwise, δL(∆
′, l(C)) = ∅ (for all C ∈ OP )
• For all B ∈ OP , δO(∆, B) = X (∆, B). For all B ∈ OP and ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, B), we
have δO(∆
′, C) = S (for all C ∈ OP ).
It is easy to show that (M,∆) |=
∧
∆ and (M,∆) 6|= q. It may seem that the
construction is complex for the satisfaction of an atomic formula. However, this is
needed to ensure the additional properties M1 and M2. These properties are crucial
to satisfy the constraints C5 and C6 when ψ = saysl(A) φ (case 4 below).
Case 2: ψ = PAψ
′. Let X (∆, A) = {∆1, ...∆n}. Since ∆ 6⊲ ψ, we have ∆i 6⊲ ψ
′
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In addition, since ∆i is closed, by induction, there exists a model
M i = (Si, πi, δiL, δ
i
O) such that (M,∆i) |=
∧
∆i and (M,∆i) 6|= ψ
′. We construct a
new model M ′ = (S ′, π′, δ′L, δ
′
O) as follows:
• S ′ =
⋃
1≤i≤n S
i ∪ {∆} ∪ {∆B|B ∈ OP , B 6= A}.
• π′ respects the assignment in each of the models. For all p ∈ Φ, ∆ ∈ π(p) iff
p ∈ ∆. And, for all p ∈ Φ and B ∈ OP such that B 6= A, we have ∆B ∈ π(p)
iff p ∈ ∆′.
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• δ′L respects the relation in each of the models, except for ∆i ∈ S
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
for which we proceed as follows:
– If pspeak(A,∆), then δ′L(∆i, l(C)) = δL(∆i, l(C)) ∪ {∆} (for all C ∈ OP )
– Otherwise, δ′L(∆i, l(C)) = δL(∆i, l(C)) (for all C ∈ OP )
For the other states we proceed as in Case 1. For all B ∈ OP , δ
′
L(∆, l(B)) = ∅.
For all B ∈ OP such that B 6= A, ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, B):
– If pspeak(B,∆), then δ′L(∆
′, l(C)) = {∆} (for all C ∈ OP )
– Otherwise, δ′L(∆
′, l(C)) = ∅ (for all C ∈ OP )
• δ′O respects the relation in each of the models. For all B ∈ OP , δ
′
O(∆, B) =
X (∆, B). For all B ∈ OP such that B 6= A and ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, B), we have
δ′O(∆
′, C) = S ′ (for all C ∈ OP ).
The following can be shown by simultaneous induction on the structure of formulas:
• For all ϕ ∈ ∆, (M ′,∆) |= ϕ.
• For all B ∈ OP , ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, B) and ϕ ∈ ∆′, (M,∆′) |= ϕ.
• For all si ∈ Si and all chain formulas φ, if (M i, si) 6|= φ, then (M ′, si) 6|= φ
It follows that (M ′,∆) |=
∧
∆. In addition, (M ′,∆) |= OA¬ψ
′ since for all ∆′ ∈
δ′O(∆, A), we have (M
′,∆′) 6|= ψ′. Hence, (M ′,∆) 6|= PAψ
′.
Case 3: The case for ψ = OAψ
′ is similar to the one above, and we leave the details
to the reader.
Case 4:The final and most difficult case is for ψ = saysl(A) ψ
′. We begin with some
notation, followed by an example.
Let A = {A1, ..., An} be the set of principals such that Ai ∈ A iff Ai = A or there
is some subformula saysl(Ai) ϕ ∈ ∆. A
1 = A and An = An−1 ∪ (A×An−1) for n ≥ 2,
where An is the set of chains of principals of length less than or equal to n. The set
of chains A+ =
⋃
i≥1 A
i.
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Given a chain (An, ..., A1) ∈ A
+, we define the schema φ(An...A1) as follows:
φ(An...A1) = PAn saysl(AN ) ....PA1 saysl(A1) φ
Note that φ(A) = PA saysl(A) φ. The set of chains of φ is given by:
C(φ) = {φ}
⋃
σ∈A+
φ(σ)
. And, let Lψ(∆) be set of all ψ
′ ∈ Lψ such that ψ
′ is a subformula in ∆.
p(A3, A2, A1)
p(A2, A1)
p(A1)
not(p)
p(A3, A2, A1)
p(A2, A1)
p(A3, A2, A1)
p(A1)
p
A4 A3 A2 A1A4 A3 A2 A1A4 A3 A2 A1
l(A4), l(A3) l(A4)
l(A4)
l(A2) l(A1)
l(A1)
s3 s2 s1
l(A3) l(A2)l(A4)l(A3)l(A4)l(A4)
Figure B.2: Model to show that {saysl(A4) p(A3, A2, A1), saysl(A3) p(A1), saysl(A1) p} 6⊢
saysl(A4) p. The states s1, s2 and s3 demonstrate the satisfaction of C5 and C6.
Example: We now discuss an example to provide intuition for the construction. Let
∆ consist of the following formulas:
• saysl(A4) p(A3, A2, A1)
• saysl(A3) p(A1)
• saysl(A1) p
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Suppose we wish to show that ∆ 6⊢ saysl(A4) p. The closure of ∆ is given by ∆
∗ = ∆∪
{saysl(A3) p}. We need to construct a model M with state s such that (M, s) |=
∧
∆∗
and (M, s) 6|= saysl(A4) p. Hence, there needs to be a state s1 ∈ δL(s, l(A4)) such that:
• (M, s1) |= p(A3, A2, A1), and
• (M, s1) 6|= p
Figure B.2 shows such a model with a state s1. The difficulty comes in enforcing the
constraints C5 and C6. Intuitively, the constraint C5 says that if A permits B to say
p and A does not say p, then A needs to demonstrate this by taking B’s statements
as her own, and showing that p does not follow. On the other hand, if the permission
to B does not entail p, then it suffices for A to say what it is permitted to say. Thus,
we unroll the chain p(A3, A2, A1) until a further unrolling would entail p. This results
in:
• (M, s1) |= p(A2, A1), and
• (M, s1) |= p(A1)
Unrolling p(A1) further would result in p, giving us a contradiction. The process
of unrolling results in, for example, the loop from s1 to s
′ ∈ δO(s1, A3) and back to
s1 ∈ δL(s
′, l(A3)). However, since p(A1) is not unrolled, there is no loop from s1 to
s′ ∈ δO(s1, A1) and back to s1. As a result, to satisfy C5, we need to generate a
sibling which permits s1. For this we construct the state s2 (in Figure B.2) such that:
• (M, s2) |= p(A3, A2, A1), and
• (M, s2) 6|= p(A1)
Thus we can unroll p(A3, A2, A1) just once, so that (M, s2) |= p(A2, A1), but no
further. Hence, there is no loop from s2 to s
′ ∈ δO(s2, A2) and back to s2. However,
there is a connection from s2 to s
′ ∈ δO(s2, A1) to s1, and thus s2 permits s1. Similarly,
we need to generate a state s3 which permits s2.
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For a closed set ∆ such that ⊥ does not appear as a subformula, it can be shown
that the number of witnesses (e.g., the states s2 and s3 in Figure B.2) needed are
bounded by the length of the longest delegation chain. The presence of ⊥ makes
matters more difficult. For this case, we have not obtained a bound on the number
of witnesses needed. We do not know if it is polynomial in the size of ∆. The
construction that we give below generates a potentially infinite number of witnesses.
We are guaranteed (by decidability of the full logic) that there exists a finite model,
but it may be exponential in the size of ∆.
Witnesses: Given a closed set ∆ and φ ∈ Lψ, a witness is a tuple w = (φ
′, B,∆′, λ′),
where φ ∈ C(φ), B ∈ Op, ∆
′ ⊆ Lψ(∆), and λ
′ ⊆ OP , with the following restrictions.
λ′ is the smallest set such that:
• B ∈ λ′
• If C ∈ λ′, ∆ ⊲ saysl(C) φ
′(D), then D ∈ λ′
∆′ is defined as follows:
• If ∆ ⊲ saysl(C) φ
′ for some C ∈ λ′, then ∆′ = ∅.
• Otherwise, ∆′ = {ψ′|ψ′ ∈ Lψ(∆) and ψ
′ 6⊲ φ′}.
It is immediate that ∆′ is closed. We restrict attention to the set of witnesses where
∆′ 6= ∅:
W(φ) = {w|w = (φ′, B,∆′, λ′) and ∆′ 6= ∅}
We begin by establishing some properties of witnesses. For all w ∈ W(φ), such that
w = (φ′, D,∆′, λ′):
W1 For all B ∈ λ′, ∆l(B) ⊆ ∆
′
W2 For all B ∈ OP , pspeak(B,∆
′) iff ψ 6⊲ φ′ for all XB saysl(B) ψ ∈ ∆
′.
W3 For all B 6∈ λ′, if it is not the case that pspeak(B,∆′), then for all C ∈ λ′, there
exists w1 ∈ W(φ) such that:
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W3.1 w1 = (φ
′(B), C,∆′′, λ′′)
W3.2 For all XB saysl(B) ψ
′′ ∈ ∆′′, we have ψ′′ ∈ ∆′.
W4 For all B ∈ λ′, if it is not the case that pspeak(B,∆′), then there exists w1 ∈
W(φ) such that:
W4.1 w1 = (φ
′(B), B,∆′′, λ′′)
W4.2 For all XB saysl(B) ψ
′′ ∈ ∆′′, we have ψ′′ ∈ ∆′.
W1 and W2 follow easily from the definition of witnesses. For W3, we proceed by
contradiction. Suppose there is no w1 ∈ W(φ) which satisfies W3.1 and W3.2. Let
λ′′ be the smallest set such that:
• C ∈ λ′′
• If E ∈ λ′′, ∆ ⊲ saysl(E) φ
′(F,B), then F ∈ λ′′
It follows that ∆ ⊲ saysl(E) φ
′(B) for some E ∈ λ′ (otherwise w1 ∈ W(φ) giving us
a contradiction). Since ∆ is closed, a simple induction can be used to establish that
∆ ⊲ saysl(C) φ
′(B). This suffices to conclude that B ∈ λ′ giving us a contradiction.
The proof of W4 is similar.
Construction: We are now ready to construct the model. We are given a closed set
∆ and saysl(A) φ such that ∆ 6⊲ saysl(A) φ. Let w
φ = (φ,A,∆φ, λφ). Since ∆φ is closed,
by induction, there is a model Mw
φ
= (Sw
φ
, πw
φ
, δw
φ
L , δ
wφ
O ) such that (M
wφ, wφ) |=
∧
∆φ and (Mw
φ
, wφ) 6|= φ.
Note that the induction hypothesis cannot be applied to longer chains. However,
for all w ∈ W(φ) − {wφ} such that w = (φ′, B,∆′, λ′), we have ∆′ 6⊲ ⊥. Hence, by
induction, we can construct Mw = (Sw, πw, δwL , δ
w
O) such that (M
w, w) |=
∧
∆′.
We construct a new model M ′ = (S ′, π′, δ′L, δ
′
O) as follows:
• S ′ = Sw
φ ⋃
w∈W(φ)−{wφ} S
w ∪ {∆}
⋃
A∈OP
X (∆, A).
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• π′ respects the assignment in each of the models. For all atomic propositions
p ∈ Φ, ∆ ∈ π(p) iff p ∈ ∆. In addition, for all p ∈ Φ, A ∈ OP and ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, A),
we have ∆′ ∈ π(p) iff p ∈ ∆′.
• δ′L respects the relation in each of the models, except for the following cases.
Let w = (φ′, C,∆′, λ′) ∈ W(φ)−wφ. For all s ∈ δwO(w,B) and E ∈ OP , we have
s′ ∈ δ′L(s, l(E)) iff:
– s′ ∈ δwL (s, l(E)) or
– s′ = w1 for some w1 = (φ
′′, D,∆′′, λ′′) ∈ W(φ) such that:
∗ φ′ = φ′′(B)
∗ It is not the case that pspeak(B,∆′′), and
∗ C ∈ λ′′
For the remaining states, we proceed as follows. For all w ∈ W(φ), B ∈ OP ,
w ∈ δL(∆, l(B)) iff w = (φ
′, C,∆′, λ′) and B ∈ λ′. For all B ∈ OP such that
B 6= A, ∆′ ∈ X (∆, B):
– If pspeak(B,∆), then δ′L(∆
′, l(C)) = {∆} (for all C ∈ OP )
– Otherwise, δ′L(∆
′, l(C)) = ∅ (for all C ∈ OP )
• δ′O respects the relation in each of the models. For all B ∈ OP , δ
′
O(∆, B) =
X (∆, B). For all B ∈ OP such that B 6= A and ∆
′ ∈ X (∆, B), we have
δ′O(∆
′, C) = S (for all C ∈ OP ).
We need to verify that the frame constraints hold in M ′. The only non-trivial case
is to show that C5 and C6 hold at ∆. Consider w = (φ′, D,∆′, λ′) ∈ W(φ) with
C ∈ λ′. By construction, w ∈ δ′L(∆, l(C)). For all B ∈ OP , there are three cases:
• If B ∈ λ′, then w ∈ δ′L(∆, l(C)) and C5 is satisfied.
• If pspeak(B,∆′), then C5 is satisfied because M2 holds at w in Mw.
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• Otherwise, we proceed as follows. By W3, there exists w1 = (φ
′(B), C,∆′′, λ′′) ∈
W(φ) which satisfies W3.1 and W3.2. Since C ∈ λ′′, by construction, we
have w1 ∈ δ
′
L(∆, l(C)). In addition, by construction, for all s ∈ δ
′
O(w1, B),
w ∈ δ′L(s, l(B)). Hence, C5 is satisfied.
The proof of C6 is essentially identical, except that we use W4 instead of W3 in the
last case. A straightforward inductive argument can be used to show that (M ′,∆) |=
∧
∆ and (M ′,∆) 6|= saysl(A) φ. We omit the details.
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Appendix C
Computing ASTs: Proof
In this section, we discuss the NP-hardness of ordering or ranking siblings during the
computation of the AST. We assume the notation developed in Section 5.5.1. The
proof relies on the NP-completeness of the Acyclic Subgraph problem:
Theorem C.1 (Karp [80]). The following problem is NP-complete:
Input: A graph G = (V,E) and a constant k
Output: Yes, if there exists E ′ ⊆ E such that |E ′| ≥ k and G′ = (V,E ′) is acyclic
We now show that the decision version of the ranking problem is NP-complete:
Theorem 5.1. The following problem is NP-complete:
Input: A PPT τ , a preterminal p ∈ τ , probabilities P (oi ≫ oj|τ), and c ∈ [0, 1]
Output: Yes, if there is an ordering r such that P (r(p)|τ) ≥ c
Proof. The proof proceeds by reduction from Acyclic Subgraph. We are given a
graph G = (V,E) and a constant k. We construct a ppt τ with a single preterminal
p = V , i.e., the set of operators are the vertices in the graph. The probabilities are
defined as follows:
P (u≫ v|τ) =














0.5 if (u, v) ∈ E, (v, u) ∈ E
0.6 if (u, v) ∈ E, (v, u) 6∈ E
0.4 if (u, v) 6∈ E, (v, u) ∈ E
0.5 otherwise
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We will now build up to the definition of the constant c. Let E1 ⊆ E be a set such
that (u, v) ∈ E1 iff (u, v) ∈ E and (v, u) ∈ E. E1 is symmetric, i.e., (u, v) ∈ E1
iff (v, u) ∈ E1. Suppose G
′ = (V,E ′) is an acyclic subgraph of G. We claim that
there is an acyclic subgraph G′′ = (V,E ′′) such that E ′ ⊆ E ′′ and for each edge
(u, v) ∈ E1, either (u, v) ∈ E
′′ or (v, u) ∈ E ′′. The construction is straight forward.
Given G′ = (V,E ′), let (v1, ..., v|V |) be a topological sort of G
′. We construct E ′′ such
that (vi, vj) ∈ E
′′ iff (vi, vj) ∈ E
′ or (vi, vj) ∈ E1 and i < j.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can consider acyclic subgraphs G′ = (V,E ′)
such that |E ′ ∩ E1| =
|E1|
2
. In other words, subgraphs which contain (u, v) ∈ E ′ or
(v, u) ∈ E ′, for each edge (u, v) ∈ E1. The pairwise orderings imposed by a ranking
will correspond to the following – (1) the number of edges in E ′∩E1, (2) the number
of edges in E ′ −E1, and (3) the number of non-edges (corresponding to the last case
in the definition of the probabilites). We define three constants k1, k2, and k3 for
each of these cases:
k1 =
|E1|
2
k2 = k − k1
k3 =


|V |
2

− k
Note that |E ′| = k1 + k2 = k. Finally, we define the constant c:
c = 0.5k1 × 0.6k2 × 0.5k3
We claim that G has an acyclic subgraph of size k iff there is a ranking r such that
P (r(p)|τ) ≥ c. Suppose G′ = (V,E ′) is an acyclic subgraph of G, and |E ′| ≥ k. Let
(v1, ..., v|V |) be a topological sort of G
′. The ranking r which respects the topological
sort order has probability c. Next, suppose (v1, ..., v|V |) is a ranking with probability
c. We define the set E ′ ⊆ E such that (vi, vj) ∈ E
′ iff i < j, i.e., only edges from
a vertex of lower rank to higher rank. It is immediate from the definition of c that
|E ′| = k, i.e., k1 edges with probability 0.5 and k2 = (k − k1) edges with probability
0.6.
234
Bibliography
[1] M. Abadi. Logic in access control. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Logic
in Computer Science, 2003.
[2] M. Abadi. Access control in a core calculus of dependency. Electronic notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, 172:5–31, 2007.
[3] M. Abadi, M. Burrows, B. Lampson, and G. Plotkin. A calculus for access
control in distributed systems. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages
and Systems, 15(4):706–734, 1993.
[4] A. Abrahams. Developing and Executing Electronic Commerce Applications
with Occurrences. PhD thesis, Univeristy of Cambridge, 2002.
[5] C. Alchourron and D. Makinson. Hierarchies of regulation and their logic. In
R. Hilpinen, editor, New Studies in Deontic Logic. 1981.
[6] R. J. Anderson. A security policy model for clincial information systems. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1996.
[7] C. Areces, P. Blackburn, and M. Marx. Hybrid logics: Characterization, in-
terpolation and complexity. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 66(3):977–1010,
2001.
[8] J. L. Austin. How to do things with words. Oxford University Press, 1962.
235
[9] F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. L. McGuinness, D. Nardi, and P. F. Patel-
Schneider, editors. The description logic handbook: theory, implementation,
and applications. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2003.
ISBN 0-521-78176-0.
[10] M. Backes, B. Pftizmann, and M. Schunter. A toolkit for managing enterprise
privacy policies. In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
2006.
[11] H. Barringer, A. Goldberg, K. Havelund, and K. Sen. Rule-based runtime
verification. In Proceedings of 5th International Conference on Verification,
Model Checking and Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI 2004), volume 2937 of
LNCS, pages 44–57, January 2004.
[12] A. Barth, A. Dutta, J. C. Mitchell, and H. Nissenbaum. Privacy and contextual
integrity: Framework and applications. In Proceedings IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, 2006.
[13] D. A. Basin, F. Klaedtke, S. Muller, and B. Pftizmann. Runtime monitoring of
metric first-order temporal properties. In FSTTCS, 2008.
[14] A. Bauer, M. Leucker, and C. Schallhart. Monitoring of real-time properties. In
Proceedings of the 26th Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and
Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS’06), volume 4337 of LNCS, December
2006.
[15] L. Bauer, S. Garriss, and M. K. Reiter. Distributed proving in access control
systems. In 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundation Symposium, 2007.
[16] M. Y. Becker, C. Fournet, and A. D. Gordon. Design and semantics of a decen-
tralized authorization language. In Computer Security Foundations Symposium,
2007.
236
[17] N. D. Belnap and P. Bartha. Marcus and the Problem of Nested Deontic Modal-
ities. In W. Sinnot-Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher, editors, Morality and
Belief: Festschrift in Honour of Ruth Barcan Marcus. 1995.
[18] T.J.M. Bench-Capon, G.O. Robinson, T.W. Routen, and M.J. Sergot. Logic
programming for large scale applications in law: A formalisation of supplemen-
tary benefit legislation. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on
AI and Law, 1987.
[19] J. Berant, Y. Gross, M. Mussel, B. Sandbank, E. Ruppin, and S. Edelman.
Boosting unsupervised grammar induction by splitting complex sentences on
function words. In Proceedings of the Boston University Conference on Lan-
guage Development, 2007.
[20] Y. Bertot and P. Casteran. An EATCS Series. Springer, 2004.
[21] E. Black, S. Abney, D. Flickenger, C. Gdaniec, R. Grishman, P. Harri-
son, D. Hindle, R. Ingria, F. Jelinek, J. Klavans, M. Liberman, M. Marcus,
S. Roukos, B. Santorini, and T. Strzalkowski. A procedure for quantitatively
comparing the syntactic coverage of english grammars. In Proceedings of the
Fourth DARPA Speech and Natural Language Workshop, 1991.
[22] J. Blitzer, R. McDonald, and F. Pereira. Domain adaptation with structural
correspondence learning. In Proceedings of the Conference on Empirical Meth-
ods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP), 2006.
[23] Guido Boella and Leendert van der Torre. Permissions and obligations in hier-
archical normative systems. In Proceedings of the 9th international conference
on AI and law, 2003.
[24] J. Bos, S. Clark, M. Steedman, J. R. Curran, and J. Hockenmaier. Wide-
coverage semantic representations from a CCG parser. In Proceedings of COL-
ING, 2004.
237
[25] Travis D. Breaux, Matthew W. Vail, and Annie I. Anton. Towards regulatory
compliance: Extracting rights and obligations to align requirements with regula-
tions. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Requirements Engineering
Conference, 2006.
[26] G. Brewka. Reasoning about priorities in default logic. In Proceedings of AAAI,
1994.
[27] B. R. Bryant. Object-oriented natural language requirements specification. In
ACSC 2000, The 23rd Australasian Computer Science Conference, Jan 2000.
[28] E. Charniak. A maximum entropy inspired parser. In Proceedings of NAACL,
2000.
[29] B. F. Chellas. Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press,
1980.
[30] R. Chisholm. Contrary-to-duty imperatives and deontic logic. Analysis, 24,
1963.
[31] T. Chklovski and P. Pantel. Verbocean: Mining the web for fine-grained se-
mantic verb relations. In Proceedings of EMNLP, 2004.
[32] P. Cimiano, A. Hotho, and S. Staab. Learning concept hierarchies from text cor-
pora using formal concept analysis. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,
24, 2005.
[33] A. Cirillo, R. Jagadeesan, C. Pitcher, and J. Riely. Do as I SaY! Program-
matic access control with explicit identities. In 20th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium, 2007.
[34] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D. A. Peled. Model Checking. The MIT Press,
1999.
238
[35] W. W. Cohen, R. E. Schapire, and Y. Singer. Learning to order things. Journal
of Artificial Intelligence Research, 10:243–270, 1998.
[36] M. Collins. Discriminative reranking for natural language parsing. In Proceed-
ings of ICML, 2000.
[37] M. Collins. Ranking algorithms for named-entity extraction: Boosting and the
voted perceptron. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Association for
Computational Linguistics (ACL), pages 7–12, 2002.
[38] R. Cooper. Quantification and Syntactic Theory. D. Reidel, 1983.
[39] A. Copestake, D. Flickinger, C. Pollard, and I. A. Sag. Minimal recursion
semantics: An introduction. Research on Language and Computation, 3:281–
332, 2005.
[40] Koby Crammer and Yoram Singer. Pranking with ranking. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 14, pages 641–647. MIT Press, 2001.
[41] D. Dahl, M. Bates, M. Brown, W. Fisher, K. Hunicke-Smith, D. Pallett, C. Pao,
A. Rudnicky, and E. Shriberg. Expanding the scope of the ATIS task: the
ATIS-3 corpus. In Proceedings of the ARPA HLT Workshop, 1994.
[42] N. Dinesh, A. Joshi, I. Lee, and O. Sokolsky. Checking traces for regulatory
conformance. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Runtime Verification, 2008.
[43] N. Dinesh, A. Joshi, I. Lee, and O. Sokolsky. A default temporal logic for
regulatory conformance checking. Technical Report MS-CIS-08-07, University
of Pennsylvania, Department of Computer Science, 2008.
[44] N. Dinesh, A. Joshi, I. Lee, and O. Sokolsky. Reasoning about conditions and
exceptions to laws in regulatory conformance checking. In Proceedings of the
Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, 2008.
239
[45] N. Dinesh, A. Joshi, I. Lee, and O. Sokolsky. Permission to speak: A logic
for access control and conformance. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Pro-
gramming, In Press, Corrected Proof:–, 2010. ISSN 1567-8326. doi: DOI:
10.1016/j.jlap.2009.12.002.
[46] C. Fellbaum, editor. WordNet. MIT Press, 1998.
[47] C. Fillmore. The case for case. In E. Bach and R. T. Hams, editors, Universals
in Linguistic Theory. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.
[48] K. Fine. In so many possible worlds. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 13:
516–20, 1972.
[49] M. Fitting. A Kripke/Kleene Semantics for logic programs. Journal of Logic
Programming, 2, 1985.
[50] D. Garg and M. Abadi. A modal deconstruction of access control logics. In
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Foundations of Software
Science and Computation Structures (FoSSaCS), 2008.
[51] D. Garg and F. Pfenning. Non-interference in constructive authorization logic.
In 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2006.
[52] P. Gastin and D. Oddoux. Fast LTL to Buchi automata translation. In Proceed-
ings of the International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2001.
[53] J. Gelati, G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, and G. Sartor. Normative autonomy
and normative co-ordination: Declarative power, representation, and mandate.
Artificial Intelligence and Law, 12(1-2), 2004.
[54] C. Giblin, A. Liu, S. Muller, B. Pfitzmann, and X. Zhou. Regulations Expressed
as Logical Models (REALM). In M.-F. Moens and P. Spyns, editors, Legal
Knowledge and Information Systems. 2005.
240
[55] J. Y. Girard. Linear logic. Theoretical Computer Science, 50(1):1–102, 1987.
[56] G. Governatori. Representing business contracts in rule ml. International Jour-
nal of Cooperative Information Systems, 14(2-3), 2005.
[57] G. Governatori and A. Rotolo. Logic of violations: A gentzen system for reason-
ing with contrary-to-duty obligations. Australasian Journal of Logic, 4, 2006.
[58] G. Governatori and A. Rotolo. Changing legal systems: Abrogation and an-
nulment. part i: Revision of defeasible theories. In Deontic Logic in Computer
Science, 2008.
[59] G. Governatori and A. Rotolo. Changing legal systems: Abrogation and annul-
ment. part ii: Temporalised defeasible logic. In Normative Multi Agent Systems,
2008.
[60] G. Governatori, Z. Milosevic, and S. Sadiq. Compliance checking between busi-
ness processes and business contracts. In 10th International Enterprise Dis-
tributed Object Computing Conference (EDOC), 2006.
[61] J. Grimshaw. Argument Structure. MIT Press, 1990.
[62] B. Grosof, Y. Labrou, and H. Y. Chan. A declarative approache to business
rules in contracts: Courteous logic programs in xml. In ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce, 1999.
[63] J. Halpern. Multi-agent only knowing. Journal of Logic and Compuation, 11
(1), 2001.
[64] J. Y. Halpern and R. van der Meyden. A Logic for SDSI’s Linked Local Named
Spaces. Journal of Computer Security, 9(1):47–74, 2001.
[65] Joseph Y. Halpern and Yoram Moses. A guide to completeness and complexity
for modal logics of knowledge and belief. Artif. Intell., 54(3):319–379, 1992.
ISSN 0004-3702.
241
[66] E. F. Harrington. Online ranking/collaborative filtering using the perceptron
algorithm. In Proceedings of ICML, pages 250–247, 2003.
[67] Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Black-
well, 1998.
[68] J. R. Hobbs and S. M. Shieber. An algorithm for generating quantifier scopings.
Computation Linguistics, 13(1-2):47–63, 1987.
[69] Wesley N Hohfeld. Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reason-
ing. Yale Law Journal, 23:16–59, 1913.
[70] J. F. Horty and N. D. Belnap. The Deliberative Stit: A Study of Action,
Omission, Ability, and Obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 29:109–136,
1995.
[71] G. Ioup. Some universals for quantifier scope. Syntax and Semantics, 4:37–58,
1975.
[72] R. Jackendoff. Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. MIT Press,
1972.
[73] A. J. I. Jones and M. J. Sergot. Deontic logic in the representation of law:
Towards a methodology. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 1, 1992.
[74] A. J. I. Jones and M. J. Sergot. Formal specification of security requirements
using the theory of normative positions. In European Symposium on Reasearch
in Computer Security (ESORICS), 1992.
[75] A. J. I. Jones and M. J. Sergot. A formal characterization of institutionalized
power. Journal of the IGPL, 4(3), 1996.
[76] A. Joshi. Tree adjoining grammars. In D. Dowty, L. Kartunnen, and A. Zwicky,
editors, Natural Language Parsing. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
242
[77] H. Kamp. Free choice permission. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 74:
57–74, 1973.
[78] H. Kamp and U. Reyle. From Discourse to Logic: Introduction to Model-
theoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic, and Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory. Kluwer Academic Press, 1993.
[79] S. Kanger. Law and logic. Theoria, 38, 1972.
[80] R. M. Karp. Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In R. E. Miller and
J. W. Thatcher, editors, Complexity of Computer Computations, pages 85–103.
Plenum Press, 1972.
[81] S. O. Kimbrough. On representation schemes for promising electronically. De-
cision Support Systems, 6(2), 1990.
[82] S. O. Kimbrough. Reasoning about objects and attitudes: Towards a disquo-
tation theory for representation of propositional content. In ICAIL, 2001.
[83] S. O. Kimbrough and R. M. Lee. On illocutionary logic as a telecommunications
technology. Journal of Electronic Commerce, 1(3), 1997.
[84] S. O. Kimbrough and S. A. Moore. On automated message processing in elec-
tronic commerce and work support systems. In ACM Transactions on Infor-
mation Systems, 1997.
[85] S. Kripke. Outline of a theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy, 72:690–716,
1975.
[86] S. A. Kripke. Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press, 1980.
[87] H. S. Kurtzman and M. C. MacDonald. Resolution of quantifier scope ambigu-
ities. Cognition, 48:243–279, 1993.
243
[88] Marcel Kyas, Cristian Prisacariu, and Gerardo Schneider. Run-time monitoring
of electronic contracts. In 6th International Symposium on Automated Technol-
ogy for Verification and Analysis (ATVA’08), 2008.
[89] G. Lakemeyer and H. Levesque. Towards an axiom system for default logic. In
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference, 2006.
[90] R. K. Larson. Quantifying to np. Manuscript, MIT, 1985.
[91] K. Van Lehn. Determining the scope of english quantifiers. Technical Report
AI-TR-483, AI Labs, MIT, 1978.
[92] M. Leucker and C. Schallhart. A brief account of runtime verification. Journal
of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 2009.
[93] N. Li, B. N. Grosof, and J. Feigenbaum. Delegation logic: a logic-based ap-
proach to distributed authorization. ACM Transactions on Information and
System Security, 6(1):128–171, 2003.
[94] O. Lichtenstein and A. Pnueli. Propositional temporal logics: Decidability and
completeness. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 8(1), 2000.
[95] L. Lindahl. Position and Change: A Study in Law and Logic. Synthese Library
112, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977.
[96] T. Liu. Learning to rank for information retrieval. Foundations and Trends in
Information Retrieval, 3(3), 2009.
[97] D. Makinson. General patterns in non-monotonic reasoning. In D. Gabbay,
C. Hogger, and J. Robinson, editors, Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence
and Logic Programming. 1994.
[98] D. Makinson and L. van der Torre. Input/output logics. Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 29:383–408, 2000.
244
[99] D. Makinson and L. van der Torre. Permissions from an input/output perspec-
tive. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 32(4), 2003.
[100] R. B. Marcus. Iterated deontic modalities. Mind, 75(300), 1966.
[101] M. J. May, C. A. Gunter, and I. Lee. Privacy apis: Access control techniques
to verify and analyse legal privacy policy. In Proceedings of the 19th IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW), 2006.
[102] R. May. The Grammar Of Quantification. PhD thesis, MIT, 1977.
[103] R. May. Logical Form: Its structure and derivation. MIT Press, 1985.
[104] A. McCallum. MALLET: A machine learning for language toolkit.
http://mallet.cs.umass.edu, 2002.
[105] L. T. McCarty. A language for legal discourse - i. basic features. In Proceedings
of ICAIL, 1989.
[106] L. T. McCarty and W. W. Cohen. The case for explicit exceptions. In Workshop
on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, 1990.
[107] R. McDonald. Discriminative Training and Spanning Tree Algorithms for De-
pendency Parsing. PhD thesis, Univeristy of Pennsylvania, 2006.
[108] R. McDonald, F. Pereira, K. Ribarov, and J. Hajic. Non-projective dependency
parsing using spanning tree algorithms. In Proceedings of HLT-EMNLP, 2005.
[109] J. B. Michael, V. L. Ong, and N. C. Rowe. Natural-language processing support
for developing policy-governed software systems. In 39th International Confer-
ence and Exhibition on Technology of Object-Oriented Languages and Systems,
pages 263–274, 2001.
[110] E. Miltsakaki, R. Prasad, A. Joshi, and B.Webber. The Penn Discourse Tree-
bank. In LREC, 2004.
245
[111] N. H. Minsky and D. Rozenshtein. System = program + users + law. In ICAIL,
pages 170–180, 1987.
[112] R. Montague. The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary english. In
J. Hintikka, J. Moravcsik, and P. Suppes, editors, Approaches to Natural Lan-
guages, pages 221–242. 1973.
[113] R. C. Moore. Semantical considerations on non-monotonic logic. Artificial
Intelligence, 25, 1985.
[114] D. B. Moran. Quantifier scoping in the SRI core language engine. In Proceedings
of the Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL),
1988.
[115] G. J. Myers, T. Badgett, T. M. Thomas, and C. Sandler. The Art of Software
Testing. John Wiley and Sons, 2004.
[116] K. Nigam, J. Lafferty, and A. McCallum. Using maximum entropy for text clas-
sification. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Machine Learning for Information
Filtering, pages 61–67, 1999.
[117] D. Nute. Defeasible logic. In Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and
Logic Programming, volume 3. 1987.
[118] S. P. Overmeyer, B. Lavoie, and O. Rambow. Conceputal modeling through
linguistic analysis using lida. In 23rd International conference on Software
Engineering, pages 401–410, 2001.
[119] M. Palmer, D. Gildea, and P. Kingsbury. The Proposition Bank: a corpus
annotated with semantic roles. Computational Linguistics, 31(1), 2005.
[120] B. Pang and L. Lee. Seeing stars: Exploiting class relationships for sentiment
categorization with respect to rating scales. In Proceedings of the Annual Meet-
246
ing of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL), pages 115–124,
2005.
[121] P. Pantel and M. Pennacchiotti. Espresso: Leveraging generic patterns for
automatically harvesting semantic relations. In Proceedings of COLING/ACL,
2006.
[122] Fernando C. N. Pereira, Naftali Tishby, and Lillian Lee. Distributional cluster-
ing of english words. In Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguis-
tics, pages 183–190, 1993.
[123] Henry Prakken and Marek Sergot. Contrary-to-duty obligations. Studia Logica,
57(1):91–115, 1996.
[124] T. Reinhart. Anaphora and Semantic Interpretation. Croom Helm, 1983.
[125] T. Reinhart. Quantifier scope: How labor is divided between qr and choice
functions. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1997.
[126] R. Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13, 1980.
[127] R. Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. In Readings in nonmonotonic reasoning,
pages 68–93. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA, 1987.
[128] U. Reyle. Dealing with ambiguities by underspecification: Construction, repre-
sentation, and deduction. Journal of Semantics, 10:123–179, 1993.
[129] M. Rooth and B. Partee. Conjunction and type ambiguity. In R. Bauerle,
C. Schwarze, and A. von Stechow, editors, Meaning, Use, and Interpretation of
Language, pages 361–383. 1982.
[130] A. Ross. Directives and Norms. Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1968.
[131] W. Rudin. Real and Complex Analysis. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987.
247
[132] W. S. Saba and J. Corriveau. A pragmatic treatment of quantification in natural
language. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
1997.
[133] J. Sadock. Speech acts. In L. R. Horn and G. Ward, editors, Handbook of
pragmatics, pages 53–73. 2004.
[134] G. Sartor. The structure of norm conditions and nonmonotonic reasoning in
law. In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Artificial intelligence
and law, pages 155–164, 1991.
[135] J. R. Searle. A classification of illocutionary acts. Language in Society, 5:1–23,
1976.
[136] M.J. Sergot, F.Sadri, R.A. Kowalski, F.Kriwaczek, P.Hammond, and H.T. Cory.
The british nationality act as a logic program. Communications of the ACM,
29(5):370–86, 1986.
[137] L. Shen and A. K. Joshi. An svm based voting algorithm with application to
parse reranking. In Proceedings of the Conference on Computational Natural
Language Learning (CoNLL), 2003.
[138] L. Shen, A. Sarkar, and F. J. Och. Discriminative reranking for machine trans-
lation. In Proceedings of HLT/NAACL, 2004.
[139] A. P. Sistla and E. M. Clarke. The complexity of propositional linear temporal
logic. ACM, 32:733–49, 1985.
[140] P. Srinivasan and A. Yates. Quantifier scope disambiguation using extracted
pragmatic knowledge: Preliminary results. In Proceedings of the Conference on
Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP), 2009.
[141] M. Steedman and J. Baldridge. Combinatory categorial grammars. In R. Bors-
ley and K. Borjars, editors, Non-Transformational Syntax. Blackwell, 2007.
248
[142] C. A. Thompson, R. J. Mooney, and L. R. Tang. Learning to parse natural
language database queries into logical form. In Proceedings of the Workshop on
Automata Induction, Grammatical Inference and Language Acquisition, 1997.
[143] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA). http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/, 1996.
[144] U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Code of Federal Regulations.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html.
[145] M. Vardi. The complexity of relational query languages. In STOC, 1982.
[146] Moshe Y. Vardi. Why is modal logic so robustly decidable? Technical Report
TR97-274, 12, 1997.
[147] G. H. von Wright. Deontic logic. Mind, 60:1–15, 1951.
[148] Y. Winter. Flexible Boolean Semantics: coordination, plurality and scope in
natural language. PhD thesis, Utrecht University, 1998.
[149] Y. W. Wong and R. J. Mooney. Learning synchronous grammars for semantic
parsing with lambda calculus. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the
Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL), 2007.
[150] L. S. Zettlemoyer and M. Collins. Learning to map sentences to logical form:
Structured classification with probabilistic categorial grammars. In Proceedings
of UAI, 2005.
[151] L. S. Zettlemoyer and M. Collins. Learning context-dependent mappings from
sentences to logical form. In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Associ-
ation for Computational Linguistics (ACL), 2009.
249
